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For some time before April 1977 1 had been studying environmental and develop-
ment issues in the North Sea. During this research I was told by both industry and govern-
ment agencies that blowouts of oil and gas wells in the area were "impossible today".
Thus, when the serious blowout occurred at the Bravo Platform, Ekofisk Field, in
the Norwegian sector on April 22, 1977, it was clearly an event of vital significance, not
only for those directly involved, but also for the work on which I was engaged. Since the
contacts and cooperation generated in my earlier work offered me a unique opportunity
to follow this event and its consequences within the Norwegian Government and the
North Sea oil industry, I did so. Those directly involved extended the cooperation required
and I was able to interview key persons in the Norwegian Action Command that had been
directly involved in responding to the Bravo blowout.
Less than six months later, on October 14, 1977, a second blowout occurred, this
time at the Maersk Explorer Platform off the coast of Denmark. Again, the necessary co-
operation was extended and I was able to interview the officials responsible in Denmark.
Under the aegis of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA),
a workshop on blowout management was organized, using these two incidents as the point
of departure for the discussion. Widespread interest was shown, and representatives of
both industry and government from the United Kingdom and Norway, as well as from
other North Sea countries, Canada, and the United States, attended the meeting. The
workshop was supported financially by IIASA and technically by the Norwegian Petro-
leum Society, this latter body being interested in promoting and disseminating practical
information and research results to its membership.
This volume started out as an account of the proceedings of the workshop. How-
ever, in addition (in Part One), I have myself contributed five chapters. Four of these give
an overview of the North Sea blowout problem, descriptions of each of the blowouts, and
the issues raised by the participants in the workshop. Furthermore, since the Three Mile
Island nuclear accident occurred while this book was being prepared for the press, I was
able to add a short chapter drawing attention to some striking parallels between the TMI
accident and the Bravo blowout.
Part Two of the book (Chapters 6-10) contains the papers that were presented at
the workshop. Several participants did not present formal papers but I considered it valu-
able to include outlines of their remarks, since they represent authoritative expressions of
the views of experts with significant relevant experience.
xii Preface
In this way, through the overviews in Part One and the expert statements based on
first-hand experience in Part Two, the book presents a major body of factual and evalua-
tive material on the North Sea blowout problem. It is written for persons with special
technical and managerial interests in the blowout problem, as well as for others who may
want an overview supported by a significant body of technical detail and authoritative
references. In addition, persons interested in technological hazards and associated manage-
ment issues should also find relevant material in this book.
Any success this effort may have achieved is due entirely to the many people who
supported it, including those interviewed and those contributing to and attending our
workshop. Hans-Christian Bugge, who was the Director of the Norwegian Action Com-
mand at Bravo, was a gracious friend throughout the course of the project: to him lowe a
sincere debt of appreciation. Others who gave their time include Dag Meier-Hansen,
Torvald Sande, Paul Hofseth, Bj¢>rn Myklatun, Peter Steen, and Tony Read; to all of these
men I say thanks. Rolfe Tomlinson at IIASA gave both this project and the overall disaster-
management research task his enthusiasm and support. Finally, Shari Howell at IIASA
acted as friend, secretary, and workshop coordinator, and I speak for all the workshop




In 1977 two major offshore blowouts occurred in the North Sea: an oil well in the
Norwegian sector on April 22 and a gas well in the Danish sector on October 14. These
two near-disastrous events signaled that such blowouts could no longer be dismissed. Up
to this time the occurrence of such events in the North Sea was seen as "impossible" by
both the oil industry and its regulators because of innovations in prevention technology
and the high safety requirements specified. Such optimism is not hard to understand
given the record of drilling operations in the North Sea that existed before these accidents
as noted by Cooper and Gaskell [1] in 1976:
"The North Sea, being the most inclement offshore oil area, has seen the greatest
development in safety measures for offshore work. Every year better blowout
preventers and automatic chokes to shut down wells in case of accident are
designed. Each accident is fully investigated to see where better codes of practice
can be devised."
Thus, the two major blowouts of 1977 were greeted with surprise and generated an aware-
ness of the need for even greater preventive and safety measures.
A blowout is the result ofa sudden uncontrolled release ofgas or gas-oil at extreme-
ly high pressure. This unexpected high-pressure release occurs at great velocity and the
large amounts of material evolved are at a high temperature. Hence, the risks ofexplosion,
fire, and widespread pollution are all present. Blowouts represent the potential loss of life
and equipment, as well as loss of the gas or gas-oil itself together with the associated
revenue and energy content.
Blowouts can occur on drilling into an unexpectedly high geological pressure zone,
from human error, equipment failure, or external causes such as collision or fire. The
possibility of a blowout exists at all drilling stages (whether for exploration or produc-
tion), during production, and during maintenance and inspection of the drilling and pro-
duction equipment.
This book describes the system within which the blowouts occurred and summa-
rizes post-I977 thinking by both the oil industry and its government regulators. It does
not attempt to find fault with either industry or government; nor does it provide a tech-
nical description of the two blowouts that occurred. Rather, it aims to place the blowouts
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in the larger framework of disaster management. This means that blowouts are viewed as
examples of an important man-technology interface with a potential for disastrous conse-
quences, thus demanding a broad range of management skills.
This is a particularly valuable means of viewing blowouts because of the general
overview it requires. Frequently, in both industry and government, a holistic view is
difficult to obtain. For example, in the present cases, various departments within firms,
various subcontractors, and several regulators were involved in the design, approval, con-
struction, operation, maintenance, and investigation of drilling and the production plat-
forms. Anyone group is so specialized that it is usually not competent to investigate the
overall process of introducing and operating an offshore platform. In addition, a group
organized to investigate a major accident such as a blowout often has difficulty in obtain-
ing the necessary overview through lack of specialized knowledge, severe time constraints,
and the fact that the investigation is limited to one incident only.
The potential for the occurrence of technological or man-induced disasters has
increased as the pace and scale of new technological operations have accelerated through-
out the world. The production of hazardous materials and the operation of hazardous
technologies in hazardous locations account for the growing interest and concern in miti-
gating or managing the effects of accidents. Research is increasingly being devoted to
studying technological hazards [2] .
Because many technological disasters are one-time events of low probability, they
are only briefly considered by the large numbers of workers, supervisors, regulators, users,
and third parties in the industry who are not directly involved with the accident. Even the
disastrous consequences of such low-probability disasters fail to maintain the active inter-
est of these groups in the long term. In addition, the behavior of the social groups directly
involved with or affected by disaster are not always common [3] .
A blowout is an example of a complex technological process that has gone out of
control in a hazardous environment; as such it shares many attributes of other technolog-
ical disasters. However, blowouts can induce changes in worker behavior, operational and
organizational conditions, technological safeguards, and recovery mechanisms because of
the immense financial value of oil and gas resources, to the operator and to the regulating
government. In addition, the regulator places stringent rules and liability conditions on
the operator, who is entirely in control of the offshore platform. These financial consid-
erations and controls act as strong inducements to implement advantageous changes in
operation techniques and technological development. Finally, social demands for govern-
ments to control the actual or potential oil pollution of shorelines also brings about
changes in operating conditions, not only on offshore platforms alone, but also in test
sites open for drilling, and this can even affect the overall environmental controls of
entire societies [4] .
Blowouts and other technological disasters share a number of attributes: they are
low-probability, high-consequence events; actual experiences are limited and discontin-
uous; they involve technologies with highly integrated subsystems; changes in technology
and transfers in manpower are frequent; a large number of operations and organizations
exist; and hazardous operating environments are involved. These attributes contribute to
the blowout potential associated with all offshore drilling and production platforms. Such
platforms are higWy complex entities with many individual wells being drilled, producing,
or being maintained at any particular time. Spacing is one of the most widely accepted
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means for reducing the consequences of technological disasters. Yet an offshore platform
is so compact and so many activities are carried out one upon another that such a spacing
program is impossible. This book does not attempt to provide an in-depth survey of off-
shore platforms; the interested general reader can find such a survey elsewhere [5]. Large
numbers of organizations are involved in constructing, operating, and maintaining plat-
forms. The myriad of subcontractors, subsubcontractors, and workers of different nation-
alities used at different stages can jeopardize safety because of different attitudes toward
risk and differing views of the overall system.
Two attributes of blowouts that are not shared with other technological disasters
are the uncertainties of environmental conditions and impacts. An offshore platform as
designed, constructed, towed, located, and operated is subject to uncertain environmental
forces, such as heavy storms with high winds and waves, deep waters, shifts in the seabed,
and high-pressure collapsible geological structures. These forces can cause the platform to
sink, collapse, corrode, and blow offlocation, thus generating blowouts via the sheared
wells. In addition, ships can collide with a platform in conditions of poor visibility or
because of bad seamanship or failures in radar and communications [6] . None of these
events is wholly predictable, and the year of 1977 showed that blowout risk could no
longer be ignored in the North Sea. Technological processes normally operate in known
environmental conditions, so that safe operation is more or less assured. Only space tech-
nologies appear to surpass offshore platforms in the number of unknowns that have to be
taken into account during design and operation. In this sense, it is a tribute to the oil
industry and its regulators that major offshore accidents have been so few.
The second attribute arises because of the uncertain long-term environmental effects
of spilled oil in the ocean and along the shore. The oil industry has frequently noted that
natural underwater seepages from undrilled offshore reservoirs release a much larger
amount of oil than has ever been evolved from a blowout [7] . Natural seepage is a con-
stant source of small, diffuse emissions over a wide area, while the impacts of a blowout
are sudden, massive, and highly concentrated at the source. Thus although the impact of
a blowout can affect the immediate marine environment, the extent of this influence is at
present unknown in the long term. Therefore, the upper limit of the cost of controlling
oil pollution from a blowout is also unknown. At present every effort is exerted to reduce
oil pollution, whether from tanker spills or blowouts. Inducements for this effort are the
indirect effects of blowouts, including political strain on the government, bad publicity
for oil industry, and public reaction, all of which can lead to conflict over oil-related pro-
jects elsewhere, even at a much later date [8].
From the foregoing it is clear that a blowout is a significant event. The two major
blowouts in the North Sea were without precedent at the time, and many of the lessons
learned have been incorporated in present practice. This book does not detail these
changes; rather, it seeks to give an overview of the blowout problem that will be useful in
assessing optimum response, regardless of specific changes in technology and operations.
This book is in two parts: the first offers an overview of the blowout problem; the
second supports this view by reports from the proceedings of the IIASA workshop on
blowouts. For good and obvious reasons, both the oil industry and its regulators empha-
size the prevention of blowouts. Because of this existing strong emphasis, attention will
be focused on the response required to a blowout once it has occurred. Responses of the
oil industry and government to actual blowouts are studied here, but only on the basis of
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the two cases studied in the North Sea. Therefore, this volume is not a complete study of
the blowout problem. For a more complete technical survey of blowouts in the North Sea
the interested reader is referred to Ref. 9.
The first three chapters give an overview of response to a blowout for the two cases
in the North Sea. The first chapter considers the general framework of blowout response
in qualitative terms. It outlines in a general way the stages of prevention, well control,
and pollution control, with alternatives, on the basis of decision trees. No attempt is made
to decide which branch of the decision tree is superior. Rather an overview is preferred in
order to provide a context for discussion of the two cases.
The second and third chapters describe the blowout responses in the Norwegian and
Danish sectors of the North Sea. Both of these countries are highly sophisticated techni-
cally and have strong and abiding interests in safety and antipollution measures. There-
fore, the actions taken by Norway and Denmark before, during, and immediately after
their blowouts are of general interest. The second chapter is devoted to the blowout in
the Norwegian sector, while the third describes the Danish-sector blowout and compares
it to the Norwegian-sector event.
A fourth chapter describes the experience gained from a very different type of acci-
dent - that at the Three Mile Island nuclear facility - where nevertheless many of the
same issues were raised. This chapter provides a comparative overview of the Ekofisk Bravo
and Three Mile Island accidents from an organizational standpoint in the hope of providing
a more coherent organizational form for managing future technological accidents.
The fifth chapter contains a summary of the main points in the papers presented
at the IIASA workshop and an overview of the issues emerging from the workshop discus-
sions. The participants were selected on the basis of nationality, employer, and their posi·
tion with respect to blowout-response systems. Norwegian and British oil-industry repre-
sentatives, regulators, and environmental experts were present and made major contribu-
tions to the meeting. In addition, US and Canadian government representatives added their
experiences as a contrast to the North Sea experiences. Finally, some other North Sea
countries also made contributions. The discussions were particularly valuable in highlighting
issues of importance in blowout response and the prevention of future blowouts.
The second part of the book (Chapters 6-10) contains the papers presented at the
workshop. In some cases, where no fonnal paper was presented, an outline is included based
upon the transcribed recordings of the statements. Each paper has been edited to reduce
its size and to emphasize specific points of view.
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Part One
Review of the Blowout Problem

91AN OVERVIEW OF THE NORTH SEA BLOWOUT PROBLEM
David W. Fischer
This chapter reviews the blowout problem associated with offshore platforms and
presents a general qualitative framework for the comprehensive management of such a
blowout. The prevention of blowouts, the control of wells, and the avoidance of pollu-
tion are considered, together with alternative strategies and problems that may be encoun-
tered. The importance of striking a balance between resources and risks is discussed as an
essential part of blowout management. Finally, the current position toward blowouts in
the UK and Norway is addressed briefly.
A GENERAL RESPONSE SYSTEM
The potential for blowouts in the North Sea is considered high enough by both
industry and government to justify the expenditure of a great deal of effort and money
on preventive measures [1]. One estimate showed that fire-fighting and safety cost about
five percent of the total cost of running a 32-well production platform in the North Sea,
a figure equal to the total drilling-equipment cost for the same platform [2]. [n 1975 the
total cost of constructing a production platform in the North Sea was US $100 225 mil-
lion [2]. Thus a production system is designed, constructed, and operated with safety in
mind.
One does not have to look far to understand the concern for platform safety: off-
shore production must cope with a hazardous and unfamiliar environment, extreme
weather conditions, high-pressure geological structures, a shifting seabed, a large number
of resident workers, and relative isolation. Given these difficult operating conditions it is
clear that operators must invest heavily in the most advanced techniques for sustained oil
and gas production, including blowout prevention. However, even the most sophisticated
technological system is subject to malfunction, as well as the effects of human error and
adverse external conditions. The operating conditions quoted provide a great challenge to
those charged with preventing or containing blowouts.
The measures necessary to prevent or control a blowout and to contain an oil slick
are shown in Figure 1.1. This generalized scheme shows the chain of successive stages in
blowout management from the initial prevention attempt to the final feedback of infor-
mation learned from the experience. After each unsuccessful stage, oil has escaped into




































FIGURE 1.1 General oil blowout responses and resources.
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the environment and will cause pollution and damage. The amount of oil escaping, with
the resulting environmental effects, can be inversely correlated with the resources allocated
to each stage to reduce such escape. A blowout program requires the allocation of resources
at each stage to prevent or control blowouts and to minimize pollution. Overconcentra-
tion of limited resources in a single area can result in uncontrolled release of oil into the
environment.
Figure 1.1 shows the general elements of a management system for blowouts. No
attempt is made in this figure to show the alternative measures available at each stage.
The elements of the system include: prevention of blowouts and rescue; well control; pol-
lution control; implications of resource and risk allocation; adverse events; and the feed-
back of lessons learned.
The prevention of blowouts is undoubtedly the key element in a management sys-
tem: prevention is obviously better than containment. Protection of life, of course, has
the highest priority when a well goes out of control. When personnel and platform safety
is assured, well control becomes of primary importance, since a blowout causes financial
loss and pollution, and has political and other economic repercussions. Pollution control
requires a major effort to mitigate the effects of oil discharge on both the surface and the
underlying water column of the sea. Measures to control the blowout and pollution must
be carried on simultaneously.
Resource and risk allocation are important elements because they determine the
state of readiness, response, and risk mitigation built into the operation to prevent blow-
outs and, in the event of an emergency, to contain the blowout and provide rescue and
antipollution measures. The financial resources available directly influence the amount of
research and development carried out, the introduction of the safest systems available,
failsafe mechanisms, standby equipment, and crew training and supervision. The effect of
overall resource allocation reduces the inherent risk but there is always some residual risk
in the system. A positive approach toward the allocation of resources to reduce risks and
an understanding of the implied residual risk at each stage of operation is important if an
overall balance in resource and risk allocation is to be achieved. Each offshore platform,
as well as each national sector of the North Sea, is subject to a risk that depends on the
explicit allocation of the resources made available for preventing and controlling blowouts
and their impact; this is so even if the allocation is made in an arbitrary way with no
understanding of the overall system and tradeoffs involved.
Adverse events are factors outside the planned functioning of the platform that
exacerbate the operating conditions. Indeed, such an adverse event may even cause the
blowout in the first place; for example, a sudden shift in the seabed or a marine collision
could cause the platform to move and shear the wells. Adverse events can also affect the
attempts made to rescue personnel, contain the blowout, and restrict pollution. Resource
allocation for blowout prevention and control must take account of the probability of
such events.
Feedback is the final important element of Figure 1.1. The experience gained is fed
into the system that prevents or responds to blowouts. Of course, resource allocation also
affects the degree to which such experience is utilized.
Risk and resource allocation can be a source of conflict. Typically, both the opera-
tor of the platform and the regulators view prevention of a blowout to be the prime
requirement. This approach is reasonable in that the number of near-blowouts vastly
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exceeds the number of actual blowouts. However, since the possibility of near-blowouts is
very large, preventive measures may exhaust the available resources. Hence practically no
resources may be available should a blowout actually occur or to combat other blowout-
related events. It is clear that a balanced approach to blowout management requires the
allocation ofresources to prevent such occurrences and to control un preventable blowouts.
Both of these responses need funds for research, development, design, construction, stock-
piling, and training. Resources spent on increasing safety are not reflected in the produc-
tivity of the platform and, in some instances, could even reduce it.
To attempt to eliminate blowouts by increasing preventive resources implies, since
the overall resources are obviously limited [3] : a decrease in the resources available to
combat un predicted accidents;a decrease in the resources available for productive effort-
for example, safety inspectors are substituted for production workers; an increase in the
risks of related industries that support, supply, or are otherwise connected with the activ-
ity; and an increase in product cost and a decrease in government revenue - preventive
measures may slow down production.
An overview often provides a perspective to assess the optimum balance between
the potential merits and demerits of a course of action. Excess resources are valuable but
can be easily squandered, especially by external pressures after an accident, into ad hoc
situations rather than developments based on overall safety considerations. Risk cannot
be decreased equally for all activities and, since ever-increasing safety measures are almost
always subject to a law of diminishing returns, the productivity of the system is adversely
affected.
At any point a decision maker can err by omission or commission. Error by omission
includes overlooking risk that could have been anticipated had more resources been avail-
able. This implies that resources should be available to cope with any unprevented event.
Error by commission is an attempt to anticipate all events by devoting resources to what
will never happen. This implies the inability to cope should an unexpected event occur.
Obviously, a continuum exists between these two types of error and the actual risk and
resource allocation for the system is largely dependent on a series of often disconnected
features. Figure 1.1 attempts to show an overall response system for blowouts in which
the necessity for achieving a balance between the stages is apparent.
The initial design for a balanced response system based on the framework shown in
Figure 1.1 is shown in Table 1.1. This table is a simple layout that can be used for the
initial planning and final risk and resource allocation for all the necessary responses to a
blowout. More detailed planning is necessary for each of the items noted, but this study
emphasizes the overview so that such details are not included here. Each column of Table
1.1 corresponds to the basic stages identified in Figure 1.1, while the rows list the key
questions to be answered for each stage in the system. The tabular form allows each stage
to be compared to other stages in order to detect risks within the system, and also allows
one to total and compare the resources and risks available at each stage with the expected
losses during that stage.
A detailed examination of the material needed to answer the questions in Table 1.1
will now be given.
1. What? Objectives for each of the stages are specified and compared, to deter-
mine the structure of the response system as a whole.
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Prevention Rescue and safety Well control Pollution control Recovery Lessons
aThis table was partly compiled from a mimeographed set of notes provided by the Norwegian Petro-
leum Society, Oslo, 1977.
2. Who? Organizations or participants are identified with each of the objectives
above and their known capabilities are compared.
3. When? Optimum tinting of the necessary measures is determined by considering
the coordination process.
4. What order? The precedence ofwhat is to be done and when can be determined
(the priorities) and can be used as the basis for later tradeoffs.
5. How? Actual procedures for accomplishing the above objectives are determined.
6. How else? Alternatives to the above procedures are predetermined, should the
planned procedures become unworkable.
7. With what? Resources required for carrying out the necessary procedures and
their alternatives are determined.
8. With whom? Other organizations and participants important to each stage are
determined and coordinated.
9. How long? The overall timeframe for each stage is computed for stockpiling and
deciding priorities.
10. What if? Adverse events that could occur and influence planned responses are
determined.
11. What then? Changes in planning necessitated by such adverse events are taken
into account for greater flexibility.
12. How much? The total cost of the resources necessary for each stage is estimated.
13. What losses? The total expected losses are computed for comparison with the
planned resource expenditure.
14. What risk? The residual risk remaining after the planned resource expenditure
is estimated.
Clearly, Table 1.1 is not a final representation of the necessary steps for achieving
an adequate overall response to blowouts, but it does contain the basic questions and
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stages that are important for ascertaining an overall management system. The table is
designed to show the allocation of resources to the overall risk connected with the blow-
out of wells. A basic premise is the need to balance resources and risks at each stage of
the response system. From this very general approach, alternatives can be considered for
the most important stages - blowout prevention, well control, and pollution control. Res-
cue procedures and personnel safety have been extensively considered elsewhere and so
will not be discussed here.
PREVENTING BLOWOUTS
Figure 1.2 shows measures that are involved in preventing a blowout. This figure is
modeled on the prevention system designed and used for the North Sea [4]. Since two
blowouts have subsequently occurred, it is obvious that these preventive measures are
inadequate. Although this book does not emphasize the preventive aspect, it is of interest
to discuss its usual extent and some associated problems.
A preventive system must begin with planning of each well, including a careful inter-
pretation of the geological strata to be penetrated. Such interpretations and predictions
are used to locate and design the well and draw up the drilling program. The drilling pro-
gram details the equipment to be used, the casing size and depths, the drilling-mud program
(quality and density of mud), and any specialized training necessary for the operators.
Operation of the well is based on effective supervision and continuous monitoring of the
drilling. Monitoring is done by lowering a device into the well to assess the drill bit as it
cuts, as well as by analyzing the cuttings and mud at the surface as they circulate back
from the drilling. Well maintenance is especially critical, since both the drill string and the
casings, which maintain the shape of the shaft, are removed. At this time the wellis unpro-
tected at the surface until the manually activated blowout preventer valve (BOP) is placed
on top of the open wellhead. Mud flow and density are of particular importance during
this period to maintain the pressure balance of the well. Finally, should the well pressure
go out of balance during drilling or maintenance, it is recommended that a valve be avail-
able, which can be activated automatically or manually, to shut down the well if the pres-
sure becomes too great to adjust the mud flow quickly.
The key to maintaining the required pressures in the well is effective drilling super-
vision, because the original drilling program may not be in accord with actual conditions
experienced at the well. The drilling supervisor bases his decisions on the monitoring of
results from samples received via the drill bit as it cuts through the strata and from the
recirculated drilling mud. The flow of fluid from the hole is a continuous indicator of
well balance, so that adjustments in mud density or drilling can take place immediately.
Needless to say, the physical presence of alert personnel with adequate offshore training
and experience are vital for effective drilling supervision. Drill-crew training is also impor-
tant if sudden abnormal conditions are to be dealt with quickly and correctly.
Organizational and personal factors in the drilling operation are also important. Per-
sonal attitudes to safety are paramount as attitudes directly influence behavior in both
routine and critical operations. The actions of individuals must be meshed in with those
of other individuals and also with complex moving equipment so that questions of organ-
ization are of great concern. One feature ofNorth Sea operations is the use of multinational


























































































































































































































16 D. W. Fischer
crews change shifts frequently and there is a constant interchange of contractors and sub-
contractors working on various aspects of drilling, each bringing with them different work
experiences from different rig designs. This pattern of work instability in a physically
confined space, and in the presence ofmoving equipment, high pressures, flammable hydro-
carbons, and often stormy weather conditions make organizational structure and integra-
tion crucial safety variables.
In the North Sea the international oil company style of operation comes into conflict
with the national style of operation, particularly in the Norwegian sector. International oil
companies have evolved a particular style ofoperation which views the various drilling and
support personnel as interchangeable parts, each having a detailed job description and
being regulated closely by a supervisor. In the Norwegian sector personnel are viewed in
the same way as other shore-based staff: each worker is seen as independent, with a con-
siderable degree of self-regulation. Also the international style of detailed job training
emphasizes rigid job demarcation and the separation of drilling from other functions
whereas Norwegian safety training suggests integration of these functions. These poten-
tially conflicting operational styles can create difficulties in emergency situations that
require a flexible response among different specialists with different backgrounds [Sa].
As a backup system to drilling supervision, BOPs are fitted. Two such BOP systems
are used in the North Sea: an automatic downhole safety valve located 50 meters under
the seabed after the well has been fully cased, and a manual system at the well-head. The
automatic BOP is designed to shut down the well immediately a sudden change of pressure
occurs. Although these valves were considered failsafe, the Norwegian blowout showed
that such a valve failed to function and indeed was itself blown out of the well. The indi-
vidual manual BOP is placed on top of the wellhead whenever the well is open, such as after
the drill string has been pulled during a well workover or maintenance program. The BOP
must always be in position, correctly assembled and maintained, and correctly connected
to the wellhead. Again, experience with the Norwegian blowout showed that such valves
may not work as planned during a well workover [5b]. As a result of this experience, the
Norwegians are considering the use of a third BOP between the sea surface and the seabed.
In addition to well planning and operation, the design and use of the offshore plat-
form itself are of the greatest importance. The unfamiliar and hazardous conditions in the
North Sea, the depths encountered, and economies of scale have led to the use of enor-
mous platforms that are each capable of drilling over 50 wells. This major innovation has
placed a significant burden on the shoulders of both the oil industry and its regulators in
regard to design and accident-response.
One teclmique that is employed in the design of these massive platforms is risk analy-
sis [6] , which is a method for estimating the failure probability of a system. Risk analysis
was originally developed for assessing military and space-travel programs and was later
applied to large technological equipment such as nuclear power plants: its use in the North
Sea is the first application by the oil industry. In this case, the technique was designed to
obtain an estimate of the risk involved in a platform design. The probability of failure of
each component of the platform was estimated by considering the probability and magni-
tude of factors that would adversely affect that component. For this purpose, not only
routine operations were taken into account, but also possible hazards to the components
from fire, storms, waves, dropped loads, etc. After modifying the design to mitigate the
effects of such hazards, the residual risk is calculated.
Ol'erview of North Sea blowout problem 17
The bases for a risk analysis are often fault trees, event trees, and consequence
analyses (for a review of these techniques, see ref. 7). Fault-tree analysis is deductive
since it begins with a definition of an "undesired event" and proceeds by identifying a set
of contributory events. The method provides a diagram, or fault tree that symbolizes the
relation between these events. Since this fault tree can be quantified, the frequency of the
undesired event can be assessed, and judgments made about the quantitative and/or quali-
tative importance of contributing events. For example, the causes of a malfunctioning
safety valve can be traced via a fault tree; these might include failure to detect a fire, a
change in pressure, or lack of maintenance.
The complement of the fault tree is the event tree. Whereas the logic of the fault
tree begins with an adverse event and works back to its causes, the logic of the event tree
works forward to the consequences of an initiating event. For example, a load dropped
onto a platform may damage a wellhead which in turn may generate a blowout. Conse-
quence analysis amasses the expected adverse consequences that would result from a com-
ponent failure.
Fault trees and event trees not only help the analyst to acquire a good understanding
of the system, but also provide a comprehensive documented account of the process. This
documentation is useful when reviewing the analysis at a later date. Thus, insights can be
gained into the basic design concepts, which gives an integrated picture of the operations
of the system. While these methods are helpful for preventing malfunctions and providing
a basis for preventive measures, there are many limitations [7,8] including the following:
the trees can mask other pathways to disaster that are unknown, ignored, incorrectly dis-
played, ordiscounted; the scope of an external adverse event or simultaneous set of events
can extend beyond the depicted trees and lead to disaster; tradeoffs among alternative
risks may be masked; and risk estimates assigned to each branch of the tree often vary.
Experts are often unable to determine missing pathways in trees or they assign proba-
bility estimates incorrectly. For example, the BOPs, which had been considered "failsafe"
by the oil industry, did not stem the blowout at Bravo. One interesting case where different
evaluations of risk and cost had to be reconciled was the suggestion by the Norwegian
authorities that crews be housed on a separate offshore platform. Thus, a tradeoff had to
be made between, say, the risk of helicopter transportation versus the risk of fire and
explosion. In the end, crew quarters were placed on the drilling platform but in a carefully
chosen location and with protected walls and escape routes.
Platforms are designed for safety as well as operating efficiency. At present, emphasis
is placed on enhancing the reliability of shutdown systems by using the best possible
design [9] . Problems remain in the overall design process, however, in that maintenance
of the platform over its operating life does not seem to have been adequately considered.
Nor has well capping been considered in the design oflarge, concrete, multiwell platforms.
In the design of North Sea platforms the effects of corrosion, the difficulties of under-
water inspection, and the costs of maintenance, including possible shutdown times, seem
to have been grossly underestimated [10J. Detection and measurement of structural
defects, including cracks and corrosion, by commercially available equipment proved
impossible in one underwater trial [10] . Both steel and concrete platforms are subject to
the problem of detecting and repairing structural defects, and maintenance is frequently
necessary long before the predicted date. Concrete is now being used to sheath wells,
making it nearly impossible to detect which well is out of control during a blowout. Thus,
corrosion protection on the platform hinders the blowout response.
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The height of the newest concrete platforms is greater than the height to which
fire vessels can spray fire-fighting material after a blowout. In addition, the wellheads on
these platforms are grouped together and covered to protect them from dropped objects;
this can hinder a capping operation. The height of the platform also retards capping
because a barge cannot be used as a working base.
Table 1.2 lists some important factors involved in determining the overall risk pro-
file of an offshore blowout. A thorough study of operations on the platform is important
before attempting to predict the occurrence of blowouts, their effects, and the necessary
response to such situations. Spill analysis can lead to an estimate of where and how in
the system blowouts can be expected, and what exacerbating events coulJ affect these
probabilities. Slick analysis suggests the kind of oil slick that will ensue, where its effects
can be expected. and under what conditions. Damage analysis considers the combined
effects of platform operating conditions. spill potential, and slick forecast. Integrating all
of these factors provides a risk proftle for the platform.
Although it is important to carry out as complete an analysis as possible, it must be
recognized that a risk proftle can never be considered as complete, Le., a risk profile is
itself subject to risk. The analyst, operator, and regulator must all be aware that it is not
possible to build all elements of risk into a proftle. At best a risk analysis is only an indi-
cator of risk.
The organization of the prevention task can meet with a conflict of interest depending
on which government agency has responsibility for safety. The two basic organizational
alternatives are to treat safety separately from operations or to amalgamate the responsi-
bilities in one body. The pressure of meeting national and industrial energy-production
objectives meets the pressure of ensuring adequate standards of safety in t>oth organiza-
tional forms; however, a separate safety body can bring safety-production tradeoffs into
the realm of public scrutiny more readily than a body that has operational responsibilities.
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































20 D, W. Fischer
Questions ofefficiency and conflicts of interest are at the core of this organizational prob-
lem. Norway has moved from a position where safety was the responsibility of a single
agency to one where it is split between agencies, while the United Kingdom has changed
from having safety as a separate responsibility to a new situation in which the functions
of offshore safety and operations are consolidated into one body.
WELL CONTROL
Should a blowout actually occur, the priority is to regain well control. Figure 1.3
outlines the various steps for attempting to do this, i.e., to obtain pressure control. The
first line of defense is the BOPs, the automatic subsea BOP, and the manual surface BOP.
Should these BOPs not operate, mud pumping must be stepped up;indeed, lllud pumping
begins as soon as well pressures begin to rise and before it is necessary to shut the manual
surface BOP. At the same time, a fire-prevention spray program begins to dampen the rig
and allow shutoff of all wells on the rig. Rescue of rig personnel also occurs at this point
so that the use of BOPs, pumping of drilling mud, other well shutdowns on the rig, fire
prevention, and personnel rescue all occur at approximately the same time.
After the rig has been ab'andoned because of a blowout, work must commence on a
capping operation. The capping effort can be carried out initially by the operator, but
usually outside experts are then called in. Either simultaneously with capping, as an alter-
native to capping, or if capping fails, a relief well is drilled near the uncontrolled well to
pump mud into the oil reservoir to regain pressure control. If this drilling effort fails, the
well will continue out of control until all of the oil and gas is dissipated.
Figure 1.3 lists the several steps of importance in attempting to regain well control.
Steps 1 through 7 occur nearly simultaneously, with platform personnel attempting to
gain control of the well before it blows. A fire at the wellhead fuses piping and can cause
failure of the subsea BOP. The functioning of the surface BOP depends on the watchful-
ness of the drilling supervisor and efficiency of the crew in closing off the well properly
and on pumping the right density of mud into the well to regain pressure. Normally, only
a fire or explosion would prevent an attempt to pump mud or activate the manual BOP.
In the Norwegian-sector blowout the BOP could not be activated because it was not in the
proper position (see Chapter 2). Complications include fire, explosion, and the necessity
to shut down other wells on the platform. Detection of the blowing well can also prove
difficult.
A blowing well may be controlled by four methods: (1) bridging - the well collapses
or becomes clogged because of materials in the structure; (2) capping -- the well is con-
trolled from the surface by mechanical means and muds; (3) relief well- a new well is
drilled into the structure to relieve pressure; and (4) emptying - the well completely emp-
ties the reservoir. These four methods contain two natural and two man-made possibilities.
Figure 1.3 does not include bridging or emptying as alternatives because it is assumed
that a blowing well will be brought under control as soon as possible. If natural bridging is
not expected, explosives can be used to induce artificial bridging. On the other hand, if
the structure is a small gas pocket in a sandstone structure and the well is isolated, it may
be decided to let it blow itself out. However, if bridging occurs, it is not known if the well
will remain clogged, so that normally a capping or relief-well operation will continue until
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the extent of bridging is known. At this point, if bridging is judged to be permanent, the
relief well can be reclassified as a production well.
If no fire is present at the blowing well, a capping operation is considered. For cap-
ping to be undertaken there must be little or no damage to the wellhead as well as an ade-
quate platform from which to assemble equipment and to work on the well. Often a barge
or drill ship is used for this work. Fire protection is of major importance and, should a
fire exist, it is paramount that it be extinguished before capping can be undertaken.
Capping consists first of closing the valves on the "Christmas tree" atop the well-
head. If this proves impossible, an attempt is made to pump heavy mud or cement into
the well. Should such pumping also be impossible, then a new shutdown valve must be
installed, such as a "blind" or "shearing" ram forced across the well opening by hydraulic
pumps. A newer technique for capping a well is called "crimp and plug"; this crimps the
well pipe so that injected steel and rubber balls can cut off the flow at the crimp. Then
the crimp is tightened and mud pumped into the well to kill the pressure [11].
Capping is complicated by high reservoir pressures, high blowout rates, large amounts
of gas, high temperatures, and complex platforms with poor access and working surfaces.
In addition, other hazards can be present, such as stormy weather, an underwater blow-
out, blowing sand, a gas vapor cloud, an explosion potential, a fire potential, a poisonous
gas cloud, and platform damage. Stormy weather inhibits the regaining of well control,
escape from the platform, and provision of a working platform (or barge) adjacent to the
blowing platform. An underwater blowout requires divers to crimp the well pipe. A sub-
sea blowout that leads to oil and gas escaping outside the well itself can result in cratering
and possible collapse of the geological structure, including the platform if it is anchored
to the seabed. Gas clouds can create explosions and poisonous gas clouds (H2 S) can kill.
Fire can cause explosions as well as generate additional blowouts and render escape and
capping impossible. Sand from the blowing well falling on the deck of the platform can
overload it, causing collapse.
Relief wells are the last major possibility for controlling the well. While this alterna-
tive is slower, it is thought to be the most effective way to bring a blOWing well under
control. One problem offshore is the scarcity of platforms available to be towed to the
site and the relatively long distances to be towed, including the possibility of stormy con-
ditions delaying the estimated arrival time. However, even a relief well can suffer a blowout
because of stress, lack of knowledge of the structure, or small gas pockets encountered en
route, hence flexibility in the drilling procedures is essential. Indeed, one source [12]
suggests that two relief wells should be drilled simultaneously: one into the casing "shoe"
of the last casing of the blowing well and the other into the reservoir at the foot of the
blowing well.
Should a major oil blowout from a large reservoir be involved, several relief wells
may have to be drilled, each with a large capacity for pumping mud, because of inaccura-
cies in drilling and measurement, which can lead to deviations as great as 40--60 meters.
This problem occurred with the Mexican Ixtoc blowout where the first few relief wells
missed their target zone. Possibilities of error in the North Sea, with the greater depths,
darkness, and inclement weather, would appear more likely than those in the shallower,
lighter, and calmer Gulfof Mexico. However, well logging or recording is far more frequent
and strict in the North Sea than in the Gulf of Mexico.
In general, it takes 100 days for one relief well to be drilled to an average reservoir
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pumps for each relief well. The time needed to fmd such a barge or to convert another
vessel for pumping by installing the requisite pumps and control equipment must always
be kept in mind.
Relief drilling can be complicated by the water depths involved, as well as by stormy
conditions. Two types of platforms or rigs can be used and qualitative differences exist
between them. The jackup rig can be jacked up adjacent to the uncontrolled well, thereby
ensuring that it will relieve the blowout pressure. Its disadvantages include the requirements
for shallow depths, good weather, and a stable seabed for placement. The semisubmersible
rig overcomes these disadvantages but it has a disadvantage of its own - the long distance
from the blowing well where it is placed on site, which is such that the ability to relieve
reservoir pressure is more uncertain. Mooring the semisubmersible rig can also be a prob-
lem in stormy seas. Finally, stormy weather can present problems while these rigs are
being towed to their drilling sites.
POLLUTION CONTROL
While the well-control effort is under way, work must begin on combating the oil
that is spewing from the well during a blowout. The basic principle governing antipollu-
tion work is to capture or dissipate as much oil as possible near its source. Figure 1.4
shows the alternatives available: the first three, dispersing, containing, or destroying the
oil, require the intervention of the decision-maker, whereas the fourth, natural decompo-
sition, occurs continually. Destroying the oil slick is not possible in all cases because of
the difficulties inherent to this measure and its dependence on weather, location, concen-
tration of slick. and availability of materials. While burning is an acceptable method for
small platforms in the USA, the UK and Norway do not consider this option viable
because of the size and productivity of their platforms, the possibility of losing such a
huge offshore platform, and the possibility of additional blowouts from a multiwell rig.
The two basic pollution-control alternatives for major oil spills in the North Sea are
dispersal and containment. These alternatives work on completely different principles, so
that one method cannot be efficiently and effectively used if the other has been tried but
proved ineffective. Although dispersants can be applied at any time, they are most effec-
tive when the oil is fresh; therefore, a decision to attempt containment and capture of an
oil slick also rules out the most effective application of chemical dispersants. According
to Norwegian officials, the main disadvantage associated with dispersants is their possible
impact on the marine environment. Factors to be considered are the time of year, the state
of fish migration, eggs, and larvae, the weather forecast, and the direction of currents.
The wide use of dispersants in the UK sector is based on the advantages of rapid deploy-
ment, reasonable effectiveness under all navigable weather conditions, the relatively low
capital cost, and the ease of use by even untrained operators.
Tests carried out in the UK to contain and capture oil at sea found the equipment
to be ineffective under most conditions to be expected in UK waters. Mechanical opera-
tions are difficult to mount, and ineffective under moderately bad weather conditions;
they have high capital costs and require trained operators. Even though these disadvan-
tages exist, mechanical systems continue to be ofinterest because of their advantages [13]
of "removal of pollution potential, no ecological consequences, claimed high and sustained
recovery rates and relatively low operating costs." Although no ecological effects can be
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directly attributed to the use of mechanical equipment, should such equipment fail to
retrieve the oil, pollution of coasts and other sensitive habitats and danger to marine spe-
cies can result.
Spill size and location, as well as wind and current direction, are the crucial factors
in deciding which of the two basic alternatives to employ. These factors are important,
even if the general principle of using only one of the alternatives has been established.
Shore protection is important because the coastal zone is the area of greatest poten-
tial ecological damage. Also, the cost of shore cleanup after the oil reaches the coastline is
very high because of the amount of labor required. Therefore, the emphasis must be on
dealing with the oil slick before it reaches coastal waters. The key ecological tradeoff is
oil on the shore versus chemicals in the sea.
Sequencing of these alternatives is necessary. Directly around the source of the oil
blowout chemical dispersal is essential to help remove the fire hazard to the offshore plat-
form. At sea either dispersants or containment can be used, while barriers, containment,
and cleanup are required inshore.
Deploying chemicals is not complicated, but measures are necessary to ensure the
correct use of the designated chemical agent and proportion of mixing water, and the cor-
rect concentration of spray per unit area. If used correctly, the chemicals do disperse the
oil from the sea surface down into the water column. Therefore, dispersant activity speeds
dilution and supplements the natural decomposition process. In general, the rougher the
sea, the faster will the oil slick be dissipated naturally. Thus, a balance exists since, if the
weather is too rough for spray vessels to put to sea, then natural decomposition occurs
more quickly.
Controversy over the use of chemical dispersants results from the misuse of such
sprays on the oil spilled from the tanker Torrey Canyon in 1967. Since that time disper-
sants have been improved and their toxic effects reduced to acceptable levels. Today dis-
persants are an important tool for combating oil spills, whether from tankers or blowouts
[14]. However, scientific agreement has not been reached about the short- and long-term
effects of low-toxicity dispersants [15] .
Deploying mechanical means to contain and collect the oil slick is difficult, even if
the equipment works as specified and tested. As noted in the next chapter, which describes
experiences with the mechanical pickup equipment at Bravo, the specifications provided
by manufacturers do not match actual performance. Assuming good performance, how-
ever, a major problem is in deploying so many vessels, booms, and skimmers. For example,
four boats could be required for every, say, 500 meters of boom: one at each end of the
boom, one to skim and collect the oil, and one to carry it away. If 10,000 meters of
booms are needed, the many vessels become exceedingly difficult to coordinate. Also
there are problems of matching designs in booms and skimmers and finding trained crews
and vessels capable of remaining in place in rough seas. Again, if the sea is too rough for
mechanical pickup to be employed, natural decomposition is enhanced as the oil slick is
broken up and mixed with seawater.
To capitalize on the ecological advantages of mechanical methods, research is con-
tinuing on more effective and efficient methods of pickup. Interest is now concentrated
on the possibility of using a single converted oil tanker as the means for containing, col-
lecting, and storing oil [16].
Because of the need to deploy limited mechanical means to areas ofgreatest pending
impact, interest has also focused on predicting the drift, spread, and weathering of oil
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External events are important in determining the appropriate responses for well and
pollution control. Table l.3lists the major events that are possible in North Sea blowouts.
Each of the adverse events listed is external to the system of planned responses to a blow-
out; however, these events are crucial in determining the success of the efforts made to
control the well and its pollution. Should a blowout occur in winter darkness under pro-
longed stormy conditions, little can be done to control and cleanup the flow of oil, even
if the amounts of oil exceed 10,000-15,000 tons per day for weeks. Also under such
conditions, towing and placing a relief rig is impossible, as is bringing a vessel or barge to
the platform for use in a capping and pumping operation. In addition, personnel rescue
is hampered. Finally, vessels assigned to oil cleanup are unable to operate in the area.
Therefore, weather forecasts are important to offshore drilling operations [18].
Fire-fighting is a major task associated with blowouts, but North Sea platforms are
so large and complex that this operation is difficult. For instance, a problem already men-
tioned is that existing fire-fighting vessels cannot be used against fires on the newest off-
shore platforms because the height of these platforms exceeds that of the water spray.
Collapse of a jackup rig following a shift in the seabed is possible [19]. Although
selsemisubmersib}eltforms are being increasingly used for drilling, they are still anchored
to the seabed. Of course, collision is a threat both during the towing operation and while
drilling or production is under way. Pilot error and faulty radar or guidance gear have been
contributing factors to the collision of some oil tankers in the North Sea and the English
Channel. For example, during a twelve-month period 26 registered violations by ships
occurred within the 500-meter safety zone established around the Norwegian Ekofisk
complex in the North Sea. One ship came within four meters of one of the legs of a
producing platform before being stopped, while the abandoned UK cargo ship Hero
nearly drifted into a pump platform at Ekofisk.
TABLE 1.3 Possible events influencing the responses to an offshore oil blowout.
Well control Pollution control
Blowouts from other wells on rig
Fire and explosion damage
Loss of rig in explosion
Loss of rig from collapse or collision
Casing ruptured below sea level
Blowout outside casing causing cratering
Subsea well blow away from rig
Rig blown off location
Prolonged stormy weather
Winter darkness
Towing and placement of relief rig
Location of blowing well near coast
Another blowout elsewhere in North Sea
Prolonged stormy weather
Strong inshore winds and currents
Winter temperatures increasing the brittleness of booms
Winter darkness
Migration times and routes
Spawning times and sites
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Simultaneous blowouts and oil spills are also a possibility: a blowout almost occurred
elsewhere in the Norwegian sector during the Bravo accident. Given the multiwell plat-
forms being used, this possibility is serious. In addition, an oil spill occurred in Danish
waters after Denmark had committed most of its cleanup equipment for use at the Nor-
wegian Bravo platform.
For a summary of 33 blowouts over the years 1970-1977 the reader is referred to
ref. 12. This report also describes key operations and external events that comprise blow-
out risk and response.
RECOVERY AND LESSONS
Recovery from a major blowout varies with the blowout concerned, but, in general,
recovery of production itself is not difficult. Production from other wells at Bravo com-
menced the day the blowout was controlled, and no pollution measures were necessary.
In Denmark the damaged exploratory well Vagn-l was shut down and another well was
drilled nearby. Again pollution was not an issue. If a rig is lost or severely damaged, recov-
ery ofthe drilling and/or production capacity takes longer. Pollution cleanup of oil-soaked
coastal areas, of course, adds to the recovery time.
Questions of liability are normally raised during the recovery stage. Because no com-
pletely satisfactory method of oil removal exists and because each North Sea country has
different interests, liability for blowouts remains at issue [20J. Three basic difficulties are
proof of liability, protection of interests, and adequacy of compensation [20] . The issue
of proof of liability revolves around the problem [20] of "what standard of care should
be required of a person engaged in socially desirable activities which, even though carried
out with the greatest care, because of their nature may still result in injury to someone?"
Considerations include who is most able to bear the loss, who can most easily pass the cost
on to others, and who owns and is responsible for the activity.
The issue of protection of interests concerns proof of loss of property. In other
words, a property loss directly linked to the activity in question, such as the loss of a fishing
net on an underwater obstruction put in place by an oil company must have been sustained.
One interesting problem posed by this issue is that oil companies are required to place
subsea well completions and abandoned wells below the surface of the seabed to avoid
contact with fishermen's nets. However, the response to a near-blowout from such a sunken
well in the Danish sector was inhibited by the position of the well. Had the well been
just above the surface and marked on fishing maps, both blowout response and fishermen
would have benefited. In the UK sector, wellheads stick out from the seabed, but they
are marked by buoys and supplemented by warnings to fishermen.
The last basic liability issue is concerned with the value of compensation. The North
Sea operators have created an insurance scheme, known as the Offshore Pollution liabil-
ity Agreement, which provides compensation for those harmed by operator-induced oil
pollution. This agreement was an interim measure until the North Sea states secured agree-
ment on a convention. At present these states have an agreement limiting liability from
the effects of oil operations to US $25 million, with a gradual increase to US $50 million.
If oil pollution from a blowout goes beyond national waters, a claimant has the option of
seeking reliefunder either international or national law, whichever gives the better protec-
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The lessons learned from a blowout are as important as arresting the blowout and
containing pollution. Adequate feedback channels must be created and maintained to
ensure that the resultant problems are recognized, evaluated, and incorporated into exist-
ing operations. Some methods for ensuring feedback are given below.
1. Creating a permanent coordinating committee for assessing emergency responses,
including offshore blowouts, and the actions of the emergency command group.
2. Requiring evaluations of the actions of all participants in a blowout response,
both from the individuals themselves and from independent experts.
3. Investigating the causes of a blowout by means of an independent quasilegal
review board.
4. Preparing state-of-the-art reviews and comparisons of actual operations before,
during, and after a blowout response.
S. Including political, news-media, environmental, scientific, and fishing interests
in assessments of blowout response.
6. Requiring that oil companies incorporate the experience gained into their
existing operations.
7. Providing adequate government and industry infrastructure, training schools,
testing sites, research funds, etc.
8. Generating realistic sanctions, together with frequent inspections, requiring the
immediate reporting by operators of malfunctions, and enforcing shutdowns
for violations.
The overall objective of these requirements is to reinforce the concept of operator
responsibility in blowout prevention. Such channels as these act as means for feedback
from past blowouts to current activities and help to ensure the basis of a safer management
system. A framework for such a feedback mechanism can be found in an earlier study [21] .
A danger in attempting to apply lessons learned (besides correctly ascertaining the lessons)
is that overreaction may result. Too onerous a set of requirements may be placed on the
operator or be beyond the capacity of the regulator to enforce. In addition, too many
resources may be channeled into prevention at the cost of the response system, or the lat-
ter may be emphasized at the expense of prevention or the actual damages sustained. For
example, it has yet to be demonstrated that damages from oil pollution on the high seas
can justify the resources consumed in combating such pollution there.
UK AND NORWEGIAN RESPONSES TO BLOWOUTS
Table 1.4 summarizes the current posture of Norway and the UK with regard to
blowouts. No attempt is made to compare these postures, as each country decides its
requirements according to its own position and assessment. A major trend, however, is
the growing awareness that a mutually agreed response is necessary to meet the blowout
and tanker-spill problems. United Kingdom and Norwegian interests have now met to
clarify issues under a bilateral agreement [22].
Both the UK and Norway hold to the principle that the oil industry itself is liable
for the costs of dealing with an incident, including overhead costs of cleanup and depre-
ciation on equipment [23] . The major difference is that the UK has a ceiling on liability,
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whereas Norway claims unlimited liability. Both countries also hold that the oil industry
is responsible for cleaning up oil spills offshore and that responsibility shifts to govern-
ment only when public interests are at risk through the inability of the operator to cope,
inadequate methods are used, or where oil escapes threaten the coast [23].
As time passes a combined but similar response to well and pollution control,
which maximizes flexibility and effectiveness, should emerge, even though the styles of
operation might differ as Norway has a more centralized governmental approach to blow-
outs than the UK. The two countries view the major threat in a significantly different
way: the UK is most concerned about major oil spills from tankers going round its coasts
to the Netherlands and West Germany, while Norway, which has a smaller offshore drilling
program than the UK and fewer tankers passing its coasts, is concerned about the exten-
sion of drilling in its northern waters where major fishing areas exist.
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2THE OIL AND GAS BLOWOUT AT BRAVO PLATFORM,EKOFISK FIELD, NORWEGIAN SECTOR*
David W. Fischer
On April 22, 1977, the offshore oil well B-14 went out of control in the Norwegian
sector of the North Sea. From this time until control was regained on April 30, a maximum
of 22,500 tons of oil escaped from the well [1]. Potential revenue from this oil was lost
for both the oil company that owned the well and the Norwegian government who owned
the subsea shelf; associated products and services also suffered loss, the marine environment
was damaged, and the costs of meeting the emergency itself and compensation claims of
injured parties had to be borne.
This chapter does not discuss the cause of the blowout, how it could have been pre-
vented, or its impacts. Rather it deals with the management of the crisis after the blowout
occurred. While analysts have directed attention to risk assessments of possible blowouts
[2] , they have devoted less effort to the management of such blowouts once they occur.
The strategies employed in an emergency can often reveal the priorities of the core actors
by their specific responses to specific situations. Indeed, not only are the priorities revealed,
but the selection of alternative courses of action can reveal the way the decision process
operated. Thus, this chapter outlines the roles of the actors involved, the alternatives seen
as feasible, and the decisions actually taken. Where possible, an evaluation of these deci-
sions is made.
THE ACCIDENT AT THE BRAVO PLATFORM
The blowout at the Bravo offshore well occurred while maintenance work was being
undertaken on a production well on a platform housing fourteen other wells. While the
automatic BOPs worked on these other wells, the well under maintenance went out of
control. The specific causes of this blowout were investigated by an independent commis-
sion set up by the Norwegian government; their report was submitted on October 10, 1977
[3]. Any combination of causes, including poor prediction of subsurface conditions, poor
well design, poor crew training, and ineffective supervision by company and government
"Parts of this chapter previously appeared in the journal Energy, Vol. 3, 1978, pp. 785 - 797.
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personnel, could have been involved [4]. However, at the Bravo site the underlying cause
of the blowout was found to be that the organizational and administrative systems were
inadequate [5].
Red Adair, the famed tamer of oil wells, is reported to have said, while he was in
Norway after visiting the well at Bravo, that he has tended more blowouts caused during
the repair and maintenance of production wells than during the drilling of exploration
wells. His statement was corroborated by the Bravo Commission Report [5] : "A well
workover is a major task that is performed comparatively rarely. Experience shows that
the blowout hazard is greater for such work than for any other work performed on the
field in the production phase." Such statements conflict with the generally held Norwegian
view that exploration wells have the highest blowout potential [6].
The blowout at Bravo consisted of a maximum of 2,830 tons of oil and 1,410 tons
of gas ejected every 24 hours for almost eight days [7]. No completely accurate measure
of these oil and gas losses is available. Foreign matter in the formation itself or in the
production pipe might have reduced the amount of oil and gas. Press reports at the time
of the incident reported figures varying from 4,000 to 7,000 tons of oil per day, which
exceeded the theoretical maximum quoted by the company; however, no bases were given
for such figures.
The mixture escaping, oflight consistency, was forced through the wellhead at near-
boiling temperature and under extraordinarily high pressure. The mixture shot above the
platform in the form of spray, and a portion of the oil evaporated before it contacted the
water surface. The gas, of course, was nearly entirely dissipated. As the oil sprayed out of
the wellhead it was mixed with water sprayed from a fire boat, to prevent the hot oil
from starting a fire or causing an explosion that could destroy the platform.
A brown oil slick formed on the waters surrounding the Bravo platform, 1-2 mm
thick. The mixing action of winds and waves, as well as water spray from the fire vessel,
caused emulsifying conditions to occur, and both the color and composition of the slick
changed. The Action Group assumed that half the blownout oil evaporated into the
atmosphere, while natural degradation of the remaining oil emulsions caused the slick to
disintegrate. The intermittent slick covered an area of approximately 4,000 square kilo-
meters with varying degrees of thickness and contamination of Norwegian waters, although
only a small portion reached the Danish sector. The slick did not move toward the coast
as initially feared, but remained downwind in the general vicinity of the blowout source
through the combined effects of winds and currents. The degree of movement of invisible
dissolved oil beyond this area is unknown. The rate of spread of the main slick was less
than one kilometer per hour. Observations from daily air flights showed that the slick was
almost stationary and would eventually completely disintegrate by natural weathering.
Only a few patches were expected to reach the Norwegian coast, the area of greatest
potential damage.
The blowout at Bravo was the first major blowout in the North Sea during nearly a
decade of drilling offshore. However, recent reports on blowout risk show that such occur-
rences must be expected in future. A study in the UK by the Department of the Environ-
ment notes that data available for the years 1964-1971 suggest that one blowout will
occur for every 455 wells drilled in the North Sea, but less than one-third of these blow-
outs will cause an oil outflow greater than 350 tons [8]. The study pointed out, however,
that four minor gas blowouts had already occurred during operation ofjust over 600 wells
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in the UK sector, which suggests that the predicted rate is too optimistic. Another study
for the UNEP Conference with the Petroleum Industry [9] noted that "accepting a risk
per well of 0.0333% (the same risk per well as in the Gulf of Mexico), there is a 50% chance
for a major incident after having drilled around 70 platforms." Finally, a Norwegian report
[10] notes an average of one oil-gas blowout per 500 offshore wells drilled and com-
ments that, with nearly 1,000 wells drilled in the North Sea, no blowouts have occurred.
In fact, the report goes on to imply that blowouts are not foreseen in that "There has
been no instance of a blowout in connection with the modern safety controls that are
mandatory on the Norwegian shelf."
Not only was the Bravo incident the first major oil blowout in the North Sea, but it
was also the first major oil loss in the Norwegian sector. Previous incidents had occurred
but were minor. Therefore, little experience had evolved in Norway for responding to
emergencies connected with large offshore oil spills. This lack of experience is not to say,
however, that Norway was not expecting such emergencies. It simply had not dealt with
the actual problems surrounding these offshore incidents.
PRINCIPLES ESTABLISHED BEFORE BRAYO
The government of Norway had established certain principles for dealing with emer-
gencies connected with offshore oil development in the North Sea before the Bravo inci-
dent [11]. They can be summarized under four headings:
I. Principles for the operator.
(a) The operator has the responsibility of meeting every situation that might
occur.
(b) The most advanced technology must be available at all times to meet
these situations.
(c) The operator carries unlimited liability for all damages and costs resulting
from these situations.
(d) The operator must have operational plans to meet all possible situations
should they arise.
2. Principles for the regulator.
(a) The regulator must give prior approval to operator plans and work proce-
dures through expert agencies coordinated by the Oil Directorate of the
Ministry of Industry and Crafts.
(b) Government to assume responsibility when the operator is deemed unable
to handle the situation or the risk of great damage is present.
(c) Regional emergency response centers to be created along the coast; costs to
municipalities in building up facilities to respond to emergencies, as a supple-
ment to operator efforts, to be subsidized.
3. Principles for well control.
(a) Prime emphasis to be on saving human life, e.g., ensuring the safety of
platform workers.
(b) Stopping the uncontrolled flow ofoil at the wellhead to be the main objec-
tive in combating a blowout.
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4. Principles/or pollution control.
(a) Operator to contain and capture the oil slick as near as possible to the source
of flow, i.e., to clear the oil in the open sea.
(b) Emphasis to be on mechanical means for stopping oil pollution rather than
chemical dispersants.
(c) Government to participate in research and development on such mechanical
means.
(d) National government to be responsible for protecting the coastline on a
cost-recovery basis from the operator.
The Bravo incident provided the first real test of the practicality of these principles. While
many of them seem obvious, some carry implications that a priori appear to affect the
adequacy of response by both operator and regulator.
The requirement that the operator assumes initial responsibility to meet every situa-
tion that might occur with the most advanced technological apparatus available is, in real-
ity, constrained by economics. The operator generates his own response system for meet-
ing this principle, governed in part by his financial position. Offshore operators therefore
rely primarily on prevention rather than on oil cleanup technology [12]. To minimize the
financial costs associated with oil loss is an objective that ranks in importance with the
removal of escaped oil from the sea. Both Statoil in Norway and British Petroleum in the
UK are involved in research on oil-spill cleanup technology.
A number of years ago the Norwegian government created and approved a coastal
response program and funded it at an adequate level for completion in the spring of 1978,
a year after the Bravo blowout occurred. The government also created a regulation in the
summer of 1976 that required the companies to develop mechanical pollution-control
equipment capable of handling a minimum of 8,000 tons of oil per day. Even though the
companies argued against this requirement on the basis of its impracticality, once the
regulation was approved the companies began the appropriate research and development
programs. This Norwegian posture has been instrumental to the development of new
pollution-control equipment for use in their sector of the North Sea, even though such
equipment was not ready for use at Bravo.
The principle of unlimited liability also carries with it an economic constraint, since
there must be some economic limit to operator liability. Operators insure against blowouts
by spreading the risk over several insurance companies who in turn spread their own risk
over still other insurance companies. Insurance companies have a risk limit of liability
based on their assessments of the risk involved and the governing laws. An agreement in
1976 limited liability for damages from each incident to US $25 million. Although Norway
recognizes this insurance limit, it does not recognize a limit on operator liability. At pre-
sent operators accept this limit, but nine European governments have now updated this
agreement by first raising the limit to US $35 million and then five years later to US $45
million [13].
Thus, in practice compensation for damage and cost recovery for the necessary
governmental cleanup operations are limited. Both government and the operator have a
vested interest in maintaining a flow of oil to obtain royalties, sales, and tax revenues.
Should recovery costs and uninsured damages be seen as too costly by the operator, the
economic incentive for remaining in a high-cost, high-risk oil field will be reduced. In
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addition, a government would not readily cancel production permits since it has a fman-
cial commitment to oil in the form of infrastructure and outstanding loans, so again opera-
tor liability is, in practice, limited. Further hypothetical limits to liability can be imposed
by the multinational oil firms changing the organization and fmancial base of their Nor-
wegian subsidiaries. Should a subsidiary become a separate company with a separate bud-
get, this budget and the company's assets form an absolute limit.
Thus, the government cannot assume there is no ceiling to the liability of operators
in its oilfields. In another sense, the final liability for damages from a blowout rests with
the owner of the seabed, in this case, the Norwegian government. Other countries sustaining
damages from a blowout in the Norwegian sector of the North Sea may have the right to
seek compensation from the Norwegian government itself or one of its national organiza-
tions.
The principle of maintaining the most advanced technological equipment available
is subject to economic constraints as well. At any time the operator can choose whether
to install existing equipment or to wait for a technological advance. However, the prin-
ciple gives no guidance to the operator on how to make this decision, although a penalty
seemingly accrues if a technique is chosen wrongly or too soon. The only basic guidance
available is from the manufacturers, who are prone to exaggerate the performance charac-
teristics of their own designs. For example, in the Bravo incident the skimmers used proved
less effective than their claimed capacities, which were determined under ideal conditions
that rarely exist in practice [13J. An operator has also to decide whether to undertake his
own research program on cleanup or to invest in a commercially available system for this
purpose. Once an operator has invested in a commercial system, he has no incentive to
continue research that might render his investment obsolete before its payout period.
The principle of not issuing an exploration and drilling permit to the operator until
he has formulated an approved plan for coping with emergencies needs discussion. Com-
pany emergency plans were approved in 1977 by the Oil Directorate of the then Ministry
of Industry and Crafts [14J. This approval was a condition for granting the exploration
and drilling license, the company emergency plan being part ofthe requirements for obtain-
ing the license. Although the Oil Directorate retains approval authority, it may coordinate
various aspects of the emergency plan with other government ministries and agencies as
appropriate. The company emergency plan must contain [14]: an organizational plan
defming the chain of command and areas of responsibility for possible emergencies; an
equipment plan for meeting particular emergencies, including details of the nature and
type of equipment, capacity, location, means of transport available, correct use of equip-
ment, place of use, etc.; an action plan for the initial alarm and communications systems,
notification ofauthorities, duties, when and how equipment is to be used, rules for reducing
danger, and for when action is to be terminated; and a training plan for platform person-
nel with appropriate drill procedures.
The overall operator plan submitted to meet these requirements is then split up and
coordinated: the pollution contingency plan with the Pollution Control Agency, the well-
control plan with the Oil Directorate, the equipment safety and rescue plan with the
Maritime Directorate, the personnel rescue plan with the Ministry of Justice (police), the
communication plan with the Telecommunication Administration, and so on. If anyone
of these agencies finds the emergency plan of the operator to be inadequate from their
point of view, the entire plan is rejected by the Oil Directorate. Overall well-program
36 D. W. Fischer
approval is coordinated by the Oil Directorate, while approval of the platform itself is
coordinated by the Maritime Directorate. Neither of these aspects can be considered before
the coordinated approval of the total package.
While the principle of an a priori emergency plan centered on government coordina-
tion and approval is important, the setting appears to limit its usefulness. Since the program
it tied to the issue of a drilling permit, considerable pressure can be exerted by both opera-
tor and government to speed up the process for economic reasons. Hence although the
operator cannot theoretically obtain a license without an approved emergency plan, in
practice financial pressures might win approval for a less-than-optimum emergency strategy.
Thus, a tendency can develop where predetermined investment schedules overshadow
items of seemingly lesser immediacy, such as an emergency plan for blowouts (particularly
if none has yet occurred, as was the case in the Norwegian sector).
This approval problem is still more acute when there is a lack of an effective means
for coping with a blowout and cleaning up oil pollution from it. As the Norwegian govern-
ment noted [14] before the Bravo incident:
"The operators have little equipment with which to meet a major blowout.
Under the existing rules the operators are required to have such equipment, but
the authorities have not yet imposed specific requirements ...".
"However it is clear that no mechanical means are available at present which
would be effective under the conditions of wind and sea prevailing in the areas
under consideration. Therefore requirements relating to dispersants must also
be imposed."
If a blowout should occur there would not be enough chemicals in the North
Sea area for effective oil spill treatment."
In view of these statements it was obvious to both operators and government that the
emergency plan was in reality a good intention rather than a practical system for control-
ling and cleaning up blowouts. Thus, it is not surprising that the emergency plans of off-
shore operators were inadequate and that this inadequacy was well known to the govern-
ment authorities. Indeed, it is possible that, since such plans were not capable of being
adequately carried out, they were not given strong credence in the drilling-permit or well-
program approval process. However, as noted earlier, the Norwegian government did
approve a set of specific requirements in the summer of 1976 for equipment, and gave the
operators one year to meet the requirements.
The principle of relying on mechanical means for responding to oil pollution on the
sea instead of cheaper, proven chemical dispersants was not well received by the oil com-
panies because of the greater possibility of damage liability, the greater expense involved,
the lack of evidence for the effectiveness of such mechanical systems, and the lack of
defmition of "best available." In addition, the UK preferred to use chemicals in its pro-
ducing sector of the North Sea. Nevertheless, the Norwegians still proposed to rely on
mechanical booms and skimmers to contain and capture an oil slick, even though these
measures were known to be inadequate in the open sea. Because of genuine operator
skepticism, little company research was done on mechanical methods of cleanup, although
British Petroleum in the UK had developed a skimmer for use on the high seas. Thus, the
Norwegian government was almost alone in preferring mechanical methods, which meant
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that it was committed to demonstrate their effectiveness, even though in theory the oper-
ators had to maintain the most advanced systems available for cleanup.
Government research was not carried out to any significant extent, although some
funds were allocated to private manufacturers for such research. No training program for
boom and skimmer operators existed as it did in the UK, even though the UK did not rely
primarily on these methods. Only limited funds were allocated to municipalities for pur-
chasing mechanical equipment to protect their shorelines. At the time of the Bravo inci-
dent, however, the Norwegian government and the oil companies had agreed on the design
of such equipment and orders had been placed by both government and the operators.
The underlying principle for responding to a possible oil blowout for both preven-
tion and control can be conveniently summarized: the Norwegian regulators rely on the
self-interest of the operator to handle the problem, i.e., they base much of their regulatory
activities on the operator's own supervision of his oil-exploration and production activi-
ties [15] . Such a system of supervision requires a good and contin uing knowledge of the
operator's supervisory capability and his plans for responses to expected and unexpected
events.
The discussion of these principles is designed to suggest the context in which the
Bravo incident occurred. The "criticism" implied in the discussion of these a priori prin-
ciples in no way applies to the responses to Bravo by the operator or the Norwegian
government.
ACTORS INVOLVED AT BRAVO
Any crisis brings about a coalition of what would normally be seen as a diverse and
disassociated set of actors. This was readily apparent in the Bravo incident; a system of
actors united only by the impact of the disaster responded to the crisis [16]. The Bravo
blowout not only brought diverse actors together temporarily to end the emergency, but
also threatened to curtail all future offshore oil development north of latitude 62° N in
Norwegian waters and to modify the regulations for such developments in the offshore
areas of other countries as well.
Figure 2.1 places the major actor groupings into a system that shows the contribution
of these groups in the overall response to the Bravo incident. The core actors are the
Action Group, which formed the key regulator, and Phillips Petroleum, the key operator.
The Action Group was an ad hoc body, it was not in existence prior to the blowout,
although it had been under active consideration for some time [17]. This Group was
created by the Environment Minister about six hours after the blowout occurred and it
was given the necessary ad hoc authority to commit the Norwegian government to what-
ever actions and expenses were deemed appropriate in responding to the Bravo crisis. If
feasible, major problems were to be presented to the Minister for decision. Four days
later, on April 26, a permanent Action Group was formalized by Royal Decree to main-
tain a quasipermanent response to such accidents.
The Action Group's composition was based on the assumed needs of the situation
at Bravo [17] : the State Pollution Control Authority to control oil pollution; the Oil
Directorate to control oil flow; the Navy to provide transportation and personnel; and the
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FIGURE 2.1 Actors involved in the response to the Bravo blowout.
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the State Pollution Control Authority, who reported directly to the Minister of the Envi-
ronment. A representative from Phillips Petroleum was appointed as liaison officer to the
Action Group, and two meetings were held per day between the Action Group and the
Directors of Phillips Petroleum Company, Norway. Had a tanker oil spill been involved,
the Marine Directorate rather than the Oil Directorate would have been used. Later a rep-
resentative from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who specialized in handling information
for the foreign press, was attached as a liaison officer.
The Action Group can be viewed in the role of a networker, that is, it facilitated effec-
tive operation at interfaces by making the linkages of the network more effective [18]. In
the present case, the network consisted of five different policy systems, three within
national government and one from local government; the Action Group formed the focal
point that represented all these systems. This reticulist group assessed the technological/
environmental situation at interfaces. Though, by definition, a reticulist does not have
decision-making authority, in this case the Ministry of the Environment granted the
Action Group a mandate to make rulings that could affect the policy of all the systems
represented. The judgments of this group were carried out through the appropriate organ-
izations; therefore, the Action Group formed the hub of the decision network.
The tasks assigned to the Action Group were to assist Phillips Petroleum to control
the oil flow at the well and to create a backup response for controlling and cleaning up oil
pollution from the well. The first task was under the direct supervision of the Oil Direc-
torate but was carried out by Phillips Petroleum who owned and operated the Bravo plat-
form. The Action Group had no direct responsibility for the operations at Bravo; rather
it surveyed and controlled the measures suggested by the operator [17] . The second task
came under the aegis of the State Pollution Control Authority; it involved alerting other
North Sea countries and coastal communities in Norway to possible impacts of the disas-
ter and overseeing the response by Phillips to capture and contain the oil slick before it
reached the coastline. This effort was also accomplished by direct supervision from a
supplementary ad hoc government containment activity that involved a variety of person-
nel, equipment, and vessels from many different areas.
The Navy provided a liaison officer for the commander at the scene of the Bravo
incident (himself also from the Navy) and also personnel and vessels for the oil-pollution
containment, as well as direct supervision for these operations.
The police representative was the first member of the Action Group to arrive at
the emergency rescue center, the base of the Group throughout its existence. His main
responsibility was to supervise the rescue of platform employees from Bravo and to ensure
that the Action Group had access to communications systems and other facilities. The
task of personnel rescue, however, had already been accomplished without loss of life
before the Action Group had assembled. This operation was carried out by Phillips imme-
diately the platform supervisor had confirmed the existence of an uncontrolled well.
In its lead role the Action Group initiated the involvement of a variety of actors in
the Bravo incident. Such actors were generally international experts, for reasons of both
practical necessity and the need to disseminate information. For example, the US became
involved because of its experience in such situations. The dissemination of information
centered around estimates of the movement and degradation of the oil slick and the extent
of actual or potential damages to marine organisms.
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Each major actor subsystem was represented in the response to Bravo. However, the
Fisheries Directorate was notably absent; this unit was given no direct authority in the
activities, although its Marine Research Institute was involved. No other actors were directly
involved in the Bravo incident, and none were considered necessary by the Director of the
Action Group. The Bravo blowout was a national crisis, so any rivalries were quickly set
aside in a cooperative spirit of national mobilization to meet any requirements it posed.
Indeed, if any complaint can be made, it would be that too many organizations were
involved in and with the Action Group.
Industry actors were not involved in the Bravo blowout except those of Phillips.
Offers of assistance from industries with expertise and equipment were rejected except
for a relief fire-fighting ship. (Such a rejection also occurred in the oil spill from the
tanker Amoco Cadiz off the coast of France.)
For assessing damages and predicting the extent and direction of the oil slick, the
Action Group relied on outside experts chosen solely from government research institutes
on the basis of their scientific reputations.
Exogenous or international involvement was based on the Bonn Treaty of 1969,
which requires a North Sea country that has had an oil spill in its waters to inform other
North Sea countries. In addition, the Action Group gave special attention to the UK, the
Nordic Community, and the USA. The UK Coast Guard was alerted and later the UK
Energy Minister flew to Norway to survey the situation and offer assistance if needed;
however, the main UK response was based on chemical dispersants and not on mechanical
containment, so that no compatible response system existed between the two countries.
Sweden offered assistance, which was accepted; the Swedish Coast Guard provided two
vessels, booms, and skimmers. Denmark, which was threatened by the expanding oil slick,
sent an observer to the Action Group, lent much of their oil-containment equipment, and
made several aerial surveys of the oil slick. In addition, a Danish vessel stayed near the oil
slick to combat it if necessary. American aid was to be in the form of air-transported
teams with skimming equipment and trained operators, but such equipment was only of
value in waves under five feet. Two US Coast Guard observers came to Norway to assess
the situation. No use was made of these US teams, because the oil flow was stopped
before a final decision had been made on US assistance.
The only uninvited actors attracted to the Bravo incident were foreign newsmen
and a Norwegian antipollution group hostile to further offshore oil development. The
involvement of this group was limited to an alternative press conference at the time of the
incident, although this did serve to focus the attention of foreign and Norwegian news
media on the larger issues that surrounded petroleum development; such issues were
drilling north of latitude 62° N and the effects of day-to-day operational oil pollution
from offshore platforms. The group had no direct interaction with the Action Group.
The foreign news representatives, who eventually totalled around 150, posed special
problems for the Action Group; their demands for information were incessant, and part
of the effort had to be diverted to satisfy this demand. However, representatives from the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs eventually assumed this liaison role. Problems included the
sheer number of reporters, the variety of information demanded, their ease of access to
the working area of the Action Group, their demands for up-to-date and background
information, their deadlines for presenting material, the fact that Norwegian reporters
often had access to information before it had been given to the Action Group (which also,
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incidentally, aroused criticism about the supposed withholding of information from foreign
reporters), and chartering of aircraft to view the Bravo blowout even though this could
have interfered with operations to control the well. This last problem was countered by
the creation of an air safety zone around the Bravo platform.
ALTERNATIVES FACING THE ACTION GROUP
Several key alternatives were open to the Action Group, including decisions of
timing. The first set of alternatives concerned organization of the Group in relation to
other governmental bodies, and to Phillips Petroleum. Figure 2.2 shows the Action Group
in relation to other important organizations associated with Bravo. As is readily seen, the
Action Group played a central and authoritative role in combating the oil blowout at
Bravo.
The Group checked plans formulated by Phillips to deal with the blowout and the
resulting pollution. Afterward Phillips was asked to prepare a new plan to meet additional
criteria put forward by the Action Group. This draft plan was prepared and presented to
the Oil Directorate, who checked the technical aspects of the draft. Then Phillips presented
this revised plan to the Action Group for approval. After the Oil Directorate confirmed
feasibility, final approval was given by the Group. Constant monitoring of Phillips' opera-
tions was also undertaken.
The Action Group also monitored Phillips' pollution-containment and well-control
efforts closely. A plan drawn up jointly by the Action Group and Phillips was used to
contain oil after implementation by the Navy who acted as the site supervisor. Finally,
the Action Group directed and coordinated government efforts to support the Bravo
operations.
The other role of the Action Group was coordination. This coordinating role allowed
Phillips Petroleum and the Oil Directorate to play more active parts in the response to the
blowout. Without this facility the government must, of necessity, have been more passive
in responding to initiatives from Phillips, and emphasis would have been on controlling
the blowout, a much smaller effort being put into pollution containment. Violation of
established government principles would also have been more possible.
The direct authoritative role taken by the Action Group stemmed from the estab-
lished principle that the government can take over the operation if it deems the risk of
great damage to be present [19]. Thus, the operator was aware that the government
could take over company operation at any time. Before the formation of the Action
Group, Phillips Petroleum was already engaged in personnel rescue, fire prevention, con-
trol of pollution by chemical dispersants, and assessment of well-capping possibilities.
The alternative strategies and resources available for blowout prevention, well and
pollution control, and cleanup were presented in Chapter 1. These alternatives were pre-
sented partly to show what options were available to the Action Group in their attempt
to control the Bravo blowout. However, another series of "alternatives" was important
in determining the appropriate responses, particularly for well and pollution control -
the adverse events that might have occurred at the Bravo blowout if a similar blowout
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FIGURE 2.3 Outline of major and minor decisions of the Action Group established to combat the
Bravo blowout.
While it would be interesting to construct a decision and event tree of the possi-
bilities, no adverse events actually took place during the Bravo blowout. In fact, in the
judgment of the Director of the Action Group, the response to Bravo had already reached
its practical limits. Had any combination of other events been present and coupled to the
responses chosen, far greater difficulties would have been experienced and damage would
have been more extensive. Clearly, the Bravo event in itself provided a valuable "training
exercise."
DECISIONS MADE AT BRAVO
The decisions made at Bravo were significant in that they established the pattern
of Norwegian responses to oil blowouts. Principles of operation were both established
and confirmed. The basic decisions listed in this section were provided by the Director
of the Action Group as well as by the preliminary report of this Group to the Minister
of the Environment. Figure 2.3 shows an outline of these decisions.
The first major decision was the appointment of the Action Group by the Minister
of the Environment, including the necessary authorization to make decisions in the name
of the Norwegian Government. This decision, of course, was basic to the entire operation.
The Prime Minister provided his personal backing to the Action Group and the Minister
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of Industry and the Minister of the Environment together gave their support. Thus, the
leading government representatives of the development and environment policy systems
were unified in responding to the crisis. The Director of the Action Group was also the
Director of the State Pollution Control Authority, so that the Group functioned under
the immediate direction of a representative from the environment policy system who, in
turn, reported directly to the Minister of the Environment. Therefore, although a union
was formed between government development and environmental core actors, the environ-
mental actors played the lead roles. The basic premise was that the Bravo blowout was a
national emergency that required a unified national response. This key decision on author-
ity and unity led to the formation of the ad hoc Action Group, which formed the basis of
the Bravo response. This initial decision was further corroborated by the Norwegian govern-
ment when it established the Action Group as a permanent body four days later [23].
The implication of this decision not only guaranteed a unified response by govern-
ment but also established a command relationship with Phillips Petroleum. Under previous
principles, the owner and operator of a platform was solely responsible for responding to
a blowout and for meeting any associated crisis. Phillips in theory was therefore obliged
to take whatever steps were necessary to stop the blowout and to restrict damage from it.
In addition, the company had to accept unlimited liability, including liability for such
actions taken by the government as it considered necessary. This liability position was
reconfirmed by the Action Group.
What had not been decided or known prior to Bravo was whether the operator or
government would take the lead role in responding to the crisis. All that had been known
a priori was that government could take over the management of the crisis if the situation
so demanded. No guidelines existed to define these circumstances. The government, in
accordance with this established principle, decided immediately to guide the overall oper-
ation and to direct Phillips' responses to the blowout. Thus, the company became sub-
ordinate to the government, even though it had to carry out the work and pay for the
entire operation.
Few problems were encountered between the Action Group and Phillips, as the
company accepted its subordinate role, its responsibility, and its open-ended liability.
Phillips' attitude toward the Action Group was described as "good." The quality of the
information flow from Phillips to the Action Group was well maintained through Phillips
liaison officer and twice-daily meetings with the Action Group. However, initial informa-
tion received from Phillips about the Bravo platform and the capping process was des-
cribed as "too vague." In addition, Phillips was seen as slow in informing officials about
the blowout in the first place.
The Action Group had the following tasks: to keep itself informed about events as
they happened; to evaluate Phillips' plans and actions; to create guidelines for the work
necessary; to give the necessary orders and concessions to Phillips; to decide who would
participate for the government; and to organize a staff to support the effort [23].
POLLUTION-CONTROL DECISIONS
The second major decision made was a result of the authority assumed by the Action
Group in relation to Phillips. This was that mechanical techniques rather than chemical
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dispersants were to be used to stop pollution. Much time was spent in discussing this issue.
It was fmally referred to the Minister of the Environment for fmal approval because of its
signal importance. The decision had implications about the scale of effort, and hence
about the expense necessary to combat pollution, as well as the increased risks ofoil reach-
ing the coastline owing to delay in getting mechanical devices in place and their unproven
operational feasibility. A precedent was also being established for future operations con-
nected with major oil spills. Political risk was involved as Norway has a strong political
commitment to its fisheries and fishing industry. A judgment of "no chemicals" gave con-
tinued political support for the established principle of mechanical containment. Reliance
on mechanical means is in accordance with the statement [24] that "present levels of
knowledge and experience do not truly allow a decision concerning dispersant use to be
based on scientific fact."
In its investigation ofPhillips ' plans and actions the Action Group found that the com-
pany had no mechanical equipment or trained personnel available, either offshore or in
Norway. In fact, Phillips had only chemicals available for meeting oil pollution from its
offshore platforms; the company was relying solely on chemicals to disperse oil pollution
[13]. This reliance on chemicals, however, was an interim measure until the company was
able to comply with government regulations passed in November 1976 to have available an
oil pollution cleanup capacity of8,000 tons per day. The blowout occurred during the peri-
od between government passing the regulation and implementation by the operators [13].
During the first twelve hours after the blowout, Phillips used chemicals freely in an
effort to disperse the oil. The company stopped only when ordered to do so by the Action
Group the day after the blowout [25]. Around the platform itself, however, permission
was given for the continued use of chemicals to disperse oil, which could be a fire hazard.
As a backup measure Phillips was allowed to bring supplies of chemicals and spray ves-
sels to the area for use if deemed necessary by the Action Group. Phillips requested
approval from the Action Group for combined use of mechanical methods and chemicals;
however, after discussion with scientists and other experts a ministerial decision was made
to prohibit the use of chemicals. Therefore, Norwegian offIcials judged that the impact of
potential coastal pollution would be less than the impact associated with the use of chem-
icals on the high seas.
Control over the chemicals actually used by Phillips proved to be difficult. Although
the company reported the use of only 55 tons of two types of chemicals in total, it was
not possible to check this figure, and for safety reasons no restrictions were placed on the
amount of chemicals used to disperse oil around the platform itself. Spraying at night
occurred, but it was claimed that no checks were possible.
Since the Action Group placed total reliance on mechanical methods, several lesser
decisions and efforts became important. They involved the accuracy of surveillance and
forecasting of decomposition and movement of the oil slick, the types of mechanical
equipment to be used in the attempt to collect the oil, and mobilization of coastal
protection resources.
Two flights were made daily to observe and photograph the oil slick. In addition,
naval vessels were dispatched to take charge of the collection effort and to report on decom-
position, spread, and movement of the oil slick. Phillips mounted its own aerial effort to
follow the development of the slick; an aircraft, while being traced on radar by a Navy
command vessel in the vicinity, followed the contours of the oil slick.
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A key problem in surveillance was the number of aircraft from other nations that
were monitoring the oil slick. In addition to Norwegian air surveillance, at anyone time
Swedish, Danish, West German, British, and NATO aircraft could be in the vicinity, each
plotting their own estimates of the slick's movement. Inevitably these estimates did not
agree, but, more importantly, air traffic control was complicated by the differences that
existed in the definition of a safe air zone, i.e., minimum offshore altitudes over platforms
and safety zones in Norway differ from those in the UK. Some interference of Norwegian
surveillance occurred because of the presence of foreign aircraft.
The gradual thinning, spreading, and breakUp of the slick into patches meant that a
greater surveillance effort had to be mounted to maintain the initial degree of accuracy.
The Action Group decided not to attempt to maintain this accuracy but to describe the
slick in more general terms. This decision was corroborated by the fact that no foreign
aircraft reported the slick beyond the area estimated by Norwegian sources. After the
blowout was stopped, a detailed air reconnaissance was made over the area assumed to
have been affected or reached by the slick. Only small oil patches were seen in some lim-
ited areas, so that no mechanical collection was deemed to be worthwhile. Larger areas
contained a thin mm that was decomposing naturally.
In addition to aircraft surveillance, a mathematical model was used to predict the
drift of the oil slick. The first version of this model was produced in April 1977, just a
few days before the Bravo blowout occurred. This blowout provided a test for the model
and daily computer runs were made and used by the Action Group in planning the cleanup
operations [26].
The next minor decision proved to be of considerable difficulty: what types of
booms and skimmers to employ. The mechanical equipment available in Norway for use
in coastal waters was flown to the Action Group's center of operations. Both company
and Norwegian aircraft and vessels were used to transport booms and skimmers to the site
of the operation. In addition, two Swedish Coast Guard vessels with booms and skimmers
were requested. Many other offers of equipment were received by the Action Group from
foreign sources. The group decided to reject these offers temporarily and use only the
equipment it knew best. Norway had already developed coastal protection booms that
had been tested in the open sea in good weather. Other equipment had been ordered but
never tested.
The greatest problem in using the equipment was the difference in performance
between that claimed by the manufacturer and that observed in actual use. The equip-
ment available had a combined total theoretical capacity of 7,000-8,000 tons of oil per
day, which exceeded the estimated flow of oil from the blowout. Only a part of this
equipment was initially employed, and it collected 20 tons of oil in its first day of use
[27] . Thereafter, the equipment was reported to be 25% effective under the most ideal
conditions. Other equipment rated at 4,000 tons per day collected only 100 tons per day.
Equipment used by Phillips with a quoted capacity of 1,800 tons per day was also only
25% effective. Four Vikoma skimmers developed in the UK by British Petroleum and
employed by Sweden each had a theoretical capacity of 300 tons per day but only col-
lected 60 tons in total during the time they were used [13]. The only skimmer that
approached its quoted capacity when operating in three-meter waves had been designed
and built in Norway but never tested prior to its actual use. In all, eight different types
of boom and three types of skimmers were tried.
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The emulsified oil collected by this equipment totaled 1,700 cubic meters and con-
tained 935 cubic meters of oil (about 800 tons) [1] . The greatest amount collected in a
single day was 800 cubic meters, while the least was 60 cubic meters. The total amount of
800 tons of collected pure oil is insignificant, of course, when compared with the 13,000
tons of oil which escaped into the water. Although waves were high and the weather bad
for efficient operation of booms and skimmers, storm conditions were not experienced;
most of the equipment simply failed to work in the open sea under less than ideal condi-
tions [13] .
Another problem with this equipment was the number of small units to be brought
together and deployed in an effective manner. Transport, booms, skimmers, and person-
nel had to be found and matched to form a unit capable of containing and collecting the
oil. Vessels suffered maintenance problems, some had insufficient crew, and some were too
underpowered to remain in place on high seas. Booms and skimmers of different design
were difficult to put into place and match. Insufficient numbers of effective booms and
skimmers were available for use even if conditions had been ideal. The slick was charac-
terized by patches of oil extending over an area of 1,500 square kilometers. Only 6,100
meters of boom were actually used to combat these oil patches or kept on standby.
Phillips ordered 2,000 meters of booms, but only 100 meters per day could be produced.
Finally, personnel were generally untrained in using such equipment. A training period is
essential if personnel are to use the equipment effectively. Differences of opinion exist
over whether the equipment was ineffective in itself or rendered ineffective through inad-
equately trained personnel. At present an assessment is under way to determine the effec-
tiveness of the equipment, vessels, and communications used [13].
Coastal-protection mobilization was necessary because of the major decision to
reject chemical dispersion of oil in favor of mechanical collection. The coastal commu-
nities were informed by the State Pollution Control Authority that an oil slick was
approaching the Norwegian coast. The Oslo center of the Agency acted to coordinate
community efforts to protect the shoreline. Communities were instructed to review their
resources, establish emergency plans, and specify areas to be protected. The government
also guaranteed to cover the expense of establishing emergency measures and participating
in the protection and cleanup operations. Reimbursement for the purchase of equipment
was, however, not guaranteed. This decision was made to stop various communities from
ordering and buying equipment and thus temporarily blocking the production of other
equipment mo~e urgently needed at sea.
It was initially assumed that the oil would reach the coast by April 26, although it
was not until May 2 that the entire coastal area liable to be affected was organized.
Communities were kept informed about the movement of the slick by the Action Group
via its Oslo office. County Governors were used as liaison officers. Emergency protection
areas were designated with the aid of the Nature Conservation Division of the Ministry of
the Environment. Plans were then prepared for moving personnel and materials to and
between these emergency zones. A joint plan was fmally prepared to provide the areas to
be protected with available supplies and equipment. Soon after the organization had been
completed. a demobilization order was issued. Some criticism was directed to the national
government, but the Bravo blowout showed that communities were generally ill prepared
to respond adequately to a coastal oil threat.
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The other major decision associated with pollution control was to let the oil slick
drift and naturally decompose at sea, no attempt being made to collect it mechanically or
disperse it chemically. This was in effect a "nondecision," since although the Action Group
did not approve this course, it was necessitated by the sheer impossibility of coping by
mechanical methods. Once the slick thinned and broke into isolated patches over a wide
area of sea, it was too expensive to use mechanical devices in an efficient way. These fac-
tors dictated the decision to let the slick drift, which was reinforced by a prognosis that
the slick would remain at sea, disintegrate naturally, and not reach the coastline. Finally,
only the use of chemical dispersants would have been cost-effective at this stage, and such
a course had already been ruled out on political grounds, although this decision could
have been reversed had the slick approached the shore.
The action of the sea caused the slick to evaporate and disintegrate. On May 3 it
was estimated that in another five to six days the oil would have completely disintegrated;
therefore, the final minor decision was to demobilize the coastal protection service on
the estimated day. Some risk was involved in this decision, but forecasts of the weather
and movement and decomposition of the slick were such that the costs involved in main-
taining a major state of readiness could not be justified.
WELL-CONTROL DECISIONS
The other major decision that stemmed from the authority of the Action Group
in relation to Phillips was associated with well control. Phillips was ordered to present a
well-capping plan and to start drilling a relief well [1]. Such an ad hoc well-control oper-
ation was necessary because no other plans existed [28] .
On its own initiative Phillips requested the assistance of the Red Adair Company
from the USA, specialists in controlling oil blowouts. It took 24 hours for a team to
arrive at the Bravo platform. For the first 36 hours after the blowout, no attempt had
been made to control the oil flow. Since the general view is that each blowout is unique
[29] , well-control equipment is not standardized, and hence no stocks exist.
With the assistance of the Red Adair Company, Phillips' engineering staff drew up
a capping procedure. Both the Oil Directorate and the Action Group approved the
Phillips--Adair plan, which however proved difficult to implement because the surface
BOP had been installed upside down [30] . This mistake necessitated modifications to
the wen-capping equipment. After several abortive efforts, further modifications were
successful in closing the well and mud was then pumped in to stabilize the pressure. When
brought under control at 17.45 on April 30, the well had been in an uncontrolled state
for nearly eight days, spilling up to 22,500 tons of oil into the North Sea (the actual
amount may be significantly less than this figure).
Simultaneously with the capping operation Phillips were trying to locate a suitable
rig, which could be towed to the Bravo site and used to drill a relief well. Such a well,
which relieves pressure buildup in the reservoir, must be close to the uncontrolled well.
Two days after the blowout a jackup rig was located and hired; however, the weather
conditions would not allow the rig to be moved. After nearly four days, during which
several unsuccessful attempts had been made to move the rig, the Action Group ordered
Phillips to bring in a semisubmersible rig in addition to the jackup rig. It was arranged
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for such a rig to arrive on site on May 1. Since the blowout was controlled on April 30, Phil-
lips' request to cancel drilling of the two relief wells was approved by the Action Group just
15 minutes after the Oil Directorate declared that the blowout was under control [30] .
Production of oil and gas from other wells on the Bravo platform was stopped auto-
matically through their BOP systems. The policy on production in the Ekofisk field as a
whole, however, had to be decided. A code existed for stopping production, but only
under specified weather conditions or when gas concentrations had built up to critical
levels. Oil blowouts were not included in this code and it had not yet been decided whether
the entire field should be shut down during a blowout. However, the Action Group estab-
blished its own code for stopping production, based on the fire risk involved, and this was
agreed to by Phillips. Production had actually been stopped several times in the past owing
to adverse weather conditions.
The Norwegian government decided independently that all production from the
Ekofisk field must cease [30] . The Action Group and the Oil Directorate were informed
of this decision. Although this matter had been considered by the Action Group, neither
its advice nor that of the Oil Directorate were requested by the government in advance of
this purely political move. The government wished to allay criticism by taking what it
considered firm, positive action. Once the blowout was under control, the entire Ekofisk
field was working within four hours.
The last minor decision about well control was to establish a safety zone around the
Bravo platform. This was necessary to ensure good working conditions around the plat-
form and avoid the possibility of other accidents in the immediate area. The zone declared
under the Continental Shelf Convention was defined as a free space of radius 500 meters
from the platform, with no air-space restrictions above it. Creation of this zone was a
source of confusion to foreign observers in aircraft, particularly to television and press
reporters, because it was defined in wider terms by the Action Group. The latter estab-
lished a zone of radius ten nautical-miles, with air-space restriction to a height of 5,000
feet above the platform itself. The various national definitions of air space, on which uni-
lateral decisions can be made, make the creation and recognition of such zones difficult.
Clarification of this issue is a matter of some urgency [30] .
EVALUATION OF THE BRAVO RESPONSES
Evaluation of the activities and decisions surrounding the Bravo incident can be
made on several bases: lessons learned by the Action Group itself, comments from critics
and observers, and the position as evaluated by the present author.
The Action Group formed a focal point for the Bravo operation and learned many
lessons during its short life. Such a group had never previously been assembled to handle
a blowout emergency. The experience gained is summarized below [31].
Organizational Evaluation
The authority given to the Action Group was confirmed as the best organizational
form.
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The creation of a body to advise the Group on industrial disaster experience was use-
ful. The fact that the response of an oil company to a blowout differs according to where
it occurs was learned - a previously unknown factor (e.g., in the UK a Clean Seas Commit-
tee has been formed by oil companies to act as a clearing center for cooperation, whereas
in Norway no such body existed nor did other oil companies provide help to Phillips).
The experience showed that no common approach to blowouts exists among coun-
tries in the North Sea area.
The need was seen for specialist companies such as the Red Adair Company to
allow government observation of their work and to arrange procedures for effective coop-
eration.
Information Evaluation
It was recognized that there is a paramount need for more reliable information
about the performance of mechanical equipment for controlling pollution in the open sea
under all the weather conditions likely to be experienced.
A special VHF radio disaster communications channel was seen as a necessity, since
the Action Group had to rely on emergency frequencies that are also required for other
rescue purposes.
Greater research on the effects of large amounts of oil in the water column was seen
as important for predicting and assessing damage.
Equipment Evaluation
The lack of options was a problem, so there is a need for government and the oil
industry to develop these for more effective blowout management.
There is a need for a failsafe manually operated BOP, Le., either it should work in
either position or be impossible to fit upside down.
There is also a need to re-evaluate mechanical equipment for pollution control in
the open sea, e.g., such equipment must be capable of efficient operation even close to
the blowout, have a capacity to remove large amounts of oil in all weather conditions,
and be in the form of a single self-contained unit.
It is important to adopt a training program for operators of fire prevention, capping,
and pollution-control equipment.
Standards for pollution-control equipment must be adopted on a uniform interna-
tional basis.
The Director of the Action Group felt that the timing of the blowout and the
weather conditions prevailing at the time were fortunate. Had the blowout occurred
earlier, it would have had a major effect on the migration of seabirds, particularly auks;
had it occurred later, a major spawning ground for mackerel would have been affected.
The accident also happened during the period of maximum daylight - nearly 24 hours
per day.
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The failure of booms and skimmers to approach their specified performance was a
great surprise. Clearly, the testing, rating, and specifications of such equipment leave
much to be desired. Even taking this into account, however, there is still a need for the
complete re-evaluation of such equipment. The greatest satisfaction was expressed by the
Director of the Action Group that, during the entire crisis, no loss of life occurred. In
addition, the platform itself and the equipment used in the operations did not suffer
extensive damage or loss.
The overall assessment of the Director was that the best was done under the circum-
stances and that the efforts of the entire country were united to control the blowout. The
operation, however, was not without criticism both at home and abroad. An anti-oil group,
rather than focusing attention on the blowout per se broadened their attack by including
oil development as a whole. It must also be taken into account that 1977 was an election
year in Norway and the government in power was in a minority position.
The Norwegian government appointed a commission to investigate criticism of Phil-
lips' actions at the Bravo platform before and during the blowout. In addition, the govern-
ment set aside a day in Parliament to debate its handling of the crisis. Finally, a white
paper summarizing all aspects of the Bravo accident was prepared [32].
Both Norwegian and foreign critics have suggested areas where the government
effort could have been improved and these are summarized below.
Relations with Phillips [33]
Both the Norwegian government and Phillips have a fmancial interest in operating
the Ekofisk field at maxirnallevels. This might affect decisions made during a crisis.
Oil Directorate personnel were neither on the platform when the blowout occurred
nor during the incident until after control was regained; therefore, little government
knowledge is available as to Phillips' possible negligence (if negligence is proven royalties
must be paid on lost oil).
Legal unlimited liability of the operator gives a false sense of security since there
are many ways of circumventing this provision.
Since the operations of Phillips in the Ekofisk complex were subject to government
vetting, the government could be held responsible for the blowout. It was common know-
ledge that Phillips did not have adequate capping and containment equipment.
The government did not follow upworkers' complaints that Phillips was not following
security regulations and had inadequate security plans.
Research Efforts [34]
The long-term effects of an oil slick on marine life are not well known [35] . If oil
remains long enough on the water surface and in the water colurrm in concentrations
above a critical level, the emulsified oil kills plankton and the eggs and larvae of fish; if
the oil evaporates or is dispersed rapidly into a large body of water, less harm is done to
marine life, since there is less likelihood of critical concentrations being attained.
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The results of studies by Norwegian research vessels were not available prior to the
blowout. During and after the incident, these vessels took samples from the vast spill area,
obtaining the data on which the claim of minimal damage was based.
The effects of the slick on birdlife are contradictory. Although the total number of
birds lost was estimated to be fairly low, British reports indicate larger numbers ofseabirds
were killed than is quoted in Norwegian reports.
Research and development has been focused on the structural design of platforms.
Operational Efforts
Statements put out during the blowout did not give a clear account of what was
happening. Does "amounts collected" mean oily water or oil? What is meant by "safety
criteria"? Why do differences exist in wave-height figures? What kinds of chemicals were
used and how were these applied? Many other queries could be raised.
Conflicting views are held on the use of subcontractors to operate platforms.
their training, and their safety procedures.
EVALUAnON OF THE DECISION PROCESS AND ITS OUTCOME
It is of vital importance to have a comprehensive, integrated plan to protect the
environment during an oil disaster [36] . This section examines to what extent this condi-
tion was met during the Bravo crisis.
A comprehensive plan must consider the contributions that each actor group can
make to alleviate the situation. Actor groups in the present case would be operators,
regulators, experts, impactees, and exogenous actors. An integrated decision process
places these actor groups in such a way that feedback from all other groups are taken into
account before a decision is made. These concepts have been applied to Phillips and the
Action Group, since they were the key actors in the Bravo incident. The decisions made
by Phillips and the Action Group can be assessed for comprehensiveness not only on the
basis of who was involved but also on whether information from such activities as research,
planning, operations, information flows, and monitoring was sought and used. If these
same activities, which are necessary to environmental management, were affected by
decisions made, then such decisions can be seen as comprehensive. Integrated decisions
affect environmental-actor regulations and procedures, as well as development-actor
designs, plans, and operations.
Table 2.1 lists the basic decisions involved in the Bravo incident, together with the
originator of the decision and the outcome. This summary also gives a qualitative evalua-
tion of each decision, others reviewing these decisions may arrive at quite different eval-
uations.
Clearly, the Action Group was a comprehensive unit that merged the technical
and environmental policies under the overall direction of the Minister of the Environ-
ment. Its decision process was thus to review the elements of both policy systems and
The 8ral'0 oil and gas blowout 53
feed the conclusions directly to the political decision maker for the environment. The
Action Group was an integrating force between the two separate policy systems, while
itself being integrated with the operator of Bravo via its authority over Philli ps. Therefore,
decisions were made readily and followed up easily.
Through its linkage to the environmental-research and monitoring actors. when
necessary the Action Group was able to utilize these resources very quickly. Damage to
fisheries and birdlife was assessed by the Marine Research Institute, while forecasts about
the oil slick were made by the Institute for Continental Shelf Research. The Action
Group was also instrumental in allowing international observers to view the operation and
gave advice on combating the oil slick. Unproven alternatives to the proven chemical
methods of oil dispersion were only attempted on such a large scale because the Director
of the State Pollution Control Agency was a member of the Action Group. Therefore,
the composition and position of the Group in the decision-making hierarchy, together
with its willingness to attempt alternative strategies, indicate its comprehensive, integrated
position in the decision process.
The outcomes of the decision process also reflect the nature of the Action Group;
the initial approach of Phillips to both well and pollution control was radically altered by
the Group. It also changed the government's view of the state of preparedness that existed
to combat the situation and stressed the need for a single comprehensive government
agency, integrated into the decision-making process, to deal with emergencies. Research
on damages caused by oil, pollution control, well control, and blowout prevention have
all been strengthened by the Bravo emergency. The Action Group played an important
role in fostering this research.
Phillips Petroleum, on the other hand, did not exhibit a comprehensive decision pro-
cess. It did not attempt to link its well and pollution control with that of the government
until ordered to do so. This does not imply a deliberate lack of cooperation with the
government, but rather a "going-ahead-alone" approach, which relied solely on what it
understood best, the industry response. This approach stressed the urgency of obtaining
personnel and a rig to combat the emergency; chemicals would then be used to disperse
the slick, and the specialist Red Adair Company would cap the well. No expertise was
available in the Phillips organization itself to cap the well and no mechanical equipment
for pollution control was available.
The strategy of Phillips Petroleum was comprehensive and integrated as far as
securing the platform and saving lives was concerned; outside specialists were also con-
tacted with minimal delay. This is in marked contrast to its approach on environmental
issues, which was not in accordance with government regulations. No experts on the
environment were brought in by Phillips before or during the blowout. No alternatives
for pollution control were envisaged. However, measures were taken to set up an inde-
pendent monitoring effort to assess damages in the open sea from the oil slick. The design
of the well system completely ignored environmental factors.
Table 2.2 is a summary of the responses to Bravo generated by each of the key
actor groups. Uttle new information is contained here; rather a convenient format is
used to display important items from the text. The table does show, however, the uncer-
tainties and conflicts that surrounded the choices of criteria available to the key actors.
Two striking points are the disappointing performances of the pollution-control
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oil slick. Before the Bravo incident, it was assumed that these two points could never have
arisen; during the incident, however, it was obvious that research and development programs
had not been pursued with sufficient vigor. little or no information existed about perfor-
mance of booms and skimmers under actual weather conditions in the open sea or about
the damage to be expected from an oil slick over a period of time. In addition, the need
for capping wells and drilling reliefs should have been foreseen and actively studied.
Most of the conflicts encountered were satisfactorily resolved; most centered on the
pollution-control operation rather than well control. The basic conflicts were over chem-
ical dispersants versus mechanical equipment in pollution control and the best methods
of using mechanical equipment for this purpose. Differences also existed over potential
damages from the slick.
Clearly, the Bravo blowout will cause major changes in the approach to pollution
controL not only in Norway but probably in the entire North Sea area. A reappraisal of
the principles and equipment to be used in future accidents is of major importance for
all North Sea countries. Some problems that need to be clarified will now be mentioned.
Risk
Establishing the Action Group was designed to minimize the risk of mismanage-
ment. In line with this approach, the Action Group reduced risk by ordering Phillips to
cap the well and make available a relief rig simultaneously. However, the Action Group
may well have taken a risk itself in foregoing the use of chemicals and allowing the oil
slick to drift, given the lack of knowledge on the fate of oil in the sea. This risk was prob-
ably unjustified considering the potential damages to marine organisms at sea and to
coastal communities in both Norway and Denmark.
Pollution Control
Norway specified mechanical equipment of rated capacity for pollution control,
even though doubt existed about both the equipment and its performance. Thus, reliance
was really on the self-cleansing capacity of the sea. This approach differs from that used
for chronic oil discharges, where pollution-control equipment is demanded, even though
the sea can more readily absorb this pollution.
Information
Full information on the alternatives available must be known before an accident
actually occurs; otherwise there is no basis for adequate decision making during the crisis.
However, here neither information on the effectiveness of the equipment for pollution
containment under the expected operational conditions nor estimates of subsequent
damages were available. Total reliance on the claims of equipment manufacturers is
unacceptable. Information about chemicals and mechanical equipment also seem to be
unavailable from UK sources.
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The degree of supervision on the operating companies appears not to be a factor
of accident record or phase of operation. Since Phillips had had two previous production
accidents in the North Sea [37] and since it was undergoing a well workover after loss of
a monitor into the well at Bravo, greater government supervision would seem to have
been warranted. Realistic sanctions, such as prescribed and enforced shutdown periods,
are also important in enforcing safety standards.
Response
Bravo showed that Norway was not well prepared to handle a blowout, even though
its response was quite reasonable. Prior to Bravo the Action Group did not exist, nor did
an adequate well-control capability, and untested pollution-control equipment was regarded
as adequate for use on the high seas.
Cooperation
Bravo showed that each North Sea country had its own individual strategy for com-
bating emergencies; these were not always compatible. In addition, each country assessed
the risk ofblowouts and the resulting damages differently. The commitment ofa country's
pollution control equipment elsewhere leaves it vulnerable to an oil accident in its own
sector: Denmark's commitment of its total pollution containment equipment and vessel
left it unable to cope with a 40-ton spill in its own waters during the Bravo incident. A
need exists for an effective, compatible, integrated response to oil accidents in the North
Sea. For example, it would be valuable to have agreement on a level of compatible standby
equipment that would be readily available for loan.
Company cooperation during the Bravo accident did not seem to meet the stipula-
tions of the Clean Seas Committee, which was formed by the oil companies for mutual
assistance dUring accidents. Nor are company responses similar in each North Sea country.
An integrated network of compatible and dependable responses is important for both the
oil companies and the countries of the North Sea.
In 1967 Norway established a code of safe practice for offshore drilling and was the
first country to do so [38] . In 1977 Norway was the first country to suffer a major oil
blowout in the North Sea. Given the Widespread environmental interests in Norway, it is
clear that even safer drilling procedures will evolve and be integrated into the offshore
petroleum development program. Better oil-disaster management practices will also evolve
and contribute to improved environmental safeguards, but it remains to be seen whether
this evolution will be truly comprehensive and well integrated into an overall system.
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3 THE GAS BLOWOUT AT MAERSK EXPLORER PLATFORM,DANISH SECTOR
LJavid HI. f'ischer
On October 14, 1977, a gas blowout occurred in the Vagn-l exploratory well being
drilled from the Maersk Explorer jackup rig. The gas blowing from this exploration well
was ignited and began burning approximately 90 minutes after the well went out of con-
trol. The flow from the well consisted of gas with some water and large amounts of sand.
Because no oil was associated with this blowout, no pollution-control measures were nec-
essary. The well was located in the Danish sector of the North Sea 10 km from the West
German sector, so that, if an oil slick had been involved, an international response would
have been required.
The blowing gas burned for approximately 12 hours and extinguished itself just as a
Norwegian fire-spray vessel arrived on site. It was decided to drill a relief well to kill the
well and another jackup rig being towed nearby was hired and started to drill only 24
hours after the start of the blowout. The blowout stopped of its own accord 10 days after
it started, just before the relief well reached the gas-producing formation. Although no oil
pollution occurred and both the fire and the blowout extinguished themselves, the opera-
tion was more expensive than the earlier Bravo blowout [I].
PRINCIPLES ESTABLISHED BEFORE THE VAGN-l BLOWOUT
In 1962 the Danish government granted a 50-year concession covering all onshore
Denmark to the A.P. Moller Company. Later this concession was expanded to include the
entire Danish sector of the North Sea. A.P. Moller, a Danish ship owner, had no previous
experience with oil and gas operations. The terms governing his concession were very
general and left considerable latitude in interpretation and operation. Moller formed the
Danish Underground Consortium with three oil companies based in the USA -- Gulf,
Chevron, and Texaco - and with Royal Dutch Shell, to operate the lease. Although Gulf
left the Consortium in 1975, to date over 50 wells have been drilled.
The terms of the concession were very lenient and very few governmental technical
evaluations were required about such matters as type of rig, location of rig, or drilling
operations. The only way the Danish government could regulate offshore drilling was by
extending the safety regulations that applied to onshore Denmark to activities offshore, and
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it was on this basis that the government required more detailed operator information and
issued approvals for well applications. The Danish Energy Agency is the body that regu-
lates the drilling operations of the Danish Underground Consortium through these safety
regulations. However, the regulator cannot deal directly with the drilling operator or
influence the well drilling and control program directly. The regulator has a formal rela-
tion only with A.P. Moller, not with the oil companies or their operator Chevron, who
does the actual exploration drilling. Since only basic raw geological and well information
is required, evaluative information about such data is not normally provided to the govern-
ment. In addition, evaluative and non-safety drilling information during the actual drilling
is not normally provided. However, evaluations of drilling are available on an informal
basis when a government representative visits an offshore rig or the operator's offices. Even
so, safety remains generally in the hands of the operator on the basis of his knowledge of
"good oil-field practice" and his own self-interest in not incurring needless expense and
injury. The only other possibility the government has of obtaining more information is
through a change in the concession agreement with A.P. Moller.
Oil-pollution regulations exist for the Danish sector of the North Sea, and these
regulations would affect drilling operations ifan oil blowout occurred [2] . Under the regu-
lations the government can take the lead in pollution cleanup, and one assumes the gov-
ernment could require the operators to take whatever measures it considered necessary. In
this sense the Danish posture would be quite similar to that of the Norwegians. However,
the major difference between Norway and Denmark in combating oil slicks is that Den-
mark relies on a mixed pollution-control response, including mechanical collection and
chemical dispersants, rather than solely on a mechanical one. In addition, A.P. Moller has
no pollution-control equipment, but relies solely on the cooperation of offshore opera-
tors and the government, whereas Norway requires each operator to maintain pollution-
control equipment capable of picking up 8,000 tons of oil per day.
ORGANIZATION AT THE VAGN-l BLOWOUT
This section emphasizes organizational responses by both the operator and the
government. Because the government does not have a direct regulatory relationship with
the operator, Chevron, it did not playa direct role in the operator's blowout response.
Figure 3.1 shows the organizational relations that existed in the Vagn-l blowout. The
only formal tie between government and operator was via Danbor, a separate company
organized by Moller to interface with the government.
Figure 3.1 also indicates the main government actors involved in monitoring the
blowout. An ad hoc coordinating body or Steering Committee was set up, consisting of
the Ministry of Trade as leader, the Danish Energy Agency, the Danish Geological Survey,
and the Environmental Protection Agency; the Environmental Protection Agency played
a somewhat passive role in this Committee because no pollution was determined to exist.
Had the blowout involved oil pollution, it is likely that the Environmental Protection
Agency would have taken the lead role, and that the Navy would have coordinated the
collection or dispersant effort.
The operator, by virtue of having sole responsibility for stopping the blowout,
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made all major decisions in conjunction with its headquarters in San Francisco, USA. No
Danish organizations had a major role, not even the Danish concessionaire, A.P. Moller.
Both the government and Chevron determined the need for outside expertise. The
Danish Steering Committee requested the assistance of the Norwegian Petroleum Direc-
torate, and Chevron requested the assistance of the Red Adair Company.
Finally, Figure 3.1 indicates some of the contractors involved in the well-control
operation. Each operation listed in the figure was carried out by a separate contractor.
No pollution-control operations appear in this figure because an oil blowout did not
occur. Oil-pollution operations would have necessitated a more complex and extensive set
of government actors and actions.
DECISIONS MADE AT THE VAGN-l BLOWOUT
Because the Vagn-1 blowout was the first to occur in Danish waters, several basic
decisions had to be made, particularly on the government side. The Ministry of Trade,
which has statutory authority for all operations offshore, formed the small Steering Com-
mittee described above. In its initial meeting further involvement by other government
bodies was considered, as well as who should lead the group. It was finally decided that
the Ministry of Trade would lead, since no pollution was involved. Other expertise within
the government was on standby. The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate was called in to
assist the Steering Committee in assessing the blowout and making recommendations.
After this organizational phase, the Committee requested information from Chevron
via A.P. Moller about the present and planned future responses to the blowout. This ini-
tial request generated a discussion between A.P. Moller and the Committee about what
kind of information and plans should be given to the Committee and also how much
access the Committee should have to planning meetings, etc. The Ministry of Trade con-
cluded that all information should be open for the Committee, and A.P. Moller finally
agreed on this point.
Before receipt of the government's request for information, Chevron had already
taken several actions of its own: notifying the government (Navy) approximately one
hour after the blowout occurred; determining the need for a fire-fighting vessel and hiring
one from Norway; deciding to drill a relief well, determining its optimum location, sub-
contracting the job, and preparing to drill; determining the need for information centers
both offshore at the nearest rig and onshore at A.P. Moller; and deciding to engage the
Red Adair Company as an external consultant and contracting for its help.
The Red Adair Company dispatched a representative to Vagn-1 and Chevron head-
quarters sent its own "troubleshooter" to the scene. Both the Adair representative and
the Chevron expert agreed that drilling of the relief well should be continued. In addition,
they suggested that Chevron should hire another rig to support a station for pumping drill
mud rapidly into the relief well when it entered the gas zone.
When the Steering Committee received the information about Chevron's decisions
and current activities, it required on safety grounds that the relief-well program and the
rigs be approved. An application for these rigs was then submitted while the initial drilling
activities were under way, and approval was given promptly on October 17, two days
after drilling had begun. As part of its approval, the government required additional safety
equipment to be used during the relief drilling.
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In addition, the Steering Committee wanted a well-capping operation to be under-
taken while the relief well was being drilled, if possible. Chevron rejected this plan on the
advice of the Red Adair Company representative.
Just before the relief-well drilling began the blowout stopped ot its own accord on
October 24. Then Chevron decided independently to kill its Vagn-l well, developed a well-
kill plan, and stopped drilling the relief well. The deck of the Maersk Explorer rig was
cleared and the well killed. Then relief drilling was continued and mud and heavier mate-
rials were pumped into this relief well until pressure was stabilized and it could also be
killed. Only after this event did Chevron request comments from the government's
Steering Committee on its plans to clear the deck of the platform, kill the well, and stop
drilling the relief well. These plans were developed by Chevron over 14 days and then given
to the coordinating group with a request that they approve them the same day. Even though
additional reporting and paperwork remained to be done, the major responses to the blow-
out ceased when the blowout itself ceased.
During Chevron's operations the Steering Committee had three major safety con-
cerns: (l) a subsea or underground blowout might occur outside the well casing, thereby
causing cratering and collapse of the rig as well as the geological structure itself; (2) the
sand blown out of the well might accumulate on the deck of the rig and cause it to col-
lapse; and (3) the overall safety and capability of the relief-well drilling operation.
The first consideration arose because of the pressure increase that accompanies a
capping operation, and because the existing pressure could induce an additional blowout,
followed by crate ring and collapse. Cratering is a problem that has occurred recently else-
where in offshore areas with high-pressure geological structures [3] . The second consid-
eration was also serious because the accumulating weight of the sand on the rig was in-
creasing stress on the legs of the jackup. The third consideration stemmed from possible
disregard of normal safety precautions during the emergency relief procedure, which
could have rendered the procedure ineffective, thus causing an additional blowout or loss
of life, time, and equipment. These safety considerations partly underlay the government's
requests for more information and their insistence on approving the responses to the
blowout.
COMPARISON OF GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO THE BRAVO AND VAGN-l
BLOWOUTS
This section compares the actions organized by the Norwegian and Danish govern-
ments in response to the blowouts that occurred in their offshore sectors of the North
Sea. Figures 3.2 and 3.3 summarize the basic actions taken by the Norwegian Action
Group and the Danish Steering Committee. There are two significant differences in these
national responses: the Norwegian response assumed the more authoritative role compared
to the Danish coordinating role, and was centered around a pollution-control effort that
was not necessary in the Danish case.
Under the terms of the exploration licenses granted for the Norwegian shelf, the
government reserved the right to assume authority for blowout responses if it deemed the
licensee to be acting inadequately [4] . In such a case all actions taken by the Norwegian

















































































FIGURE 3.2 Government actions at the Bravo blowout, Norwegian sector.
Directorate deals directly with each oil operator on an individual basis and must approve
its interpretations of the drilling program and subsequent modifications. Under the terms
of exploration granted by the Danish government this right of direct supervision was not
reserved to the governmen1. Therefore, the Danish Energy Agency, which has day-to-day
responsibility for offshore regulation, must rely on the operator's sense of safe oil-field
practice. Thus the Danes have a more passive response to offshore blowouts than the
Norwegians.












































FIGURE 3.3 Government actions at the Maersk blowout, Danish sector.
Table 3.1 compares the Norwegian and Danish responses to their blowouts. The
Danes were not in a position to assume a role of authority over Chevron because of the
general and vague terms of the offshore lease and the questions still remaining on the off·
shore applicability of onshore safety regulations. Therefore, the Danish Steering Commit-
tee took a passive role; the operator made all the important decisions on well control
without ad vising the Committee until after the work was under way. Information requested
was initially denied and later only partly furnished; the Steering Committee was unable to
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TABLE 3.1 Comparison of regulator-operator relationships for the North Sea blowouts, 1977.
Norway: Bravo blowout
Action Group in command role
Action Group in direct contact with
Phillips
Action Group advised on plans before
implementation
Operator and Action Group made joint
decisions
Operator shared information on request




Steering Committee in passive role
Steering Committee not in direct contact with
Chevron
Steering Committee advised after the event
Operator made all important decisions
Operator did not share information on request
Steering Committee did not see data
Government did not opt for a special
investigation
see the data on which Chevron's decisions were based. All contact with Chevron was
made indirectly through A.P. Moller via Danbor.
After the emergency Denmark elected to investigate the Maersk blowout accident
by the sort of maritime inquiry that is normally held for a shipwreck, to be followed by a
report from the Steering Committee to parliament. In contrast, the Norwegian government
appointed an independent fact-finding commission to determine the causes of the blow-
out, required a formal public report from its Action Group on its relations with Phillips as
well as on the entire blowout response, and mandated a formal public report to the
Storting, its parliament. Sanctions and fines were levied on Phillips personnel and others
deemed responsible. Offshore safety and operating conditions were strengthened by the
Petroleum Directorate. A major research program on offshore safety measures and contin-
gency planning was begun and funded at a high level. Finally, the Norwegian government
made the Action Group into a permanent body to deal with offshore emergencies.
Denmark's response was to extend the applicability of all onshore safety regulations
to offshore activities and to take an initial step toward establishing a permanent body
along the lines of the Norwegian Action Group. The terms of the offshore concession
agreement with A.P. Moller are a major constraint against Denmark adopting a stronger
line. However, some demands are being made by politicians for changes in this leasing
arrangement.
EVALUATION OF SOME ISSUES RAISED BY THE BRAVO AND VAGN-l
BLOWOUTS
The Bravo and Maersk blowouts have raised issues about human error, regulator-
operator relations and roles, substitute decision-making groups, expertise available from
other countries, the degree of cooperation and response desirable between operators in
different countries, the vulnerability to one's own interests when aiding others, and deter-
mining an adequate response.
Human error was the basic cause of both the Bravo and Maersk blowouts. The
Norwegian Commission of Inquiry reported [5] that the "underlying cause of the accident
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was that the organizational and administrative systems were on this occasion inadequate
to assure safe operations." Before the Bravo blowout the BOP was in two separate parts
on the deck; it was not hanging in place over the wellhead. Nevertheless, the well was
opened in spite of signs that it was already unstable. Neither the drilling supervisor nor
the drilling engineer were available on deck to check these operations, even though they
knew the well was unstable. Finally, the qualifications of the drillers were inadequate
because their theoretical knowledge and experience had been gained solely in land-based
operations [5] . In the Maersk blowout human error was also placed at the heart of the
accident. It was known that the gas zones were shallow, and that there was no BOP avail-
able; also, the pipe was taken off too soon, the signs of well instability were ignored, and
the necessary inspections of equipment had not been made [5] .
Thus, there appears to have been little thought given to a blowout in either case,
since both blowouts were seen as preventable by government representatives. While human
error will always exist, it does seem that greater care was called for during the well work-
over at Bravo and at the exploration well on Maersk than was exercised. Ensuring just
how to prevent human error by circumscribing human behavior in a mode conducive to
greater safety will always be a subject of concern in complex technologies operating in
hazardous environments. However, the governments and the societies they represent have
every right to ensure that greater attention be given to the human dimension, and espe-
cially to preparedness to meet emergencies and contributing events. While greater priority
is being placed on the safety of technological systems, this should be matched by concern
for the human interface with these systems. Although there is frequent transfer of person-
nel from one region to another, operators cannot assume that experiences gained in one
region are transferred to the others. Training, orientation, supervision, and inspection
remain important if blowouts are to be prevented, regardless of the number of BOPs used.
Relations between the regulator and the operator are defined both formally and
informally. However, the formal setting for these relations provides the basis for the bar-
gaining done at the informal level. In the Norwegian case, the authority of the Norwegian
Petroleum Directorate had been established by Royal Decree to grant concessions to
private oil companies. Through this authority the Directorate worked directly with oil
companies in defining the conditions of oil operations both before and during such oper-
ations [6] . Owing to this standing authority, Phillips was prepared to playa subordinate
role to the ad hoc Action Group organized by the Norwegian government in response to
the Bravo blowout. In Denmark the Danish Energy Agency was constrained by the earlier
concession agreement arranged between A.P. Moller and the government.
Substitute decision-making bodies were prominent in the responses to the Bravo
blowout. Phillips requested the assistance of the Red Adair Company, which took over
the well-control program, while Norway formed the ad hoc Action Group to supervise
Phillips' well- and pollution-control efforts. Both Red Adair and the Action Group sup-
planted the normal operating relations of Phillips and the Norwegian Petroleum Direct·
orate. Questions of authority, responsibility, liability, knowledge, and impact on future
endeavors and relations are all at issue when substitute decision-makers are used. These
issues had not been fully studied before the Bravo incident. In Denmark, Chevron retained
control of all well-control operations and the Danish Steering Committee had no decision-
making role. Thus, this issue was not raised in the course of the Maersk blowout.
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Using experts from other countries raises issues of accountability of action, trans-
ferability of knowledge, and coordination of effort. In a foreign place the results of
advice given by a foreign expert do not greatly affect him, since he leaves at the end of
the emergency. The nationals must cope with and adjust to whatever results have evolved
from his advice. The basis of such advice is expertise, but such knowledge may not fit the
local conditions or be readily coordinated and assimilated. Thus, the overall management
effort can be biased when foreign experts are used.
In the Maersk incident the Danish blowout was entirely in the hands of a foreign oil
company that took direction from its US headquarters. At Bravo the authoritative role
taken by the Action Group was partly based on the issue of foreign domination of
national concerns. However, at the operational level, well-control expertise was imported
in both cases and little effort was made to allow national experts to participate in these
operations, either in their planning or in their conduct. Finally, the questions of know-
ledge and coordination were raised in the pollution-control operation at Bravo. The per-
formance characteristics and handling properties of foreign booms and skimmers were
unknown, so that no recourse to such equipment was made, even though it may have
been superior. Also, foreign crews were underused, even though Danish and Swedish, and
also British Petroleum pollution-control vessels and crew were on the scene. Similarly,
criticism by national fishing interests may have discouraged the use of available low-
toxicity dispersants from the UK, regardless of their effectiveness. All of these examples
raise the issue of the role of foreign expertise in an emergency. Clearly, it is important to
plan to use foreign expertise to contribute to an effective management strategy and to
minimize the problems stemming from such advice or use.
Failure of the oil companies to cooperate during the Bravo blowout, and the differ-
ent oil-company responses planned for different countries raises another issue. For exam-
ple, A.P. Moller relies exclusively on oil companies to combat pollution and control blow-
outs in the Danish sector. It has no equipment of its own to cope with these problems.
In Norway each company acts independently with its own equipment and with little
sharing among them, which forced Phillips to seek equipment from the USA. On the
other hand, a committee has been formed in the UK to share pollution-control equipment.
In sum, there is a need for an integrated international response system involving all parti-
cipants, including oil companies and national governments.
Cooperation in responding to an oil blowout means that a company or country
must have additional capacity available for its own emergencies. For example, Denmark's
commitment to Bravo of its main pollution-containment vessel and equipment left it
unable to cope with a simultaneous 40-ton oil spill in its own waters. Also, Norway
released its only large-capacity fire-fighting vessel to Denmark for Maersk, thereby leaving
itself vulnerable. Other redeployments included a British fire-fighting vessel going to
Ekofisk from the UK Forties Field, and the maintenance of another fireship had to be
postponed so that it could go to the Forties Field if necessary. Clearly, the cost of stand-
by equipment is high and must be balanced against the probability of simultaneous blow-
outs or tanker spills. No integrated company-government responses on an international
level had been developed before the blowouts of 1977, so that efforts to achieve this end
were necessary, although much still remains to be done.
The final issue raised by these blowouts concerns the question: what is an adequate
response system to a North Sea blowout? The Norwegian and Danish experiences show
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there is a possibility of overreaction; this was particularly so in Norway, where fishery-
oriented political interests are strong. In Norway, drilling north oflatitude 62° N was
again postponed and many special operational and research programs implemented [7] .
The direct cost of these programs exceeds US $100 million and the indirect costs of dis-
placed priorities and other activities remain to be calculated. Many of the items now
being planned were, of course, overdue and necessary, such as UK-Norwegian cooperative
agreements on mutual assistance during blowouts or tanker spills. Other items, such as
duplicating drilling supervision on platforms or charting all national emergency resources,
may be excessive.
At present Norway has a permanent Action Command Group with staff that is
capable of integrating all emergency plans and responses to unplanned events. This unit
must organize itself and establish workable relations with the myriad bodies regulating
petroleum development offshore. Other kinds of emergencies must be foreseen as well.
Both Norway and Denmark have begun to create just such an infrastructure. To create a
well-integrated and comprehensive disaster-management system will take skill, care, and
judicious allocation of priorities and resources, but both countries have the means to do
so.
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4 ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES AT BRAVO AND THREE MILEISLAND: A COMPARISON·
David W. Fischer
From approximately 22.00 on April 22, 1977, when the Bravo well went out of
control until well control was regained at 11.00 on April 30 between 12,700 and 22,500
tons ofoil escaped into the sea. This oil blowout, the first major accident in the North Sea
involving a producing offshore platform, captured worldwide attention and signaled to the
North Sea oil industry and governments that oil blowouts can occur even though in-depth
prevention and safety requirements exist. Before this accident, blowouts were viewed as
"impossible" in the North Sea. The Royal Norwegian Commission of Inquiry, created to
investigate this accident, reported that "the underlying cause of the accident was that the
organizational and administrative systems were on this occasion inadequate to assure safe
operations," that the "accident to a large degree was due to human errors," and that,
while "certain technical weaknesses were present," they were only of "peripheral signifi.
cance for the course of events" [1].
Almost two years later, at approximately 04.00 on March 28, 1979, a series of
events at the Three Mile Island (TMI) nuclear plant in Middletown, Pennsylvania culmi-
nated in an accident with a partial core meltdown. From this time until the initial danger
subsided on April 2 an unspecified but probably low amount of radiation was released
into the environment. This nuclear accident was the first major accident in the USA,
and it too captured worldwide attention and signaled to the nuclear industry and govern-
ments that nuclear accidents were a reality to be reckoned with, even though in-depth
prevention and safety requirements exist. Before this time such accidents were also
viewed as "impossible." The US President's Commission [2] to investigate this accident
concludes that "fundamental changes will be necessary in the organization, procedures,
and practices -- and above all - in the attitudes of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and,
to the extent that the institutions we investigated are typical, of the nuclear industry."
In view of the striking similarity in the key conclusions stemming from the investi·
gations of these two accidents, it is reasonable to compare some of the organizational and
administrative issues surrounding them, particularly since both have resulted in slowing
down the production of new energy in an energy-scarce world. The purpose of this
chapter - added to the book after the original manuscript had been completed but before
it had gone to press - is to make such a comparison.
·Parts of this chapter previously appeared in the journal Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 3, 1980.
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It is perhaps surprising that each of these accidents has triggered public controversy
and caused temporary moratoria on further development, since neither accident caused
significant offsite damage. The oil slick at Bravo that escaped being contained did very
little damage to marine life, and no oil reached the Norwegian or Danish shores. The radia-
tion releases at Three Mile Island were largely contained, and the overall health effects
have been found to be minimal. There was no loss of human life in either accident.
Nevertheless a variety of issues underlay both these moratoria. To investigate these
sources of concern is important, but tltis chapter will confine its attention to the organi-
zational and human responses to the two accidents. Nor will it outline the sequence of
events in the accidents or discuss their significance. Certain human and technical features
are comparable, and interested readers are urged to compare them, but a total comparison
is beyond the scope of this chapter. Table 5.1 gives an overview comparison, but readers
interested in more detail should consult other books and papers (for example: for the
Bravo accident, this book and the report of the Commission of Inquiry [1] , for the TMI
accident, Lathrop [3] -- a companion volume to this one ~- and the report of the President's
Commission [2]). A bibliography of some original written testimonies and other general
references of interest is given at the end of tltis chapter.
THE ACTORS
Given an inherent awareness of accident probability, why were these two accidents
seemingly unexpected and the organization and administrative practices surrounding their
management created ad hoc? Such a question can be studied partially by looking at the
actors expected to respond to accidents. Their ideological foundation for safety and acci-
dent management and for its communication and linkage to other social actors appears to
be an important deternlinant of the adequacy of organized responses to large-scale
accidents.
Any technology has a protective core of organizations or actors linked together by
a common ideology or set of oversimplifications of shared knowledge and interests that
supports it, since the technological expertise and the ideology it requires give power to
organized technical experts in private and public bureaucracies. And energy technology
is no exception to the rule. Such influence is communicated to other actors, whether rival,
beneficiary, or sufferer, via information used to foster public opinion to achieve the ends
desired by the technocrats and others sharing the same values [4] . For example, wltile
setting a safety standard directly involves industry designing, manufacturing, supplying,
using, and servicing the technology, as well as the regulator, other actors include unions,
politicians, local governments, residents, consumers, rival technologists, other government
agencies, research experts, etc. Such a broad array of actors drawn into setting a safety
standard can generate conflict because of differing perspectives and ideologies [5] .
This proposition has as its core the concept of actors or social groupings repre-
senting various organizations involved, or wanting to be involved, in the responses to
safety and accident management. As the responses to the accidents at Bravo and TMI
showed, new organizations can be created instantly (as at Bravo) and new roles can be
created by and for existing organizations (as at TM!). Major actor groupings that are use-
ful in examining and comparing accident-management roles and linkages at Bravo and
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Norwegian sector of North Sea
Offshore oil production platform
Oil blowout, first in North Sea
Late evening, eight days
Maintenance program
Mud leaking from valve
Stuck-<Jpen downhole safety valve
Not ready to install backup valve and
installed upside down
Did not act on warnings. Did not share
information between shifts. No formal
engineering education. Lacked experi-
ence of offshore events
Lack of theoretical knowledge. Onsite
but absent. Lacked experience with
events




Existed but no details of inspections.
No plans for stopping uncontrolled
well
Hindered by responses
Not detailed or approved. Changed at
will, poorly organized
Internal communication poor
Nil offsite. Lacked offsite monitoring
and containment equipment
Operators created pooled fund. Public
assumed company liable. North Sea
states agreed to limit liability. Norway
recognized only limited liability
Temporary moratorium on drilling




Core overheat, first in USA
Early morning, six days
Maintenance program
Water leaking from polisher valve
Stuck-<Jpen pilot-<Jperated relief
valve
Not able to see to close backup
valve and shut down cooling pump
Did not act on warnings. Did not
share information between shifts.
No formal engineering education.
Lacked experience with events
Lack of theoretical knowledge. Off-
site. Lacked experience with events




Existed but no details of inspec-
tions. No plans for stopping core
melt
Hindered by design and responses
Not detailed but approved. Poorly
organized
Internal communication poor
Nil offsite. Lacked offsite monitor-
ing equipment. Extensive onsite
Operators sought Price-Anderson
Act to limit liability. Public as-
sumed government liable
Temporary moratorium on new
plants
TMI include: the company(s) owning, operating, and servicing the technology; the govern-
ment agency(s) regulating the technology; the response agency(s) with responsibilities for
managing emergency situations/accidents (this agency can also be part of a regulatory
agency); the inside experts from government agencies, research institutes, companies, and
universities; the heterogeneous social groups impacted, that is, potentially benefiting or
suffering from the technology and any associated accidents; and the exogenous and unor-
ganized influential groups that an accident affects, such as politicians, outside experts,
and news-media representatives.
While each of these actor groupings has a different ideology, including goals. incen-
tives, information, perceptions, and alternatives, the accident is the basis for their being
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bound together in some form of combined and linked management response. Their incon-
sistencies can be used, set aside, ignored. or canceled in order to meet the commonly per-
ceived threat.
No direct a priori organizational forms normally exist to integrate all of these actor
groups; rather the accident itself is the integrating factor. Choices of organizational form
and function have tended to evolve during the course of accidents, as occurred at Bravo
and TM!. The actual responses were ad hoc, based on experiences during the accident,
rather than on normatively derived organizations and administrative practices from a
priori analyses. This ad hoc approach has the advantage of allowing access by certain
impactees and exogenous actors into the accident-management systems, but it can lead to
interference and incorrect interpretations both within the management system itself and
for the public at large. Thus, a planned accident-management system should include seem-
ingly external, but influential and involved, actor groups.
If a large scale, politically important accident can involve such actor groups, the
question is: who is involved and in what ways? The links among these actor groups for
the purposes of onsite accident control, mitigating the offsite consequences, and the
giving and acting on information about the accident are also of concern.
THE ACTOR AND ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSES AT BRAVO AND TMI
Table 5.2 is the cornerstone of the comparisons that this chapter discusses; it lists
six types of actors and has been designed to be self-explanatory, so that only amplifica-
tion of selected issues will be discussed in the text.
For the accident response organizations the significant differences between Bravo
and TMI lie in their manner of creation and the degrees of authority and centralization.
At Bravo an immediate ad hoc decision was made by the Minister for the Environment to
place all major regulatory and supportive actors into one Action Command under a single
leader. While this response existed earlier in outline form, it had never been implemented
and was done so by oral authority within hours after notification of the accident. All on-
site and offsite public responses were placed under this single technocratic actor, and the
Action Command was a direct representative of the central government, so that no politi-
cians had to participate directly in its decisions. The Action Command carried out its
functions through the normal regulators and left the primary responsibility for managing
the onsite and offsite consequences with the operator. In addition, all official statements
were released to the news media through this one body, which eliminated the possibilities
of conflicting and speculative information from the operator or elsewhere within the
government. Finally, the Action Command had a priori authority to take over the manage-
ment of the accident from the operator if it was deemed necessary in the public interest.
At TMI this actor type was created ad hoc in the midst of managing the accident by
the two top politicians concerned, one of whom directed the key offsite responses person-
ally. The organizational form was decentralized into three separate headquarters using
political and technocratic actors whose responsibilities matched their normal jurisdictional
boundaries. An understanding of the accident and communications among these sets of
actors thus became crucial, especially with increasing distance from the site of the acci-
dent. Oral authority was also used by these politicians in the creation of this form of
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Organized at beginning of accident
Direct authority to take over accident
if necessary
One centralized body for onsite/offsite
responses including normal regulators
as part
Worked through normal regulators who
implemented decisions
Centralized source for information
Political role in background
Contingency planning had begun
Reliance on operator self-interest
Preaccident regulatory functions split
by speciality
Local authority of regulator recognized
No a priori accident roles, alternatives
developed
Adopted passive role in accident




Unlimited liability plus obligation
to reimburse offsite costs
Small petroleum company
Reason to expect accident
Primary responsibility for accident
responses
Knew regulator would supplement
response
No a priori alternatives
Used ad hoc external experts
Other operators gave no support
although in plan
Relied on own wishes for offsite
responses (chemicals)
Met with government for public
information
External foreign companies have key
accident control role
No a priori plans for scientific and
foreign support
Plane and computer used in plotting
slick





Organized during the accident
Indirect authority to take over
accident
Actors merged into three groups
with split responses between onsite/
offsite
Finally based on normal regulator
Separate sources for information
Political role required
Contingency planning had not fore-
seen accident
Same as for Bravo
Preaccident regulatory functions
centralized
Regulator has no local offsite
authority
Same as for Brave
Adopted ad hoc active role in
accident
Created political and public
anxieties
Poor internal communications




Same as for Bravo
No a priori regulator response role
Same as for Bravo
Same as for Bravo
Other operators aided in accident
on request
Relied on NRC directives/advice
Met news media alone on request
but later not at all
Manufacturers have key advisory
role
A priori roles transferred to TMI
Same as Bravo (for cloud)









Areas of impact unknown
No a priori roles for communities
Rely on news media for information
Site visit by Prime Minister
No active political role
No a priori roles for news media
News information harmonized and
centralized
Used both officials and professional
news media experts
Outside experts exploited accident
No a priori foreign cooperative/roles
No ongoing international forum
TMI
Areas of impact known
A priori for counties within 5 miles
Same as for Bravo
Site visits by President, Governor
Significant active political role
Same as for Bravo
News information conflicting and
separated
Used officials
Same as for Bravo
Same as for Bravo
Have IAEA
response. Information was given to the news media jointly by the Governor of Pennsyl-
vania and a designated representative of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), both
of whom were directing the key onsite and offsite accident-management activities. The
Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA), which was given greater authority
during the accident, became separated from the information flow from the Governor's
Office during the later stages of the accident.
Accident management was split among different actors because of the unfamiliarity
with nuclear accidents, the slow recognition of the nature of the accident, conflicting
information and recommendations from the NRC, the rising interest and conflicting infor-
mation being presented in the news media, the potential for public misinformation and
panic, and the potential political impacts on government and the future use of nuclear
power. Three separate accident-management and information centers were established ad
hoc during the course of the accident. This arrangement was only possible because of
action by the State Governor and the President of the USA, who acted to limit the
sources of information and to consolidate the supporting agencies. These centers were:
the onsite accident center at the TMI plant, which was supplemented by NRC head-
quarters staff, where one man became the source of all technical and onsite information;
the offsite accident-management center in the State Governor's Office, which coordinated
all state and federal responses and was the source of information on evacuation and other
protective measures; and the President's Office, which coordinated the federal agency
responses for emergency relief and gave out information on this effort.
The direct responsibility for onsite management of the nuclear accident became a
moot point as events progressed, because of the increasing involvement of the NRC in
cooling down the reactor. No a priori authority existed for the NRC to take over the
management of the plant from the NRC licensee-{)perator. In addition, the operator was re-
quested not to release information to the news media and was not present at press briefings.
The normal regulators at Bravo and TMI played different roles in managing these
accidents. The crucial differences are that the NRC headquarters first took an ad hoc
active role in the accident at a distance, and later onsite at TMI when asked to do so by
the President of the USA. Accident information that got to Washington, DC from the site
generated considerable concern and some hasty recommendations, which, in turn,
Organizational issues at Bravo and TMI: a comparison 81
prompted misinformed advice to offsite managers and speculative statements to the news
media. The NRC role at the site contributed to its onsite management, while the NRC in
Washington, DC created needless anxieties among offsite managers and the general pub-
lic. The details of the information flow between the NRC Regional and Washington, DC
Offices are not clear from accident accounts. No a priori scientific knowledge seemed to
guide the NRC in responding to this multifaceted accident or in understanding the nature
of the hydrogen bubble. This combined lack of scientific knowledge and appropriate
responses was a shortcoming and should have acted as a brake on hasty and speculative
statements-to the accident managers and the news media [2].
During the Bravo accident the onsite regulator, the Oil Directorate, played only the
passive role of checking and assessing the operator's prospective plans for controling the
accident. This regulator then advised the Action Command on the quality of the plans
presented. The offsite regulator, the Pollution Control Authority, played a supplementary
role in that it directed the operator to use mechanical pollution-control devices and aided
Phillips in finding and using them.
The operators at Bravo and TMl each had primary responsibility for preventing and
responding to accidents. Each responded similarly by protecting their employees and
physical plant, by calling in industrial experts to supplement their efforts, and by notify-
ing and cooperating with government regulators and accident managers. Also, each oper-
ator cooperated with the wishes of its government's accident-response actor with regard
to the news media. Neither operator relied on previously developed assessments of alter-
natives in responding to the set of events confronting him, including preventing escalation
of the accident level as well as responding to it. Accident management was not a priority
for these two operators.
Both of these accidents should have been expected. However, in both cases the
supervisory and operational staffs did not respond correctly while the accident was still
preventable. Once the accident had occurred, the experts from elsewhere in the industry
occupied key roles in bringing it under control.
At Bravo Phillips Petroleum had the primary responsibility for preventing and res-
ponding to an accident. This responsibility existed, even though the 1977 accident oc-
curred during a time of transition from few preparations to moving toward an adequate
posture for mobilizing to meet this responsibility. Thus, it would seem that the govern-
ment regulators should have had some role or means of supplementing the operator's
existing responses before the operator was fully capable of responding to an accident in
the required manner. The reason given for not having such supplementary postures a
priori was the belief that no accident would happen in the interim, the fact that the
requirements had already been imposed on the operators, and concern for diluting the
operator's degree of responsibility.
Other oil companies operating in the Norwegian sector of the North Sea did not
come to the aid of Phillips in this accident. Although a cooperative plan existed among
the oil companies, it was not followed. On the other hand, at least one offer from the UK
sector was received and accepted. Apparently, a fear of future government responses
toward oil development inhibited the oil companies responding to Phillips' plight, as
well as the government's decision to ignore the use of chemicals, which was the only
alternative the oil companies could immediately use in a joint response. Requirements
now exist for intercompany responses to accidents based on the use of mechanical
methods of pollution control.
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At TMI the company itself had the primary responsibility for responding to the
accident, as long as the status of the accident and its consequences were contained
within the perimeter of the plant site. The plant staff summoned technical engineers
from its parent company for operational efforts to contain the accident. In addition, the
plant supervisor brought in representatives from Babcock and Wilcox, the designers and
constructors of the reactor cooling systems, their control, and their instrumentation.
Finally, at a later stage in the accident, aid was requested from the nuclear industry,
which responded by creating an ad hoc advisory group consisting of representatives from
other private nuclear plants. Because the consequences of the accident went beyond the
plant itself, into the adjacent environment and beyond, the plant supervisor also notified
PEMA, the regional office of the NRC, the local county, the parent company, the Brook-
haven National Laboratory, the Pennsylvania Bureau of Radiation Protection, and the
State Police. The supervisor also dispatched onsite and offsite radiation monitoring teams.
The experts used in responding to each of these accidents had similar tasks: to con-
trol the accident, to track and predict the radiation cloud/oil slick, and to help control
the consequences. At Bravo no scientific roles for experts had been developed a priori.
and so they were initiated by the scientists, while at TMI scientific roles developed for
government nuclear facilities were transferred on request to the TMI situation. However,
at Bravo scientists generally agreed on the predictions and state of the oil slick, while at
TMI considerable disagreement existed over the nature and consequences of the accident
and its radioactive emissions. Industrial experts were directly involved in controlling the
accident itself, while government experts concentrated on the bubble and offsite impacts.
A priori and integrated roles had not been developed for these actors.
The total reliance on one foreign expert with no local experience for the key role of
regaining control at Bravo might appear as a weakness in an effective accident-management
system. While the Red Adair Company has a worldwide reputation within oil-company
circles, the vast majority of its experience rests with killing blowouts on land where access
to and space for amassing equipment to kill the blowing well is always available. However,
the design, height, and complexity of the large North Sea offshore platform hinders the
use of capping procedures. Therefore, a possibility of prolonged offshore accidents exists,
and localized experience in developing internal, integrated expertise has been suggested.
The impactees for these two accidents were quite different: Bravo affected marine
life and potentially threatened coastal communities, whereas TMI potentially threatened
the lives and health of residents in the area. However, in each of these accidents no major
adverse impacts occurred to workers, residents, or the biological environment. In fact,
one could conclude that the offsite damages were virtually nil in both cases. A priori roles
were underdeveloped for potentially affected residents, and the information links for
most impactees were the news media.
At both Bravo and TMI exogenous actors became increasingly involved during the
course of the accidents. Politicians were essential actors in both cases. However, the
immediate appointment and confirmation of a politically delegated authority at Bravo
ensured the role of the Action Command as the accident manager. At TMI, two politicians
had to intervene during the accident to bring order out of the seeming chaos created by
conflicting information and recommendations. Site visits were made by politicians in
both countries.
The news media played a significant part in relaying information to area residents,
national citizens, and the world at large. News reporters were from local, national, and
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foreign sources, all serving different interests and making different demands on the infor-
mation machinery. No public information roles and facilities had been developed before
these accidents occurred. Consequently, both information sources and their quality con-
tributed to the confusion, particularly at TMI. News representatives assigned to cover
these two accidents did not have enough technical knowledge to judge the content of the
information or to develop useful questions to be put to accident managers.
Outside experts used both of these accidents as vehicles to convey their views to the
news media on the technologies and their broader public impacts. Such views were used
for a variety of reasons. even to convey a lack of confidence in the accident managers'
information. These reported views contributed to public alarm during the accidents and
to the decisions for temporary moratoria made by politicians after them.
Foreign observers were present at each of these accidents and their demands for
information were high because of the actual and perceived consequences in their own
countries. At Bravo foreign observers were present throughout the accident and observed
the conduct of the Action Command. In addition, foreign observers were present in air-
craft tracking the direction and extent of the oil slick. Finally, foreign groups played
essential roles in the pollution-control effort to contain and capture the oil slick. The
Bravo accident prompted a closer cooperation between Norway and the UK in planning
integrated accident-management responses. At TMI foreign observers were present at the
NRC office at Washington, DC during and after the accident, and later at the plant itself.
In addition, international agencies have studied the implications of both of these accidents.
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 group the six actor types into the preaccident management sys-
tem, the ad hoc organized responses, and the unorganized accident responses. These three
sets of accident responses existed at both Bravo and TMI and could, therefore, be expected
to exist in various forms in future major accidents. Together, these three sets of responses
constituted the overall accident-management system.
/~------, /-----~,
1 Exogenous: '\ 1/Exogenous: \
I Media } \ Ad hoc I /' Politicians I
I Foreign observers ~ \ accident V /' I
I Outsiders \ '-" manager /'~ /'I \ '- /'-~'- /' /' I II Impactees: \} '-,< ;>-'~/' I fExperts: " I
I C t I 't' \ Accident /I I Environment sCience Ioas a communi les / I -+ ~ F" II"\ F" h \ response' - - - I ~ orelgn po utlon I
IS ermen ~ / \ \ .- - - ~ control
\..... Government \ / ;£?tacttrtt:~ \ I
-------"""" v ........ -......... /\ Red Adair Company I
Unorganized r ~- - /"""\ - -+ - ~ -.t-,\ I
accident \ Normal \ I Support -1 ....... /
responses \ regulator(s) actor;.,.../ - Ad h;;;--
\ ../ /' I organized
\ / /' / responses
Authority " /Ipreaccident
' ....... _ _'" management
- - - - - Information _
-_ _ system

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































co ~ ~ ~ [ ~
Organizational issues at Bravo and TMI: a comparison 85
The arrangement at Bravo in Figure 5.1 shows the central role of the accident man-
ager. Even though it was established ad hoc, it functioned well in its relations with the
operator, normal regulators, and politicians. Because the normal regulators were part of
this ad hoc accident-management actor, and because onsite and offsite responses were
under its authority, a prolonged accident would probably not have changed this organiza-
tional arrangement.
The organizational setup at TMI shown in Figure 5.2 was the dispersed arrangement
that existed at the end of the accident. At the beginning conflicting information sources
and a lack of understanding of the nature of the accident led to losses of credibility, pub-
licly in the operator, and politically in the regulator. These problems led to a threeway
division of responsibility: an ad hoc onsite manager was created, the Governor's Office
was used to direct offsite responses, and the President's Office directed federal agency
emergency support. Had the accident persisted, this arrangement could be expected to
have been centralized further into one authority handling all responses.
CONCLUSIONS ON ACCIDENT-MANAGEMENT ACTORS AND THEIR
ORGANIZAnON
Although the experiences of those responding to the Bravo and TMI accidents have
been described and compared only briefly, it is possible to formulate some conclusions.
As these conclusions have been drawn from only two cases, they may be changed by
future experience. However, it is clear that they represent important issues to be dealt
with.
A major conclusion is the lack of a priori roles for accident management by all of
the actor types involved. For both Bravo and TMI even the accident-response actors were
not prepared for immediate active involvement either onsite or offsite. While a major Nor-
wegian response system had been legislated and was being prepared, no plans existed for
the interval before the planned system could be completed. The NRC office at Washing-
ton, DC, on the other hand, did not have preparations for active involvement with appro-
priate backup in an uncontained nuclear accident. The lack of prior agreed roles also
extends to the planned use of the normal regulator, the operator, industry and govern-
ment experts, scientific experts, the politicians, the news media, the outside experts, and
those impacted upon by the accident.
The lack of foresight about active accident-management and supporting-actor roles
seems to have stemmed from accidents being viewed as preventable. While both the Bravo
and TMI accidents were found to have been wholly preventable, both still happened.
Thus, one must conclude that technically "preventable" accidents cannot always be pre-
vented and roles must be developed for coping with the unexpected. In addition, since
transition periods always exist, it is also important for interim roles to exist, regardless
of the posited roles in the end of a transition period.
Accident-management bodies are also temporary, substitute decision-making actors,
and they were prominent in both accidents, particularly at Bravo with the ad hoc Action
Command for overall management and the Red Adair Company for managing the accident-
control process. At TMI the substitute decision makers included the ad hoc active politi-
cians and the ad hoc industry and regulatory responders. The use of substitute decision-
making actors raises such questions as authority, responsibility, liability, appropriate
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alternatives, and future working patterns, all of which impact on the relations between
the operator and the normal regulator.
Reliance on substitute actors of any type, whether decision-makers or supporting
experts, can lead to difficulty in the postaccident phase. Once the accident is over or
otherwise under control, the substitute actor has completed his task, leaving the normal
regulator and operator to cope with and adjust to the consequences. In addition, at both
Bravo and TMI a temporary investigatory actor appeared in the postaccident phase; such
an actor can further disrupt the regulator-operator relations. If substitute actors work
through or with the normal regulators and operators, accident management could be rein-
forced as an issue requiring greater attention by both regulator and operator, and a
smoother transition to the postaccident phase would ensue.
Previously assumed exogenous actors were involved in both of these accidents.
Politicians, the news media, outside experts, and foreign observers all played important
roles during and after each accident. No a priori roles existed for these actors, and one
can conclude that they were initially viewed as exogenous by all preaccident actor
groups. However, both Bravo and TMI showed that these actor types can play significant
roles in accident management and should therefore be integrated into the preaccident,
accident, and postaccident plans. Consideration for these actors and assessments of their
responses before an accident can lead to greater management effectiveness and reduced
stress in the onsite and offsite accident-response actors during the accident itself. Exclu-
sion of these exogenous actors a priori led to unforeseen political consequences on later
energy development, alarming news reports, and heightened anxiety on the part of the
general public.
One can conclude that a centralized' organizational form is needed as near to the
accident scene as possible. The TMI accident showed the confusion and loss of political
and public credibility that can occur from a decentralized system that is at varying dis-
tances from the accident. In addition, such confusion can be abetted through ad hoc
arrangements to create a different organizational form during the accident. The loss of
credibility can also extend well beyond the accident itself to limit the role of the use of
the technology in question, as shown by the current moratorium on nuclear energy in the
USA and elsewhere.
In contrast, the Bravo accident demonstrated that a centralized system where
accident-response actors and normal regulators are merged into one body can be a work-
able arrangement. Under this form, news-information sources, directions and advice to
the operator, and advice to impactees and politicians are all centralized. In this way both
political and public confidence can be maintained even in the face of an evolving or
expanding accident with an uncertain outcome.
Another major conclusion from this overview of the Bravo and TMI accidents is
that there is a need for research based on systems analysis using social scientists as an
integral part of the planning process. Any accident-management system is based on indi-
vidual and organizational actors, and the causes of the Bravo and TMI accidents have been
attributed to weaknesses among the actors responsible for preventing these two prevent-
able accidents. Viewing these accidents from a perspective based on a recognition of at
least these six actor types requires a systems point-of-view based on social science. Both
the Bravo and TMI accidents reveal that the fundamental human and organizational rela-
tionships and values had not previously been subjected to study. Systems analysts and
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FIGURE 5.3 A suggested accident-management system for recognizing and organizing responses in
the preaccident phase.
social scientists should examine their implicit assumptions about doing research and inte-
grate their roles into an applied focus on accidents and their social consequences. Certainly,
the findings of such research can and should be an integral part of the structure of a total
accident-management system.
Thus, the extent of actual damage to impactees cannot be viewed as the most signi-
ficant factor in these accidents. Both at Bravo and TMI the offsite damages sustained
were nil, yet both resulted in political decisions for temporary moratoria on further devel-
opment. Technical defenses for containing the consequences of an accident only appear
to reduce the immediate effects on impactees. Politicians, the news media, and the general
public can generate long-range effects, regardless of the energy benefits involved. There-
fore, wider preaccident consultations, open twoway flows of information, and participa-
tory roles for heretofore exogenous actors may be useful in reducing political conse-
quences.
RECOMMENDAnONS ON ORGANIZING FOR ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT
Figure 5.3 portrays an accident-management system that displays a priori roles and
linkages based on a centralized organizational form for the actor types discussed in this
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chapter. Such a management system specifies roles for the responses of all actors before a
major accident happens. This framework gives a formal basis for the necessary ad hoc
actions and informal bargaining that arise during an accident. The organizational system
must be arranged so that the roles occupied and the performances in these roles are
rewarded or penalized by an incentive system at least equal to the severity of the conse-
quences expected in an accident. Separation of roles in the preaccident phase and the ad
hoc emergence of new roles in the accident phase imply that individual incentive systems
can color accident responses more than the needs of the accident as a whole. A more ratio-
nal a priori system with an integrated set of incentives for integrated management res-
ponses is the basis for more effective accident management. The sum of individual capaci-
ties to respond to an accident cannot be expected to fulfill automatically the needs for
adequate responses. Because ad hoc, unorganized, or exogenous actors will emerge and
become involved with a previously organized system in a major accident, it is important
to integrate their expected (and unexpected) responses into a total accident-management
system.
Regardless of the formal creation of roles among the various actors that can be
expected to become involved in a major accident, one encounters professional ideologies
from such actors that can inhibit its operation. One such bias is that regulators and opera-
tors become enamored of the third-party benefits of energy and tend to lose sight of the
third-party costs involved. For example, the responses to intermediate multicause acci-
dents involving the man--machine interface have not been the subject of much study. One
reason for this oversight is that the technological prevention of a total or massive accident
has occupied much of the research resources. Many references contrast a total accident
with total prevention, with the result that little is known about intermediate accidents
and their appropriate, alternative intermediate responses.
When it comes to the ideologies surrounding accident management, it seems that
the greater the implicit consensus among actors the greater the concern for gaps in their
responses. Each organization has a dominant professional bias and its own collective wis-
dom or "mindset." Such devices are important for minimizing normal uncertainties inter-
nal to the individual actor, but these values and assumptions also lead to greater uncer-
tainties within the overall accident-management system. Explicit and implicit value differ-
ences exist among the actors that can be expected to be involved in responding to a major
accident. The more the implicit values and assumptions separating these actors can be
discovered and questioned, the more differences among actors will appear. Such question-
ing can lead to self-examination among individual actors and collectively as part of an
accident-management system. However, the more fundamental issues and need for self-
examination, the less each is willing to do so, especially with other actors in the manage-
ment system. Thus, the externally appointed investigatory body in the postaccident
phase plays an essential role in requiring this questioning process and in attempting to
see the preaccident phases together as a system of interconnected responses. The real
need, however, is to create and structure this fundamental questioning process in the
preaccident phase, rather than after an accident occurs.
Figure 5.3, of course, is a static picture, and some process for questioning the values
inherent in developing such a system is necessary. Dialectical planning processes are a way
of attempting to create a more comprehensive and realistic accident-management system.
Such a process can lead to the fundamental questions of which actors should be involved
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in the system, how they should be involved, and which (unexpected) responses should be
planned for before they occur. The preaccident planning approach suggested here could
prove useful in determining a priori sources of conflict in ideologies and using them cre-
atively in designing the entire management system. Certainly, a dialectical planning
approach is a way to overcome the existence of the rigid "mindset" that the President's
Commission [2] found to be at the core of the issues surrounding the TMI accident. In
addition, an organizational expert [6] has noted: " ... we know how to cope with contin-
uous change but not with discontinuous change ... when discontinuities do occur, they
upset things in a big way because then the underlying assumptions of the past no longer
apply."
In my research on these two accidents in the oil and nuclear industries, I have
found a belief in uniqueness to be prevalent among regulators and operators. Before the
fact, each accident was viewed as "impossible"; after the fact, each was viewed as
"unique," the result of a particular one-time configuration of weaknesses that in combina-
tion led to the accident. Thus, it was assumed that such weaknesses had now been ac-
counted for and that organizational and administrative weaknesses would no longer be an
issue. I suggest that the ideology of uniqueness is a myth and that the experiences of
these two accidents show that comparative systems analyses of accident management will
be useful.
Why should the management of near and actual accidents have been downplayed in
the organization and administrative practices surrounding the design, construction, licens-
ing, operation, and servicing of offshore platforms and nuclear reactors? Such a question
can be approached partially through two further questions.
I. What are the fundamental professional ideology, adrninistrative outlook, or
attitudes toward safety and accident management held by the industry and
its regulators?
2. How are complex questions of safety and accident management formed and
put forth or merchandized to others by the industry and its regulators?
This short chapter could not hope to deal with these two significant questions; it
is my hope that subsequent research on actor behavior can bring penetrating analysis to
bear on these questions.
SOURCES OF INFORMAnON
The discussions in this chapter are based on material from many sources. Personal
interviews with Hans Chr. Bugge (Director of Action Command for the Bravo blowout
and Director of the Pollution Control Authority), Arne Flikke (Director of Oil Pollution,
Pollution Control Authority), Dag Meier-Hansen (Director of Operations, Oil Directorate),
Bj¢rn Myklatun (Senior Surveyor, Det Norske Veritas), and Torvald Sande (Director of
Safety, Oil Directorate) yielded valuable information about the Bravo accident, while
Robert Arnold (Director of Recovery Operations at TMI, Metropolitan-Edison, and Gen-
eral Public Utility), Harold Collins (Assistant Director of Emergency Preparedness, Nuc-
lear Regulatory Commission), Oran Henderson (Director of Pennsylvania Emergency
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Management Agency), and Dudley Thompson (Assistant Director for Inspection and
Enforcement, Nuclear Regulatory Commission) were equally forthright about the Three
Mile Island accident. I was present at the briefing arranged for foreign observers by the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission on May 21 and May 22, 1979, and also attended the
Congressional hearings on the same subject - the Subcommittee on Energy Research and
Production, House Committee on Science and Technology, May 23, 1979, and the Sub-
committee on Energy and Environment, House Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs, May 24, 1979. In addition to references specifically quoted in the text, many
other written testimonies and general sources of information about the two accidents
discussed in this chapter are available and were freely used in its preparation. Rather
than overburden the text with these, a general bibliography is given at the end of the
chapter and this should be of interest to readers who want to study such material more
closely.
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5 SUMMARY OF ISSUES ARISING FROM THE BLOWOUTWORKSHOP
David W. Fischer
This chapter summarizes the issues stemming from the workshop on blowout con-
trol and management. The workshop addressed issues that were of interest to operators,
regulators, and independent experts from North Sea countries; viewpoints were presented
in prepared papers, informal remarks, and ensuing discussions. The format for this chap-
ter follows the general structure of the workshop.
NATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
Economic Background
The economy of a country has much to do with the importance it attaches to oil
and gas production, and therefore its attitude to blowout risk and accidents. For example,
the oil and gas income from Norway's Ekofisk Field exceeds the income from its tradi-
tional fish and agricultural industries and even exceeds the amount collected from per-
sonal income tax. Thus, any interruption to oil and gas production is very damaging;
indeed an estimate of state income lost during the Bravo blowout was US $100 million.
The importance of this economic factor was stressed in papers by Bugge and by Fairclough.
Other Economic Interests
Each North Sea country has other economic interests that may conflict with oil and
gas production; these interests may also be greatly affected by any related accidents. In
Norway the fishing industry is widespread and contributes greatly to national income and
global dietary requirements; therefore, it sees the impact of an oil slick as potentially
catastrophic. This point formed the basis of a paper by FrPyn.
Political Implications
All participants in a major blowout expect political consequences; response to a
blowout is also regarded by government, the news media, and the general public as a
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political event. This was borne out both at the Bravo blowout in the Norwegian sector
and in tanker spills off the UK. The blowouts triggered discussion on overall oil policy and
renewed debate on past environmental and safety conflicts of oil-related developments. A
paper by Fairclough showed the political repercussions of the Torrey Canyon oil spill.
Political Background
The political situation in a country influences the overall priority attached to oil
gas production and any related accidents. In Norway significant opposition to oil develop-
ment from several parts of the political spectrum (leftists and liberal groups as well as
agricultural and fisheries interests) occurred in parliament; this delayed oil exploration
north of latitude 62° N. The Bravo blowout happened at the time of this debate and
heightened the concern and strength of the anti-oil faction. The political responses to a
massive offshore pollution incident were discussed by Bugge and by Fairclough.
Specific Political Interest
Political concern over oil accidents and their consequences is heightened by a blow-
out or spill. After the Bravo and Torrey Canyon accidents, both the UK and Norway
formed investigating bodies, presented white papers to their parliaments, created commis-
sions, established research projects, and reorganized parts of governmental machinery to
cope with oil accidents. Both Bugge and Fairclough outlined this aspect in their papers.
Social Background
The social character of the region of a country most affected by the oil industry
and its related accidents is also important. Both Scotland and Norway have very rural
coastal areas with traditional lifestyles, which would be severely affected by sustained oil
blowouts or spills. Thus one region suffers the disadvantages of development, while the
other regions and other countries benefit. While no paper at the workshop addressed this
issue specifically, it did form part of the. discussions.
PREVENTIVE ISSUES
Limited Data
Because the number of blowouts worldwide is small, and they are limited to general
areas, it is difficult to obtain reliable statistical data for determining accurately blowout
risk elsewhere. However, large platforms with large numbers of people demand strict
accident prevention measures. Fault-tree analyses are done to try to improve safety, and
hazardous conditions can then be recognized and minimized. Fjeld's paper outlined the
worldwide statistics available for the last decade and Vede1er's paper suggested the criteria
that must be considered if safety during drilling is to be improved.
Blowout workshop: the main issues
Human Error
95
Risk analysis has shown that human error is a prime cause of blowouts. Such errors
occur when the drilling crew must make immediate decisions about unexpected reservoir
conditions, when they are without adequate supervision, and often when they are tired
and under stress, such as early in the morning. Improvements in the level of supervision,
reservoir prediction, crew training, the reliability of safety valves, and reporting procedures
will all help to avoid aCl;:idents. Papers by Fjeld and by Vedeler summarized some key fac-
tors in preventing blowouts, including that of human error. The paper by B¢e considered
the broader aspects of the human-technology interface.
Methods for Risk Prediction
Fault-tree analysis is the basic tool for predicting the probability of failure, and
consequences analysis is used for estimating damages associated with such failure. These
tools serve as a device for communicating between interested bodies and establishing con-
trol procedures. However, it is difficult, time-consuming, and expensive to undertake such
studies, and their usefulness is often questioned because of the inability to quantify the
actual risk. Thus oil companies have so far rejected the need for such studies. A paper by
Fjeld and Myklatun summarized the steps in a total risk analysis, while Lathrop's paper
provided the theoretical basis for such an analysis.
Disclosure of Information
The use of risk analysis is inhibited because companies and some governmental
bodies withhold information. This reluctance to share information is for the benefit of
commercial interests- the stockholders of companies or the clients of government institu-
tions. These points were raised during the discussion and were found to militate against
an adequate risk-management system. For example, it was stated that Norway has tried
for five years to get more information to enhance safety evaluation. One strategy for get-
ting more information is to work with each individual company, rather than an associa-
tion of companies.
Blowout Preventer Valves
Blowout preventer valves (BOPs) proved to be of differing design and quality. A
direct transfer of experience from the Gulf of Mexico was insufficient for North Sea
operations and conditions. The design, functioning, and testing of BOPs were thrown into
confusion. The susceptibility of these valves to fire and explosion was particularly impor-
tant. The use of failsafe design and materials was considered necessary, and work is to be
directed to this end.
Safety Philosophy
Other issues emerging during the discussion were how much safety is "enough" and
how should safety questions be decided. Company and UK regulatory authorities opt for
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rather general approaches to safety, while Norway now requires more specific measures. All
at the workshop agreed that, while too detailed a specification of safety requirements can be
costly, the problem of insufficient safeguards, especially related to human behavior and
matching components is very real. To rely solely on operator experience as the basis for
avoiding accidents and near-accidents seems unwarranted. The safety limits of an individ-
ual country seem to be decided on the basis of past experiences and the economic and
political interests affected. Papers by Me. by Bugge, and by Fairclough touched on this
point. Also a paper by George and Read reviewed how safety measures in offshore oil
production evolved.
Design Conflicts
A problem of concern to regulators is the adequacy of the total system design. In
Norway one such issue has been the use of a separate platform for the crew rather than
a reinforced crew compartment on the drilling platform. Another such issue has been how
to improve the design of safety systems to match increased production; for example, at
Bravo the fire-fighting vessel spray did not reach the platform deck. A recent report has
shown that maintenance of large North Sea platforms is becoming more difficult and
costly because the stress on platforms is greater than that assumed by the designers.
Safety valves used in the Gulf of Mexico are unsuitable for use in the North Sea. The
design for efficient production can conflict with the optimum design for accident preven-
tion; for example, covering well-heads in concrete for fire and dropped-object protection
hinders ease of well capping. While many of these points emerged only in the discussion,
a paper by B¢e considered the factors involved in designing a safety-conscious offshore
operation.
Operator-Regulator Relations
It was considered essential for the operator and the regulator to maintain good
communications. A difficulty is to get the platform crews to use established procedures
to keep the regulator well informed, and to pass on ad hoc information. Designation of
individuals, well known to the platform crews, to receive up-to-date reports and informa-
tion was seen as important if communications are to be improved and if the confidence of
drilling personnel is to be gained and unsafe drilling conditions are to be promptly re-
ported to the regulator. On the other hand, the regulator should not interfere in worker-
management relations. However, in both the USA and Canada, good working relations
between drilling crews and regulators allow the regulator to keep management informed
on ways of improving safety. This situation helps to get near-accident feedback into the
routine management of actual drilling. All agreed that communications between operator
and regulator improve after a disaster, since both parties suffer during such an event.
Safety Research
North Sea operators and countries evince more interest in safety research than was
formerly the case. Norway has launched a major four-year offshore industrial-safety
research program with the emphasis on human functioning in a sociotechnical system
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and comprehensive risk analysis of offshore activities. In addition, specific technical solu-
tions and safety procedures are to be devised for preventing and responding to offshore
accidents. A systems analysis was the basis for the research design. Finally, Norway's
experience with the Bravo blowout led to requirements for improved training of drilling
personnel, more detailed regulations for technical inspection and control of drilling opera-
tions, approved operator control plans, and research on well-maintenance problems. B¢e's




The role and degree of contingency planning was at issue during the workshop. One
regulator felt that a systems analyst could do far more harm than good through using
faulty assumptions and relying solely on available data. On the other hand, an analyst
argued for greater specification of the alternatives available before accidents happened, in
order to reduce "ad hocracy." The problems of advance planning are compounded because
accidents rarely happen in the same way and even the best plan cannot provide total con-
trol over the necessary responses. A point stressed, however, is that, once a blowout has
occurred, timing may not be a problem, because of the accepted duration of blowouts.
Therefore, greater reliance was placed on general contingency plans, even though Norway
was moving toward greater specificity. Norway favored standardized, specific plans, while
the UK preferred more diverse arrangements prompted by the operators involved. While it
was seen as "dangerous" to specify safety responses too soon, it was also seen as equally
dangerous to rely solely on operator experience and self-interest. Examples of factors for
contingency planning can be seen in papers by Killerud and by von Winterfeldt.
Fire Fighting
The highest priority in well control was given to fire fighting, in order to protect
the platform during a blowout. The issue was how such protection activities are to be
carried out. One way was to design a fire-extinguishing system as part of the platform it-
self, including a device that would inhibit the spread of fire - filling structural members
with water or spraying concrete on them. Another alternative was using a vessel to fight
fires that would be permanently stationed in the drilling area. In order to reduce the
expense of this standby vessel, suggestions were made on how it could be used for other
purposes, such as diving and inspection. Whether or not this would create difficulties has
yet to be decided. In addition, a problem was seen in that the largest available fire vessel
will not meet the demands of the largest platforms planned. Concrete-covered wellheads
inhibit the ability of a water spray to fight fire, even though this covering gives greater
protection to the wellheads from dropped objects. Response times for fire-fighting ves-
sels were also known, and some research was under way on the costs and benefits of
various delay times. The effects of fire on safety valves was also seen as an important




A primary method for controlling wells is capping to stop thc flow. Various views
cxisted on how this capping was to be done. Operators tended to see each blowout as
unique and to rely exclusively on outsidc spccialists such as the Red Adair Company. In
Norway greater oil company expertise, planning, and capping equipment are now seen to
be necessary at all times on the platform. The matching of equipment is also a problem;
the scale of a barge to be used as a working platform must be matched to the platform it
serves. Fireproofing and protecting the wellheads from dropped objects hamper capping
operations, and encasing the wellcasing and structural members of the platform with con-
crete hampers the detection of blowing wells. An undersea wellhead creates additional
problems if capping is to be attempted; little research has been done on this problem.
Research on well capping is now increasing and more attention is being paid to supporting
facilities and equipment; howcver, platform design has not yet been influenced by cap-
ping requirements. In particular, ease of firc fighting conflicts with ease of capping, and
the new large concrete platforms make detecting the blowing well and capping even more
difficult.
Relief Drilling
The major way to ease pressure on a blowing well is to drill a relief well into the
geological structure. However, relief drilling is difficult in bad weather and when mobile
rigs are unavailable. A suggestion was made that a rclief drill should form part of the larger
platforms; another suggestion was to maintain a log of available rigs or require the pres-
ence of two drilling rigs in remote areas. When the North Sea becomes solely production-
oriented, it may be necessary for the regulator to acquire one or two mobile exploration
rigs for possible use as relief rigs. Safety measures during relief drilling were seen to be
important, as well as problems of weather if a barge containing pumping equipment was
hooked to the relief rig. Given the high productivity of North Sea wells and the degree of
concern for the marine environment, relief drilling was seen to be an urgent necessity to
satisfy politicians that all available precautions were being taken.
Degree of Readiness
Some concern was evidenced over the requirement for major preparations in advance
of an incident. A priori requirements were seen to depend on standardized equipment and
to lack the ability to adapt to an emergency. Also, single-purpose equipment was too
expensive to be simply on standby, whereas multipurpose equipment was even more
expensive in itself. Since operators tend to have differing operating philosophies, and
since they view each blowout as unique, there has been some resistance to standardization.
For a small country, however, there is a need to standardize procedures and equipment
and to establish a standby capability.
Scene of Well Control
The distances between the scene of an accident, company headquarters, and the
regulator were seen as hampering well-control operations. Perceptions of the problems,
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and hence workable solutions, may differ because of this. Obtaining good communications
and adequate company expertise at the scene of the accident were regarded as important
factors in well control.
Information Availability
Since a major blowout has political repercussions, the availability of current and
accurate information to the government, public bodies, the news media, and the general
public is important. The necessity is both to get and to give timely and accurate informa-
tion to support good decision-making. To provide such a flow requires good working rela-
tions with the operator, separate emergency communication channels, full communication
facilities, the confidence of the news media, good facilities for reporters, and swift access
to operator and government. Information is also necessary to counter opinion based on
previous blowout experiences elsewhere that may be misleading with respect to the new
event. In addition, knowledge of the relation of blowout information to overall oil policy
is important. Both operator and regulator are affected in the long term by the information
retained by the public after a blowout has been controlled.
Role of an Action Command
Discussion was devoted to the question of an ad hoc action command or substitute
decision-making body to spearhead a government's response to a blowout. While most
agreed that such a body should only observe, advise, support, and approve the oil com-
panies' efforts, differences existed over how such activities were to be conducted and
what was the most efficient role for government experts. Differences emerged on whether
government experts should remain in their normal chain of command or be under an ad
hoc body. There was a warning that such an ad hoc body could make operations more
dangerous, because they were independent and isolated from knowledge of day-to-day
regulatory procedures and practices. Following the Norwegian experience at Bravo, it
was suggested that representatives on an action command should also function in day-to-
day regulatory roles. If a separate group were brought in, such as a special quasi-military
unit trained in making quick decisions, the danger exists that the government might take
over the entire operation, and potentially damage future regulatory and operational pro-
cedures, communications, and trust. A government takeover might also give the impres-
sion that operators are less responsible for impacts resulting from their activities. How-
ever, the Bravo experience showed that use of an ad hoc body set up by the government
worked well to provide timely advice to Phillips. In addition, the potential for a more
active government role in that situation existed if it had been deemed necessary.
POLLUTION-CONTROL ISSUES
Pollution Threat of Blowouts
While it was conceded that blowouts can cause a significant amount of pollution
from spilled oil, an opinion was held that tanker spills were a far greater menace. A
representative of the UK felt that Norwegian tankers, and those from other countries to
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an even greater extent, posed a greater pollution threat to UK waters than blowouts or
chronic discharges. Norwegians however, showed greater concern for oil pollution from
platforms. Both of these perspectives reflect the threat each country faces. The UK is
now experiencing tanker traffic moving almost 300 million tons of oil a year along its
south coast and has also experienced major oil spills from tankers such as the Amoco
Cadiz, Eleni V, and Christos Bitas in 1978 alone. Norway, on the other hand, has a com-
paratively small tanker traffic along its coast, but does have oil drilling that extends into
its northern waters. While the paper by Fjeld saw a relatively low threat of drilling pollu-
tion risk, Norwegian officials stressed that, when an accident does occur, its effects can be
sudden, massive, and concentrated, with impacts going well beyond pollution.
Biological and Ecological Impact
Differences in scientific opinion existed over the impact of spilled oil on the marine
environment. Some felt that biological research would not be able to answer all the ques-
tions on impact before the North Sea oilfields were exhausted. Others quoted past research
showing that spilled oil seemed to have minimal immediate impacts and no lasting effects.
However, it was feared that oil might have great long-term effects on both fish and their
habitats, even though current research had not yet revealed such effects. All agreed that
the severity of impacts depends on the type of oil spilled, and where and when it is spilled.
While the papers by Cowell, F¢yn, and Morris showed some of this concern, the discus-
sions on these papers evoked sharp differences of opinion.
Economic Impact
The enormous cost of attempting to clean a patch of sea was of great concern.
Given the lack of knowledge about environmental impact, could this cost be justified?
The increased costs incurred by oil companies in using mechanical pickup equipment on
government orders were deductable from government revenues, though companies had to
make a contribution to the government in support of general cleanup operations. In the
Bravo incident the amount of oil collected was insignificant compared to the cleanup
effort mounted. In addition, of course, the seas dispersed the spilled oil naturally, so that
within days of the blowout few traces of oil could be found. While no paper addressed
this issue, discussion was directed to the cost-effectiveness of mechanical cleanup. How-
ever, comparison of the costs of environmental precautions to their known effectiveness
is a value judgment because, if only the narrow yardstick of strict costing is applied, many
important environmental measures will never be implemented.
Political Impact
Given the political repercussions of a blowout, it is important that the pollution
threat is seen to be tackled with great vigor, even though existing mechanical equipment
is generally ineffective on the high seas. While most participants agreed on the lack of
effectiveness of mechanical pickup equipment, considerable disagreement existed over its
use regardless of its overall effectiveness. It was held that all available effort should be
expended, since the government, news, media, and general public expected such a
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deployment, and some oil at least would be picked up. Another view was that those res-
ponsible should simply say it was better to let the oil slick break up naturally without a
cleanup effort. Between these two extreme viewpoints, some felt that further research
and development was necessary. Finally, one participant noted that all countries believe
the best pickup equipment to be made in their own country!
Weather Conditions
A stormy sea hampers a working barge acting as a platform in a well-capping opera-
tion, makes towing of a relief rig impossible, and stops the use of mechanical pickup
devices for collecting the oil. On the other hand, such conditions increase the natural
dispersion of the oil. Depending on the location of the blowout, the productivity of the
well, the direction of the currents, and the extent of the storm, there is a possibility that
little oil pollution will approach the shore even if nothing whatsoever is attempted. There-
fore, some discussion centered on the question of weather conditions and if specialized
equipment was necessary to respond to an isolated blowing well far offshore.
Worst-Case Statistics and Planning
Considerable attention was devoted to the question of the worst case. Regulatory
assumptions might take every parameter to an extreme, such as assuming more than one
blowout, with each blowing oil at a rate of 15,000 tons per day for 100 days until relief
wells are drilled. Such a scenario would ignore blowout experiences elsewhere, the effects
of rough seas in speeding natural dispersion, natural bridging of the well, evaporation of
oil before it comes in contact with the sea, etc. However, worst-case statistics are favored
by the regulator in order to inform politicians of the worst damages that can be expected
so that there will be no additional shocks to follow. The counter argument by the operator
is that politicians will take the worst case as deterministic, rather than seeing it as having a
statistically low probability, and then call for onerous restrictions on all oil operations.
The question of the most responsible course of action open to the operator, regulator,
fisheries expert, and others was debated. The question of statistics was discussed to some
degree in the papers of Fjeld and of Flikke.
Mechanical Pickup
Discussion centered on the efficacy of booms, skimmers, and vessels currently used
to capture and collect oil. While some felt that mechanical equipment was of no use in
the high seas, others supported the use of such equipment as part of a continuing research
and development program, even though the amount of oil actually picked up might be
quite small. For example, during an openair blowout in the North Sea, roughly 35% of
the oil will evaporate before coming into contact with the sea, and this residual amount
will be further reduced by over half owing to natural dispersion and further evaporation.
In time this amount will be further reduced by natural means, leaving only 5-10% that
may pose a threat to key areas. At later stages emulsification may again increase the total
volume of the oily liquid. These natural changes affect both chemical treatments and
mechanical pickup methods. Difficulties encountered with the latter include mounting
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such an effort, owing to the problems of coordinating the number of units involved,
matching different types of equipment, replacing malfunctioning units, and the low
peformance compared with manufacturers ratings. Equipment capability and compati-
bility remain problems. The general view was that a mixed response of mechanical and
chemical techniques offers the most effective strategy, although not all fishery experts
agreed.
Chemical Dispersion
Chemicals of low toxicity are used to aid natural dispersion into the water column
of oil spilled on the sea surface. Using such chemicals remains controversial; Norway does
not condone their use except for saving human life and platforms. The Norwegian view is
that the long-term effects on fisheries of chemicals in the water column are generally
unknown. However, the UK view is that chemicals are known to be effective dispersants
and have lesser effects on marine life in the water column than on life on the sea surface
or inshore. Differences in toxicity between laboratory and experience were also noted, as
well as differences in the impacts in open seas and along the shore. In the Norwegian view,
more research on dispersants was needed to show their effects on marine life. In the UK
the prevailing view is that sufficient research has already been done to show that disper-
sants do not pose an ecological threat of any significance offshore. However, all agreed
that further research is necessary if decision-makers believe that recommendations about
chemicals are solely theoretical and unsupported by data. Papers by Cowell and by F~yn
provided some background for these points.
Burning Oil
A blowout in the USA was of considerable interest. Here the oil and gas were delib-
erately ignited to limit marine pollution. This ignition resulted in a burning oil slick that
evaporated most of the oil. No capping operation was attempted and relief-well drilling
was used to stop the blowout. Burning is a means to reduce oil pollution significantly, but
the reduced damages from such pollution must be balanced against the damages suffered
by the platform in the fire. The large-scale and complex multioperation platforms used in
the North Sea are far more costly than the simpler platforms in the Gulf of Mexico. Given
the rapid natural dispersion of oil in the North Sea, the lack of known damages to marine
life, the distances of platforms from the coast, and the lack of complaints from fishermen
following the Bravo blowout, the ignition of oil and gas blowouts was not considered to
be an acceptable strategy.
FEEDBACK ISSUES
Adequate Channels
Experiences with North Sea blowouts show a variety of reactions in the post-
blowout period. In Norway an independent Commission of Inquiry was organized to
investigate the Bravo blowout, followed by a formal white paper to parliament. A major
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research project on safety and emergency was launched, which covered the entire oil
industry, both onshore and offshore. Finally, a permanent Action Command was orga-
nized. In Denmark no formal measures were taken after the Maersk blowout, but a per-
manent emergency response group is in the process of being organized. In the UK the
existing system was strengthened and the bilateral agreement with Norway was also
improved. However, the Select Committee on Science and Technology of the UK Parlia-
ment has severely criticized the state of UK readiness and the total dependence on
chemical dispersants. As a result, a Marine Pollution Control Unit has been created in the
Department of Trade.
Research Priorities
Norway is the only country represented at the workshop that instituted an overall
national research project based partly on its blowout experiences. This high-priority pro-
gram concerns human behavior in relation to sociotechnical systems. lt is designed in part
to make a comprehensive risk assessment of offshore activities, and to specify technical
methods for preventing and containing blowouts. Attention is being paid to using the
results of this research to improve procedures on safety, surveillance, and accident res-
ponse for both the oil industry and government.
Standardization and Specificity
Where safety is concerned it is difficult to strike a proper balance between indivi-
dual preference and standardization. If too many regulations and standards are issued, a
loss of personal initiative can result and staff feel they are following a dull, purposeless
routine. On the other hand, too much personal freedom can engender unacceptable oper-
ational risks, even though communication and response may be excellent. Since the pur-
pose of good regulation is to feed accident information back into routine management
procedures at minimal cost, it is important for each country to strive to achieve its own
particular balance in this respect. Norway, a small country with limited regulatory re-
sources, is moving toward substantial standardization, a position the USA has also
adopted. The UK, however, has not standardized regulations and consistently opposes
moves to do so. The paper by George and Read considered this issue.
Updating Contingency Planning
Mandatory periodic meetings between the government and industrial bodies involved
in emergency response is a method Norway uses to update its new Action Command. In
the UK informal contacts are used to update contingency planning. Whatever means is
favored, the process of integrating the lessons learned from blowouts and tanker spills
into emergency response plans must be a continuous operation. Incentives must be found
to maintain attitudes of constructive criticism toward emergency plans, rather than
allowing them to drift into rigid systems based solely on accepted principles.
Science and Decision-Making
The role of scientists and management specialists in relation to decision makers
was discussed although no conclusions were drawn at the workshop. Several problems
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were pointed out; for example, one regulator was concerned that scientists were playing
too great a part in drawing up regulations. He considered that decision trees could be
misleading, since the assumptions used in their construction are often not stated and not
enough information is provided to formulate alternative branches. Other controversies
included the relative values of nonspecialists and specialists, basic research versus applied
research, and data-based solutions versus educated guesses. These are all factors that a
decision maker must take into account before making an overall assessment and final
decision, even though himself under stress from the emergency, political pressure, and the
news media. Integration of a working scientist into the specialized emergency response team
was also discussed, but it was generally thought that a separate team working in parallel
with the responsible decision makers was better. The relative roles of systems analysis and
more specialized scientific techniques were considered in an effort to ensure that they
complemented each other rather than caused conflict or duplication. The decision makers
favored closer ties with scientists and were concerned that scientists should bear greater
responsibility for their statements; only in this way would their advice improve since
assumptions made would be more closely questioned and clarified.
ADDENDUM
During the period between the blowout workshop in April 1978 and the publica-
tion of this book another major blowout occurred, at the now-infamous Mexican lxtoc
well in the Gulf of Mexico. Two Norwegian organizations were involved as technical
advisors to Pemex, the Mexican national oil company, which owned the blowing well.
Statoil, the Norwegian national oil company, and the Norwegian State Pollution Con-
trol Authority advised Pemex on oil-spill collection methods.
Considerable "discord between Pemex and Statoil as to strategy" existed; however,
several valuable lessons were learned [1, 2] including the following.
1. Relief-well drilling was a failure in that the relief-well bores did not locate
the blowing well, even though one relief well was within 12 meters of it. This
must, in part, be attributed to the infrequent well logging - every 400 meters
- by Pemex. In Norway a well must be logged every 90 meters.
2. The blowing oil did not ascend with the gas but spread in a large ring at a
depth of 50 meters and formed a stable emulsion before it reached the
surface.
3. Dispersants had much less effect on this emulsion than they would have on
oil, and the use of dispersants hindered oil-recovery operations.
4. Mechanical oil recovery proved effective only for wave heights up to 1.2
meters. In Norway requirements still exist for mechanical collection in wave
heights up to 3 meters. Also, oil droplets dispersed as much as 12 meters down
into the water column, so that mechanical collection could not prevent pollu-
tion of the coast.
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5. Mechanical oil recovery is a difficult operation, requiring good leadership,
seamanship, ships, and equipment. These conditions did not exist at the Ixtoc
blowout, so that recovery was hindered by these shortcomings. Only 4.5% of
the oil was recovered even though there was good weather and good equip-
ment was available.
6. Waiting until oil pollution reaches a given nation's territorial waters hinders a
possibly more effective response by another nation as freshly spilled oil is easier
to collect.
7. The inability of the blowout preventer (BOP) to cut through the drill collar
showed that BOP technology is not yet fully adequate.
The effect of the lxtoc blowout on Norway was to raise questions again about the
proposed North Sea drilling program north of latitude 62° N. The Norwegian Ministry of
Oil and Energy asserted that the Mexican experience was not directly applicable to North
Sea conditions and that the lessons learned in Mexico have already been incorporated into
Norway's planned response to accidents. By 1980 the Norwegian parliament sanctioned
drilling north of 62° N, but also demanded greater preparedness for meeting blowouts by
limiting the areas and number of wells drilled.
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6A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE OIL-BLOWOUTPROBLEM
Hans-Christian Bugge*
NORWEGIAN OIL POLICY: BASIC PRINCIPLES
The main components of Norway's oil-development policy may be stated as follows.
It is intended to continue exploration in the Norwegian sector of the North Sea and to
exploit at a moderate rate any economic reserves discovered. There is a certain degree of
state involvement through the Statoil agency and strict safety regulations are in force.
Contingency plans for dealing with accidents (covering issues of organization, equipment,
and training) must be drawn up by the operators who are themselves required to take any
necessary corrective actions if accidents do occur. Furthermore, operators are urged to
minimize regular discharges of oil. Under Norwegian law, the operator has unlimited civil
liability for the effects of any accident. The state's policy is to monitor closely all actions
taken by the operator and to be ready to take overall control of operations if necessary.
There is a distinct preference for mechanical rather than chemical methods for cleaning
up oil spills although it is recognized that further development of mechanical equipment
is needed.
In terms of possible environmental impact, Norway recognizes the importance of
preserving, as far as possible, the present lifestyle, activities, and settlement systems of its
coastal areas. Oil and gas operations are to be conducted in such a way that they pose no
threat to fish stocks; the more important fishing and spawning areas are shown in Figure
6.1. Development of areas north of latitude 62° N should continue provided that an
"acceptably low level of risk" can be achieved.
*Director-General, Department of Regional Planning, Ministry of the Environment, Norway. In his
previous position, as Director of the Norwegian State Pollution Control Authority and the Action
Group, Dr. Bugge directed the Norwegian government's effort at the Bravo blowout. Since he did not
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FIGURE 6.1 The main fishing and spawning areas for cod in the northeast Atlantic and the Arctic.
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FIGURE 6.2 The location of the Ekofisk field.
EKOFISK FIELD AND THE NORWEGIAN ECONOMY IN 1977
To understand the importance to Norway of the Ekofisk field and of any accidents
which could threaten production from the field, a few comparisons may be helpful. In
1977, the rate of oil production from the field was approximately three times the rate of
consumption for the whole of Norway. Considered as a sector of the national economy,
the field was more important than agriculture and fisheries put together, and, in terms of
revenue for the state, Ekofisk was more important than all Norwegian personal income
tax.
In addition to the importance of production from Ekofisk itself, the location of the
field in the productive southwest of the Norwegian sector (see Figure 6.2) led to its choice
as a "gathering center" for a number of other fields in the area. The Norwegian develop-
ment plan called for oil and gas to be collected, via a complex network of pipelines, from
the neighboring Albuskjell, Cod, Edda, Eldfisk, Tor, and West Ekofisk fields and brought
together at Ekofisk Center platform. From Ekofisk Center the oil would be pumped along





The composition of the Norwegian parliament in 1977 was approximately as follows:
Labour, 45%; Conservatives, 25%; Centrists (agrarian), 10%; Christians, 10%; Left-wing
Socialists, 5%; and Liberals, 5%. The main opposition to further oil-related development
came from the Centrist (agrarian) and Liberal groups and from the Left-wing Socialists.
A number of groups expressed mixed feelings about oil development. The main concerns
voiced by the political parties opposed to further development revolved round perceived
threats to social values, traditional lifestyles and activities, long-established settlement
patterns (particularly in coastal areas), and the marine environment. To counter tIns
opposition it was therefore important for the government to have a convincing and com-
prehensive program, covering both development and safeguards.
THE BLOWOUT AT EKOFISK BRAVO
The Bravo blowout, on April 22, 1977, occurred during a period when general
attempts were underway in the Norwegian sector to reduce the danger of pollution and to
increase the degree of preparedness for any future accidents. It also coincided with active
political debate in the country on the advisability and correct nature of drilling programs
north of latitude 62° N.
The Norwegian Minister for the Environment made an immediate decision to set up
an Action Group incorporating, under a single leader, all those involved in responding to
the accident. The Action Group was the direct representative of central government;
although in practice it left prime responsibility for managing on- and off-site consequences
of the accident to the operator, the Group was solely responsible for all official statements
to the media and had a priori authority to take over direct management of the accident if
it deemed this necessary.
The main decision of the Action Group regarding well control was to start both
capping and relief-well drilling simultaneously. For pollution control, the Group decided
to use only mechanical pickup methods; it mobilized those bodies responsible for shore
protection and organized continuous surveillance of the oil slick's progress.
Main Elements of the Blowout Contingency Plan
The Norwegian contingency plan for blowouts stressed the importance of correct
operational procedures to prevent accidents from occurring in the first place. In the post-
blowout phase, a number offunctions were identified. The plan foresaw that, immediately
after any accident, accurate and rapid provision of information would be at a premium;
fire prevention and evacuation of personnel would be urgent necessities, as would the
establishment of the Action Group. Measures to stop the flow of oil or gas, involving cap-
ping, relief-well drilling, or fire fighting, would need to be put into effect. To prevent
the situation from worsening, the contingency plan identified actions involving cooling
down the blowing platform, ceasing production on neighboring installations, designating
safety zones around the accident site, regulating the sea and air traffic in the area, and
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preparing medical facilities and hospitals. Action would also be needed to reduce the envi-
ronmental impact of the accident and combat any oil spill. Finally, the contingency plan
foresaw an important function, particularly for the Action Group, in collecting and dis-
seminating information, involving the operator, the government, the general public, the
news media, and other parties.
Immediate Consequences of the Bravo Blowout
Fortunately, there was no fire or explosion at the Bravo blowout and no loss of life.
The blowing well was capped wit/tin one week. Some 21,000 tons of oil were released
during that period; approximately 800 tons were recovered using mechanical methods.
No oil reached the shore and no complaints were received from fishermen; it is thought
that the immediate damage to the marine environment was insignificant. The economic
loss was estimated at approximately US $100 million.
Political Responses to the Bravo Blowout
An independent commission set up in Norway to investigate the causes of the
accident reported in October 1977. The Action Group set up by the government also sub-
mitted a report, in December 1977. After consideration of these and other inputs, the
government presented a White Paper on accident control and prevention measures to the
Norwegian parliament in April 1978. The measures suggested are outlined below.
MEASURES FOR PREVENTION OR CONTROL OF FUTURE ACCIDENTS
To try to prevent future accidents the Norwegian government pointed to the need
for improved training of oil-company personnel. it introduced new regulations for the
technical inspection and control of offshore operations as well as guidelines for the
operators' own control measures. More particularly, it proposed a thorough study of
problems arising during well-maintenance operations.
As part of its preparations for any future accidents the government decided to
organize the Action Group on a permanent basis. it recognized the need to evaluate the
total amount of emergency vessels and equipment required as well as the necessity of
further research and development on stopping the flow and collecting the oil spilled. it
urged that the equipment and organization for dealing with oil spills should be strength-
ened in both the public and private sectors. Finally, it recommended analyses of the even-
tual fate of oil spilled from different locations in the North Sea and advised that work
should proceed on models of the drifting and evaporation of spilled oil.
More general lessons learned from the Bravo blowout suggested that a wide-ranging
research program on emergency situations and safety was advisable. Such a program would
include a study of man's functioning in a sociotechnical system; specific solutions to various
technical problems; operating procedures and degree of surveillance and their overall
impact on safety standards; the reaction of personnel to emergency situations; and fmally,
a comprehensive risk analysis of offshore activities.
I
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7PREVENTION, REGULATION, AND RISK
Bi¢rn Vedeler, Svein Fjeld, Bj¢rn Myklatun, Carsten B¢e, Dag Meier-Hansen,
H.R. George, A.D. Read, Kai Killerud, and John Lathrop
7.1 SAFETY ASPECTS OF OIL BLOWOUTS·
This section was originally called "Safety Standards and Oil Blowout Risks" but
subsequently altered to the present title. This change perhaps reflects the difficulty of
reviewing such a complex subject as safety standards and blowout risk: probably the best
that can be achieved is to shed some light on the problems involved.
Blowout risk can be defmed as the product of the probability of a blowout occur-
ring and its consequences; the latter would include loss of life, economic considerations,
and pollution. The emphasis here will be on practical matters since theoretical aspects
have been extensively considered elsewhere. Before considering safety measures against
a blowout, it is necessary to examine the probability of such an event and the potential
consequences for the area in question. Basic differences of opinion exist which are usually
resolved on political grounds, and the standards applied will thus be different in various
parts of the world.
The blowout at Bravo in the Ekofisk field had a strong emotional effect on the Nor-
wegian population, and hence generated political overtones. Even before the final outcome
was known, it had already been decided that existing safety standards were inadequate,
and money was allocated for research and the construction of coastal defenses against
drifting oil slicks. A large number of research projects are under way to define in detail
the risks inherent in all stages of offshore oil development and to suggest ways of reducing
these risks. In the meantime, reports on the Bravo incident have indicated that, owing to
a series of lucky coincidences, the effects of the blowout were very small.
Starting from the data that are available today, the Gulf of Mexico is the only area
where offshore oil drilling and production have been going on for long enough for assess-
ments ofblowout risk to be meaningfu1. Since this is also the only area from which enough
statistical data are available to establish blowout probability, it is natural to start from here
and see how the experience gained can be applied to operations in other parts of the world.
In the Gulf of Mexico one blowout occurs in the drilling phase for every 400 wells
drilled. In the production phase, however, this decreases to one blowout per year per
"'By Bj~rn Vedeler, Senior Surveyor, Det Norske Veritas, Oslo, Norway.
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4,000 producing wells. Only a very small fraction of these blowouts caused loss of life.
Almost all of the blowouts were "killed" or stopped of their own accord before significant
pollution had taken place. However, it must be borne in mind that in the Gulf of Mexico
oil is produced from fairly small reservoirs with low productivity; in these circumstances a
well is very likely to blow itself out soon after a blowout occurs. In the North Sea, on the
other hand, reservoirs are much larger and wells much more productive. In the Norwegian
sector it is not unlikely that a well could blowout 10,000 tons ofoil per day. The productive
zones are also in areas where self·killing is not likely to take place. Therefore, a blowout
in the North Sea may last much longer than would be the case in the Gulf of Mexico. The
consequences of a blowout in the North Sea are thus more serious and widespread. If the
same level of blowout risk accepted in the Gulf of Mexico is to be applied to North Sea
operations, then it is clear that steps must be taken to significantly reduce the probability
of such an occurrence.
Before the risk can be reduced, it is necessary to carry out a fairly detailed analysis;
such a risk analysis is outlined in Section 7.2 and will therefore not be elaborated here,
but the results of this type of analysis will be discussed.
During drilling and in the production of oil and gas, special safety systems are used
to prevent blowouts. It is nearly always a combination of several circumstances that leads
to a blowout. However, the ultimate causes of a blowout are not always easy to defme.
They are usually connected with unexpected release of very high-pressure oil or gas (releas-
ing reasons) or the simultaneous failure of equipment, planning, or reactions.
The most common releasing reasons are as follows.
1. Reasons connected with the reservoir and the local geology: shallow gas pock-
ets, high-pressure zones deeper down, lost circulation, and damage to piping or
equipment from corrosion or wearing out.
2. Reasons connected with difficult operations: drilling into another well, suction
resulting from withdrawal of drill string or production pipe, and incomplete
stabilization of well during stages when the amount of safety equipment has
been reduced (e.g., during some kinds of maintenance).
3. External reasons: falling objects, drifting, fire, explosion, collision, collapsing
foundations, and natural forces (earthquakes, waves, winds, etc.).
In the same way, simultaneous failures can be listed as follows.
1. Failures of equipment: control equipment and safety equipment for drilling
and production.
2. Failures of planning: insufficient planning of well, mud too light, ring void not
full of mud, and incomplete cementing of lining pipe.
3. Incorrect reaction to unexpected situations: that is, human error.
With the reasons and failures identified, the next step is to determine which items
der.land special attention. Section 7.2 defines certain key areas, but as the matter is of such
importance it will be considered further here.




Before drilling is started it is necessary to have the best available knowledge of the
geology of the area. This can be gained by a combination of several methods. Shallow
seismic surveys reveal shallow gas pockets, while deep seismic methods give maximum
information on the deeper layers. Preliminary drilling in areas with shallow prospects in
well known foundations may reveal abnormal pressures in deeper layers.
Planning of the System as a Whole
For better design of platforms it is necessary to know more about the physical
conditions of the actual area. More environmental data are needed. When planning large,
complicated platforms the possibility of external factors causing blowouts must be con-
sidered and minimized. Platforms must be designed in such a way that fires and explosions
cannot reach the wellhead, and wellheads must also be protected against falling objects
and other possible blowout dangers. Improved standards for platform layouts are essen-
tial. Where automation is not possible, information must be simple and clear, and alarm
systems robust and with uncluttered panels to reduce the number of faults. Design stan-
dards are long overdue.
Critical Mechanical Components
The safety valves that are placed in the production pipe need to be developed
further. New designs to improve the working life of such valves are highly desirable and
design standards are vital. Installation of sand fIlters and sand detectors reduces the dan-
ger of pipes and valves wearing out. A requirement for such components should form
part of any future design standard.
Use ofAutomation and Information Systems to Reduce Human Error
Automation can in many situations improve reliability by factors of 100 to 1,000
over that of human beings, but this improved reliability can only be guaranteed for equip-
ment tested over long periods. Standards should thus be set for determining the mean
time before failure for components of systems that are to replace human beings. Measure-
ment of well parameters during drilling is very important here. The relevant technology
has been under development for some years, and similar methods are also applicable to
the monitoring of the well during insertion or withdrawal of the drill string or production
pipe. In the USA an automatic drill rig has been developed where most of the operations
to remove or insert drill pipes are automatic and only supervised from a control room.
This automation reduces the probability of a blowout as mud can be circulated when the
drill string is pulled out. The machinery can be programmed for automatic refIll of the
well and kicks can be handled much more easily. The exposure of personnel to bad
weather is reduced and drilling can be made explosion-proof.
Education of the Crew
It is well known that the training and education of offshore personnel is very variable.
It is essential to provide better, more systematic training and education to platform crews.
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It is also necessary that important and difficult jobs be only fIlled by technically compe-
tent and authorized individuals. Again, the necessary standards are at present lacking.
Control Procedures
Major errors of judgment have in many cases been the reasons for blowouts. Such
errors cannot be eliminated by improved safety procedures but they can be reduced in
number by stricter control. The control of drilling programs and equipment should be
carried out by an authority that is independent of the operating oil company, although
the latter should, of course, also carry out a coordinated control procedure of its own.
The recording ofall observed events on magnetic tape would signifIcantly improve control
procedures. Standards for such data and data banks are essential.
Conclusion
The standards that already exist in some areas of the world may be adequate for
their purposes. In other areas, however, new standards are necessary to lower the risks to
a politically acceptable level. Norway seems to be just such an area; it is to be hoped that
the probability of a blowout in the Norwegian sector of the North Sea can be reduced to
one-tenth of that in the Gulf of Mexico.
7.2 MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL OF OIL BLOWOUTS IN THE NORTH SEA:
RISK ANALYSIS FOR PREVENTION·
Efforts to increase safety during the planning, construction, and operation of off-
shore installations are mainly directed toward reducing the probability of an accident, and
containing and reducing the consequences of any accidents that do in fact occur. Risk
analysis is an important tool for achieving these ends. A risk analysis involves identifying
hazards, analyzing their origin, establishing possible consequences, and calculating the
magnitudes and probabilities of these consequences. The purpose of this section is to indi-
cate feasible techniques for risk analyses rather than to detail their conclusions.
Although this type of analysis appears to be an obvious device for developing risk-
control programs in offshore operations, it has not, however, been used extensively in
the oil industry, but is well established in the aircraft and nuclear industries. The general
procedure that is normally followed is given in Table 7.2.1; the methods and resources
necessary to perform a risk analysis are included. The subject of a risk analysis can be any
mechanical system, activity, or operation.
In risk analyses as outlined above, the scope and degree of detail, as well as the
actual method of analysis, will vary greatly from case to case. When carrying out such an
analysis it is important to specify the objectives in detail. In the case of offshore opera-
tions these may be: to investigate whether the subject under investigation fulfills specified
safety requirements; to calculate the level of specific risks; and to identify risks, the criti-
cal properties and components that might increase such risk, and to use the results for
improving safety. The last objective implies a very positive use of risk analysis in prevent-
ing accidents.
·By Svein Fjeld and Bj_n Myklatun, Det Norske Verltas, Oslo, Norway.
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Example of a Risk Analysis for a Blowout on the Norwegian Continental Shelf
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General
As mentioned above, it is imperative to have the objectives of the investigations
precisely defmed. In the present case these included an evaluation of what could be done
to minimize blowout risk on the Norwegian continental shelf. The risk can be expressed
in terms of oil discharge, or danger from fires, explosions, etc. In this example, the con-
sequences of a blowout on platform structure, platform crew, the economy, marine life,
and coastal communities were considered beyond the scope of the investigation. The
main layout of the investigation is illustrated in Figure 7.2.1.
Hazard Identification
The activities, the technology, and the equipment used for oil drilling and produc-
tion were studied. As the activities are of different types, a difference in risk level might
be anticipated. Therefore, it was found convenient to subdivide the activities into: explor-




















Measures to minimize blowout risk,
revised probability, and consequences
Knowledge of
technology
FIGURE 7.2.1 A risk-analysis procedure.
drilling - rotation and associated operations; and production - normal production,
workover-wireline (maintenance) and similar operations.
The study included a comparison of present technology and that used at the time
of the blowouts included in the historical statistics. Apart from the study of equipment,
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Based on observations of similar sys-
tems and statistics. Evaluation of the
abnormal behavior of a system is
based on knowledge of the different
elements of that system, in particular
analysis of energy and possible release
of energy and toxic substances
By applying methods like fault-tree
analysis, failure mode and effect
analysis, or other formalized meth-
ods. The purpose at this stage is to
describe qualitatively the functional
relationship between the different
elements of a system, and the pos-
sible chains of events leading to, or
emanating from, a hazardous event
Calculation of probabilities for the
different statistical data of accidents
in similar or related systems, and
reliability data of components used
in the system. The availability of
data is often less than desired. In
such cases estimations can be made
by applying knowledge of basic
physical phenomena (e.g., corrosion,
fatigue) or judgment of groups of
people with specific knowledge of
the system
Prediction of effects involves cal-
culations of data for systems and
processes in abnormal states.
Examples are the calculation of
amounts of flammable and noxious
substances released as a result of an
incident. Further examples include,
the calculation of the spread of such
substance on the ground and in the
air, effect of fires, explosions, popu-
lation exposed, etc.
This covers a range of methods and
procedures. If acceptance criteria
are established, comparison of
results with the criteria is made.
Otherwise, comparison with risk
levels in other systems and activities
is made. Risk-reducing measures are
identified and evaluated
Necessary resources
Knowledge of the system or process
under consideration is essential at
this stage. If the system is novel, his-
torical data will not be available on
the system level. Knowledge of basic
physical mechanisms must be util-
ized
To carry out this stage, there are two
types of competence necessary:
analytical tools, their possibilities and
limitations, and system knowledge.
When dealing with large-scale sys-
tems, system knowledge is divided
between a number of disciplines. In
such a case, the "analyst" may pro-
vide the coordinating function
The main "source" for this task is
"data," and the competence needed
is to know where such data can be
found, to assess the data as such, to
make use of the data in a proper
manner, to estimate the confidence
of the data themselves and the uncer-
tainties involved in extrapolating the
data, and the resulting confidence in
the predicted values of risk
Qualifications cover a range of spe-
cialized topics. The most important
requirement is knowledge of sys-
tems under extreme loads and
abnormal behavior, such as the
dynamics of structural collapse, the
characteristics and effects of shock-
waves, exposure to fire, etc.
This task requires an analytical
approach and involves management
decision problems. The decision-
maker should take part in the pro-
ject at this stage, together with the
project team
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complexity of platform, procedures, safety measures, etc., the technology study also
encompassed the qualifications of the crew, the organization and planning of the opera-
tions, and the control exercised by the contractor, the licensee, and governmental bodies.
The environmental conditions on the Norwegian shelf were also studied and, as the main
part of the historical data is from the Gulf of Mexico, a comparison with the environment
in that area was made. A similar study and comparison of the geology, as far as was
known at this stage, was carried out for the two areas.
On this basis, the hazards involved in offshore oil production were assessed. It was
found convenient to distinguish among: platform blowouts, underwater blowouts, cratered
blowouts, and subsurface blowouts.
Hazard Analysis
This is a more detailed qualitative analysis for the sequence of events leading up to
the blowout. Fault trees may be used to clarify the problem, but hardly for anything
else (see Figures 7.2.2-7.2.4). Simple event trees or merely a record of initial events and
a record of simultaneous failure of the safety system are more feasible tools in practice.
The initial event may be associated with: geology - shallow gas, deeper high-pressure
zones, and lost circulation, etc.; difficult operations - tripping, drilling into nearby wells,
and wireline operations, etc.; external causes ... dropped objects, driftoff, fire, explosion,
etc.
The simultaneous failure may be associated with: failure of equipment - control
equipment, safety valves, BOPs, etc.; improper planning - well planning, mud program,
casing program, etc.; human errors.
Risk Estimation
A statistical analysis was carried out of all available blowout accident records. Main
data sources are the Uoyd's Ust, which includes worldwide data, and the United States
Geological Survey, which publishes comprehensive data for the Gulf of Mexico and the
shelves surrounding the USA. This statistical analysis included all relevant information,
such as location, platform type, activity phase, initial event, etc. The main data are from
the Gulf of Mexico (see Section 7.3). Only a few blowouts have occurred on the Norwegian
shelf and could not be made the basis of a statistical analysis. For this reason, the histori-
cal data have to be modified to express a realistic future blowout risk on the Norwegian
shelf. This is done by studying component reliability. By comparing the reliability inher-
ent in the Norwegian shelf technology, competence and control can be compared to the
reliability of the same parameters in the Gulf of Mexico, and the resulting blowout prob-
abilities may be modified. In this modification the geological and the environmental con-
ditions were also considered.
Consequence Analysis
The parameters governing the consequences of a blowout were examined. The types
and amounts of materials that can be discharged were studied according to reservoir pre-
sure, permeability, gas/oil ratio, production tubing, etc. Possible further consequences
such as fires, explosions, oil discharge, etc., were dealt with briefly. Finally, it was assessed
how the blowout could be terminated, for example, by bridging, capping, kill mud, relief
wells, or other measures. The time necessary to terminate the blowout is decisive in rela-










An event, usually a malfunction, that results
from one or a combination of other events and
is describable in functional terms. Examples are
blowouts, kicks, and other generally described
occurrences
A basic event, or lowest identifiable condition
or fault. Examples are pore pressures, valve
cutout, or valve left open
EITHER-OR: a situation whereby an output
will exist if any or all of the input events are
present. An example is a relay valve that will
fail if EITHER there is a valve stem seal leak
OR the valve spring is hung up OR both events
occur
AND: all input events must occur to produce
the output event
Transfer symbol - connecting to a more detailed
diagram
CONDITIONAL that another event has occurred
or that the named circumstances exist at the
time of the event of interest. For example, a
high-level sensor failure can only result in an
overflow on condition that another failure has
occurred
S.Fje/d, B. Myk/atun
( ) The CONDITIONAL event of interest
o Specific activity involved
FIGURE 7.2.2 Definitions of symbols used in fault-tree diagrams.
Risk Evaluation and Control
Hazard analysis and the component reliability studies also reveal which items are
important in blowout risk and which are insignificant. On this basis a decision can be
made about the items that should be subjected to special improvement studies and recom-
mendations given on measures to reduce the probability and consequences of blowouts.
In general, the important points are to: reduce human errors by increasing automation,
improving information systems, etc.; improve the quality of critical mechanical compo-
nents; improve education of the crew; carry out comprehensive geological investigations;
improve control; and plan the system from the outset to simplify blowout control.
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Example of a Consequence Analysis to Assess the Safety of a Subsea Completion System
Against External Hazards
General
The following is an extract from a larger study carried out on the safety of subsea
completion systems. The analysis was concerned with the following effects of failure of
equipment or inadequate operating procedures: hazards to life, pollution hazards, and
lost or delayed production. A survey was made of all probable external activities that
could damage the "christmas tree" (the set of mechanical valves and casing seats on top of
the well which directs the flow ofwell fluids), together with an estimate of the magnitude of
the forces associated with these activities and a prediction of their influence on the christmas
tree. Further, an assessment was made of how damage to the christmas tree from these
activities might lead to a blowout and how this outcome could be avoided.
Survey ofPossible Objects that may Damage the Christmas Tree
The most probable external causes of damage to the christmas tree are illustrated in
the fault tree shown in Figure 7.2.5. A fault tree of a blowout caused by external hazard
is shown in Figure 7.2.6. When the christmas tree is damaged to the extent that the pro-
duction string is broken below the master valves, then the only automatic safety feature
that can prevent a blowout is the subsurface safety valve. In this event, a blowout occurs
when the subsurface safety valve is removed, or if the valve does not close on demand.
This is indicated on the left-hand side of the tree.
If the christmas tree is damaged above the manual production valve, the blowout
can possibly be stopped by the use of a diver to close this valve. In this case only a limited
amount of oil will escape as such an operation takes less than one day. On the other hand,
if the wellhead is broken in the 18.75-inch connectors, or the casing below these valves,
the blowout could last for an extended period until a relief well is drilled.
If the christmas tree is damaged in such a way that the production casing is broken,
but the production string is not, a blowout through the annulus could result if the pro-
duction packer is damaged. This type of blowout can be stopped, however, in a fairly
short time by killing the well through the production string.
Conclusions about Damage Caused by External Means
The marine christmas tree represents an obstacle to fishing in that fishing gear might
hook on it; damage can be caused both to the installation and the fishing gear itself. Other
objects such as dragging anchors, dropped weights, etc., also represent a hazard to the
christmas tree. It is obvious that the present design does not take these aspects into con-
sideration, since it is probable that damage to the christmas tree will lead to a blowout.
Consideration should therefore be given to preventive means that will reduce the proba-
bility of such hazards. The following recommendations are suggested: prohibit the use of
bottom-based fishing gear in areas with underwater installations; mark the positions of
underwater installations; shape underwater installations to avoid hooking; and locate





















































































































































































































































7.3 BLOWOUT RISK - GHOST OR REALITY?'"
The Ekofisk Bravo platform is blowing wild! This was the alarming message broad-
cast round the world on April 22, 1977. The populations of all the countries surrounding
the North Sea anxiously followed the fighting of the blowout until April 30, when one
of the largest oil blowouts ever seen offshore was terminated by a successful capping
operation. Fortunately, no lives were lost, no fires occurred, and no shores were polluted.
However, public opinion still considers that blowout risk is one of the main hazards to be
controlled before further offshore oil development takes place.
To investigate the possible causes of blowouts, Det Norske Veritas carried out a
statistical treatment of all available data, covering blowouts allover the world. The data
were mainly taken from Uoyd's Ust, the United States Geological Survey, and the United
States Coast Guard. To avoid the introduction of obsolete data, only blowouts occurring
in the period 1970-1977 were included. The main emphasis was given to data from the
Gulf of Mexico, as these are considered the most reliable. Table 7.3.1 gives the number of
blowouts distributed by year and Table 7.3.2 shows the distribution of blowouts over the
various phases of activity: about one-third of the blowouts have occurred during produc-
tion and about two-thirds during drilling. Thus, "workover" and "completion" do not
seem to be extraordinarily critical operations.



















TABLE 7.3.2 Blowouts in the GulfofMexico,
distributed by phase of activity, for the period
1970-1977.
Activity Number of blowouts
Production 10
Production - workover 3
Drilling - rotation 22
Drilling - completion 5
Unknown 4
Total 44
Table 7.3.3 gives the blowouts distributed by degree of structural damage caused.
Mobile rigs include drill ships, drill barges, jackups, and sernisubmersible platforms. it is
difficult to draw clear conclusions from this table, but it seems that most blowouts cause
little or no damage, much less a total loss of the platform.
·By Svein Fjeld, Senior Surveyor, Det Norske Veritas, Oslo, Norway.
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TABLE 7.3.3 Blowouts in the Gulf of Mexico, distributed by degree of structural damage caused,
for the period 1970-1977.
Total Severe Some Minor No Total
writeoff damage damage damage damage
Mobile rigs 3 1 4 6 15
Other drilling 3 5 9
Production 3 8 1 13
Unknown 1 1 2 4
Total 10 2 2 18 9 41
TABLE 7.3.4 Amount of oil spilled during four












Four out of44 documented blowouts caused oil spills. Two occurred during produc-
tion and two during workover on a production platform; in other words, none happened
during drilling. Table 7.3.4 shows the amount of oil spilled as a result of these accidents.
Most of the blowouts were tenninated by bridging or natural stoppages. Production
wells often had to be killed by other methods. Fire was observed at 12 out of the 44 blow-
outs: six during the drilling phase and six during the production phase. In total, nine deaths
were recorded in five accidents. On the basis of estimated numbers for the activity data,
the rate of blowouts during the drilling phase is one out of 276 wells, and during produc-
tion one out of 2,670 wells.
Apart from the oil releases in the Gulf of Mexico and the Ekofisk Bravo incident
(22,500 tons), only two significant releases have been encountered worldwide during the
period 1970-1978. Both occurred dUring drilling and the amounts released were: about
3,000 tons of oil per day at the outset for 24 days, when the blowout rate declined;
1,000,000 cubic meters of hydrogen sulfide per day at the outset for 24 days, when the
blowout rate also declined.
It was found that one out of every 50 mobile drilling rigs in the USA has had a
blowout each year compared to approximately one out of every 140 rigs in the North
Sea. It is important to note that this difference is not large enough to conclude that the
blowout frequency is significantly higher statistically in the USA compared to the North
Sea. The high uncertainty of these figures is due to the low number of blowouts recorded.
Because of the limited amount of data, other methods must be used to estimate the
risk of a blowout on the Norwegian shelf. The hazards connected to drilling and produc-
tion in the Gulf of Mexico and on the Norwegian continental shelf are nearly the same,
but several conditions affecting the risk of a blowout are different in the two areas. These
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conditions can roughly be divided into the following groups: site conditions - geology,
physical environment; and technical and organizational conditions - technical equipment,
organization and control.
Keeping the technical and organizational conditions constant, the blowout risk
would be expected to vary from location to location depending on geology and environ-
ment. However, the preventive measures taken by the oil industry have been such that the
historical statistics show no such variation. Because compensation is made for difficulties
faced, it is impossible to state the risk of blowout on the Norwegian shelf from knowledge
of the natural conditions. However, many factors suggest that the consequences ofa blow-
out, in terms of oil spill, on the Norwegian continental shelf would be very different and
more extensive than would be the case in the Gulf of Mexico. This implied difference is
illustrated by the fact that offshore blowouts in other parts of the world have contributed
very little to the total amount of oil released into the marine environment. Other accidents
in connection with offshore oil activity, e.g., rupture of oil pipes and damaged stock con-
tainers, have caused considerably more serious oil pollution than that experienced from
blowouts.
The amounts of oil released will vary with reservoir rock type and depth. During
the exploration phase, unforeseen shallow gas pockets can cause a blowout. Pressure and
quantity will vary, and it is impossible to anticipate the amounts escaping. The blowouts
will probably not last for a long time: after 1-10 days most of the shallow gas will have
escaped or the well bore will have been tightened or closed by bridging from the unstable
surrounding formations. At worst, the amount ofoil release during a blowout in the North
Sea will be the same as from an open production well, Le., 4,000- 150,000 tons of oil per
day. The probability of such an accident is very low. In fact, world statistics (offshore and
onshore) indicate that only about one-tenth of all blowouts involve any oil whatsoever,
and only one-hundredth include significant amounts of oil. The Maersk Explorer blow-
out, which blew water and gas for a few days before termination by bridging, is fairly
typical of a blowout during exploratory drilling.
During the production phase, blowouts can occur at two stages: in an open well,
that is when the well is out of operation, for example, during change of damaged tubing;
and in a completed well in which all valves are installed, the flow diameter is smaller and
the flow resistance higher compared to an open well. Thus the amount blowing in the
latter case is smaller compared to an open well. Table 7.3.5 gives estimated maximum
amounts escaping during hypothetical blowouts in the Statfjord and Ekofisk fields for
the actual pipe diameters used in open and completed wells.
It is impossible to estimate the productivity of reservoirs north of latitude 62° N,
but possible commercial fields must be of the order of magnitude of the Ekofisk field.
The figures for the North Sea may thus be used an an illustration for future fields devel-
oped. The rate of production in the Gulf of Mexico varies from well to well, but, since
small fields are also commercial, a typical maximum for escape would be approximately
200-400 tons of oil per day.
if the blowout does not terminate by bridging, the well may in certain cases be
capped by mechanical equipment. If this operation is successful, the blowout will prob-
ably last for a period of the order of days or weeks. If it is not possible to terminate the
blowout in other ways, relief wells have to be drilled. Terminating a blowout in this way
can take up to five months in the Gulf of Mexico. Improved technology and well-established
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TABLE 7.3.5 Maximum amounts of oil escaping during hypothe-
tical blowouts in the Statfjord and Ekofisk fields.
Outer pipe Oil escaping
Field Well type diameter (inch) (tons/day)
Statfjord Open 9.125 15,000Completed 7.0 10,000
Ekofisk Open 7.0 10,000Completed 4.5 4,000
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emergency plans may render the drilling of relief wells possible within 2--4 months in the
Norwegian continental shelf. Depending on the type of reservoir, the oil and gas flow may,
after some time, change to a flow of water (water-coning).
The historical data indicate that about 10% of blowouts in the Gulf of Mexico have
caused loss of human life and that about 30% ignited. On the Norwegian shelf there is
greater probability that a blowout during exploration drilling will be of the subsurface
type, which has less chance of igniting. Consequently, the risk of fire may be considered
lower on the Norwegian shelf.
The platforms used for exploration and production on the Norwegian continental
shelf are, and will continue to be, large and expensive with many persons on board.
Improved reliability and built-in safety must therefore be economically favorable. Thus,
both the public and the oil companies demand a technological and supervision system
that gives lower blowout probability compared to historical statistics.
On the basis of calculated probabilities, corrected for differences in technology,
supervision (both public authority and company), training, geology, and physical environ-
ment between the two areas, an estimate has been made of the possible reductions in
blowout probability on the Norwegian continental shelf compared to the Gulf of Mexico.
Risk analysis shows that the weakest points are situations where the crew must make
their own decisions when unexpected reservoir conditions occur. Mechanical equipment
is more reliable than human reactions. A fault-tree analysis on drilling from ships in
Canadian waters found the malfunctions to be distributed as follows: equipment mal-
function - 5.8%; improper planning - 5.0%; operation failure - 72.6%; failure due to
external conditions - 6.4%; and drill-ship failure - 10.2%.
When the blowout is just beginning and has to be fought, there will often be a
high noise level, strong vibrations, a high rate of mud return, and eventually escaping
gas and oil. The drill crew is then exposed to stress, which increases the risk of its taking
the wrong actions. Often blowouts will occur when the crew is not well prepared and
when superior staff, without fixed working hours, is not present. More than 50% of all
blowouts take place between midnight and 08.00 hours, and especially between 02.00
and 03.00 hours. Also, some mechanical components have rather low reliability, e.g.,
downhole safety valves. The reliability of critical components, however, is constantly
improving, and in certain cases it is possible to use two units to improve safety.
During exploration drilling the following factors are of the greatest importance in
determining blowout probability: shallow and deep overpressure zones, procedures,
operator qualifications, and control. Proper preliminary investigations and supervision of
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well conditions have reduced the probability of a blowout on the Norwegian continental
shelf compared to historical data for the Gulf of Mexico.
For blowouts during exploration drilling, the reservoir conditions will have a great
influence on the consequences, measured by the amount of oil spilled. By developing new
equipment that may terminate the blowout more quickly, it is hoped that the consequences
on the Norwegian continental shelf may be reduced.
The environmental conditions on the Norwegian continental shelf are more hostile
than in the Gulf of Mexico; however, this difference has relatively little influence on the
probability of a blowout and such factors as supervision, well-pressure control, rig design,
and the design of equipment for rough-weather conditions. Each of these factors could
potentially compensate for the more adverse environmental conditions.
For blowouts during rotation and operation in the production phase, the factors of
reservoir conditions, qualifications, procedures, and control are very important. By proper
planning, preliminary investigations, and supervision, it ought to be possible to lower the
probability of blowout in the Norwegian continental shelf compared to the Gulf of
Mexico. During production, equipment deterioration (for example, from the effects of
sand) represents a hazard.
Thus, environmental conditions do not seriously affect the probability of a blow-
out during the production phase. As for exploration drilling, the rougher weather condi-
tions on the Norwegian continental shelf compared to the Gulf of Mexico can be taken
into account.
Some of the measures noted above for reducing blowout risk have already been
introduced in the North Sea. On implementing further measures it should be possible
to reduce the probability of a blowout even further. On the basis of published data, a
reduction to one-tenth of previous world levels seems realistic. The probability of simul-
taneous malfunction of safety equipment should also be reduced correspondingly, which
is important because the overall probability of blowout can, in principle, be expressed as
the product of these two individual probabilities. During production it should also be
possible to reduce the possibility of a blowout to an even lower figure than that for the
drilling phase. As the equipment needed will be expensive to develop and produce, thor-
ough cost estimates are necessary to decide which efforts are to be selected for attaining
a real improvement in safety. An effective reduction of the probability of a blowout in
the two phases, however, requires thorough studies of how the new equipment will func-
tion as a part of the system as a whole.
No conclusive answer to the question heading this section can be given. The pos-
sibility of blowouts on the Norwegian shelf cannot be excluded, but the probability has
been much reduced compared to historical data from the Gulf of Mexico. Because of con-
tinuously improved technology, the probability may be expected to decrease even further
in the future.
If a blowout occurs during exploration drilling, it is very unlikely to result in major
damage such as loss of life or significant pollution. For a blowout during the production
phase, the amount of pollution might be larger, but by appropriate measures it may be
kept at an acceptable level.
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7.4 OFFSHORE INDUSTRY NEEDS SAFE OPERATORS IN SAFETY-CONSCIOUS
ORGANIZATIONS·
The main safety problem offshore is that one is confronted with a very complicated
technical and social system. After accidents have occurred, public opinion creates pres-
sure for something to be done about safety. In such situations, it is easy to take a specific
problem, reduce its particular risk, and then believe that the causative pattern leading to
the accident has been broken: It is probably also thought that total safety has increased.
It is natural to look at concrete technical problems since these are very easy to recog-
nize: a defective engine, broken conductors, valve failure, defective automation systems,
and so on. By developing reliable technical components, the risk that a technical failure
can develop into a technical breakdown or catastrophe is diminished.
Seen in the light of pure logic, safety technology will yield safer places of work. By
continually increasing and developing this technology, the risk from technical failures or
defects will continuously diminish. But in this context --- as elsewhere - technical reliability
can become so good that personal vigilance and judgment deteriorate. It is possible to rely
so much on technical systems that the personal qualities and knowledge necessary to detect
and control an unforeseen situation where the technical system breaks down are entirely
lacking.
Statistics and reports from the more serious accidents offshore show that "human
failure" or lack of knowledge and experience are the main causes of accidents. This aspect
is, of course, only part of the problem, but it serves to illustrate that, in the fmal analysis,
safety problems are caused by human failings. It is difficult to give general recommendations
on the human aspects of safety, because people are so different in ability, precision, reac-
tion, responsibility, and other qualities.
These difficulties make the study of human failure less exact and complete than
studies of technical failures. Even so, something has been learned through systematic
studies of human behavior in different situations. The most important is perhaps that
human failure is not subject to simple cause-and-effect relationships. In a hazardous situa-
tion many complicated and interactive events canbe the consequences of a simple random
pattern of events called causes. To derive one simple cause-effect relationship from this
complicated pattern might well hide what actually happened in an accident. In such ill-
defmed situations it is not easy to know what to do. What is usually done, or rather
recommended, is to emphasize the development of safety routines and drills, to promote
selection and education. and, of course, to defme responsibilities. This emphasis may
increase vigilance and some of the personal qualities needed to cope with an abnormal
situation; but, at the same time, it may alter the focus of attention and safety research
away from the technical conditions themselves, which might then change by degrees
without adequate safety measures until a point is reached where there is an imbalance
between the technology utilized and the human resources so intimately linked with it.
For instance, the platform installations today are so large and the technical and
physical chain reactions in the process plants so fast that the development of lifesaving
equipment and contingency plans have not kept pace. This is a general problem also
encountered in the shipping industry. The largest oil tankers are so immense that
*By Carsten B.pe, Project Leader, System for a Safe Ship, Norwegian Council for Scientific and
Industrial Research.
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fresh-air plant is of insufficient capacity to allow personnel to rescue a crew member who
has collapsed in a tank from lack of oxygen. In such instances, vigilance, a sense of res-
ponsibility, and experience are not enough to deal with the situation.
It follows that the complicated technical and social systems that affect the safety
problem must be tackled at two levels. The first level is organization. An organization
with a safety-conscious climate has an ability for internal self-regulation instead of being
dependent on coordination and control from outside. This ability has the ultimate conse-
quence that those concerned with safety, that is, platform personnel, must work always
with safety in mind and be aware of their own influence and responsibilities in this res-
pect. In a safety-conscious organization, safety is part of the daily routine and the impli-
cations of every technical development that entails changes in the organization must be
translated into social terms. This process ensures that those who are affected by the
changes become involved with, take responsibility for, and learn from the safety measures
demanded by such changes. These are basic principles for an organization with a safety-
conscious climate. The platform is viewed as a technical system, a place of work, and an
environment in which to develop and increase safety on a full-time basis; safety cannot be
forgotten during spare-time periods, or at other times of recreation and relaxation. In
consequence, overall safety impinges on the whole social climate of the platform and on
the social and psychological resources that can be built and maintained there.
The second level is the problem of creating a safe operator. This is easier to define,
the objectives being to minimize the probability of failure and to maximize the prohab-
ility of correction when an error has occurred. There are two approaches to achieve these
ends. The first reasons that no human being is perfect, many human actions will be imper-
fect, and it is human to fail. Hence, human error is anticipated.
The second approach is ergonomic: human failures are caused by lack of adaptation
between the abilities of the operator and the demands of the work situation. Human
failure will occur when the relation between ability and demand is out of balance. The
built-in potential for failure in humans does not occur until this imbalance catalyzes the
reaction that leads to potential failure. This type of thinking has the advantage that, at
least in theory, human failures can be completely eliminated by simply eliminating the
catalyst. Current work on human failure and human engineering is performed at this
level. The goal is to create a safe operator or man-machine interface where human errors
can be tolerated. Much has been learned in this field, but too little of the knowledge
gained has been put into practice.
The really difficult safety problem is at the organizational level. The report on the
Bravo blowout highlighted this aspect. It is very important to solve safety problems at
the organizational level, because a safety-conscious climate in an organization defmes the
boundary conditions for a safe operator.
But what is the situation today? The pattern of development is often like this:
technological resources are created and developed for a specific technical environment,
and technical and economic criteria are used as the basis for selecting alternatives. The
social system is only considered as an afterthought. When everything goes well, it is of
little interest to evaluate whether technical development is too fast for the social organi-
zation to stabilize itself under the new conditions. However, when a serious accident
occurs, the human factor becomes predominant. The low priority of social criteria within
the organization is then pointed out, and great efforts are made to straighten things out.
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FIGURE 7.4.1 An approach to safety.
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This division of interests between onesided technical and onesided pyschosocial
problems results from several causes. However, in the present context it is very important
to understand the sequence itself. First, the technical system evolves at such a rate that
the associated social organization is not given time to stabilize itself. Then the imbalance
between the technical and social systems is pointed out and cited to be the cause of any
accidents. The specific reasons quoted may be lack of knowledge about the technology
employed, lack ofexperience, lack of responsibility ,and so on. In the offshore oil industry
this situation will not improve as long as safety development remains only a minor factor
in the specialized technical environment.
Offshore safety must become part of long-term development work whose purpose is
to integrate technical and psychosocial measures. An overview of this problem is illustrated
in Figure 7.4.1. It is not enough to be simply aware of the problem. Adequate research
funds must be made available and the repercussions of project organization, methods,
goals, activities, and working partners on the problem must be continually reviewed and
research restructured to take account of such factors. It is necessary to take an overall
point of view and a long-term perspective based on this principle: "safety problems must
be treated as sociotechnical problems in that technical and social aspects of the working
environment are not isolated from each other." In offshore safety work this principle
means that technical improvement of safety cannot be accepted as a contribution to
total safety before the associated social and psychological consequences are evaluated.
Changes in the content of the work may have organizational and psychological effects
that may eventually reduce safety.
In this brief section, the emphasis has been put on the importance of creating a
safety-conscious organization. This is the cornerstone of safety work offshore. Also, a
safety-conscious organization defines the boundary conditions for a safe operator. Com-
pared to human engineering and ergonomics, very little work has been done on this sub-
ject, although much work is needed in this field, and needed very soon. International
cooperation on research projects would give a much-needed impetus to this important
work.
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7.5 A REGULATORY APPROACH TO BLOWOUT PREVENTION·
Prevention Philosophy
Regulations governing offshore oil development operations should be firmly based
on the prevention of blowouts and other accidents, rather than on measures designed to
*Based on comments made during the Workshop by Dag Meier-Hansen, Director, Inspection and Con-
trol, Norwegian Petroleum Directorate. Since Mr. Meier-Hansen did not submit a formal paper, we
present here an outline of his remarks.
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limit or handle the effects of such accidents. In addition, the question "How safe is safe
enough?" must be considered: this issue can be handled by political assessments or by
attempts to quantify the risk inherent in a given operation.
The position in Norway at the time ofwriting is roughly as follows. The government
is answerable to parliament for its actions and decisions through two ministers: the Minis-
ter for Oil and Energy is responsible for operations and the Minister for Labor is respon-
sible for safety matters. Relatively few detailed regulations are yet in force, and no such
regulations existed prior to 1969. Regulatory efforts to date have concentrated on drilling
operations. Nine different organizations inspect proposed drilling operations whenever
applications are made for government approval of drilling programs.
Problems in Prevention
On moving from the philosophical to the practical details of blowout prevention,
a number of problems must be faced and decisions made. These may be categorized as
follows. How should the government, or other appropriate licensing authority, choose a
prospective oil operator or company from among the many applicants? How should the
activities of contractors and subcontractors be regulated, and how best should individual
platforms and their operations be inspected and controlled? It is obvious that an operator
must bear a good deal of responsibility for his own actions but at the same time it is nec-
essary that a certain level of political confidence in the operation be maintained (perhaps
based on visible governmental controls): how should a satisfactory compromise be arrived
at? Sometimes it is possible to develop safer designs and use these to cut down safety
distances around various components on a platform. More generally, given the conflicting
needs of numerous different operations on the same platform, overall risk must be mini-
mized. How best should these two aims, the substitution of safer design for safety distance
and the minimizing of overall risk be achieved? Turning to safety and accident-prevention
regulations, what is the best time to apply such regulations and what degree of detail is
most appropriate for each regulation?
Recommendations
Those concerned with the safe operation of offshore oil and gas development can
learn a great deal from the experience and operating procedures ofland-based organizations
such as the oil-rerming and petrochemical industries. Discussions with prospective opera-
tors should start at an earlier stage and more attempts should be made to directly motivate
operators to be safety conscious. The discretionary powers of certifying authorities should
be strengthened and a more rigorous inspection system should be designed and imple-
mented. Some difficulties have been experienced to date in getting oil companies to accept
risk analysis; also, problems in starting a follow-up reporting system for near-accidents
have been encountered, but it is felt that both this and the risk-analytic approach are
worthy of further efforts. Finally, after five years of requests to the oil companies for
more information on design concepts and risks, and very little response, Statoil has now
begun its own risk analyses.
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7.6 LEGISLATION FOR OFFSHORE FACILITIES IN THE MARINE
ENVIRONMENT*
Historical Introduction
Large-scale exploration for oil and gas in and around the United Kingdom has only
taken place during the last 10-15 years. However, there were small-scale operations very
much earlier, and some of the legislation dates back to these earlier activities. In Shropshire
tar springs were used for medicinal purposes in medieval times, while there were reports,
in the seventeenth century, that gas was escaping from a spring near Wigan in Lancashire.
In 1885 natural gas was used for lighting the railway station at Heathfield in Sussex.
The UK government first sponsored the search for petroleum during the First World
War when submarine attacks threatened overseas supplies. This led to the first legislation
governing petroleum, the Petroleum (Production) Act of 1918 [l] , after which oil was
found in small quantities at Hardstoft in Derbyshire. In 1934 a new act was passed which
vested in the Crown the ownership of all natural petroleum not then discovered. Subse-
quently, oil was discovered in 1940 at Eakring in Nottinghamshire, which made a small
but useful contribution to oil supplies during the Second World War.
In 1958 the first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea was held and the
ensuing Convention on the Continental Shelf [2] agreed that coastal states were entitled
to exercise sovereign rights over the continental shelf for the purpose of exploring it and
exploiting its natural resources. At that time the continental shelf was commonly taken
to refer to the seabed and subsoil outside territorial waters to a depth of 200 meters. This
has since been revised and a further revision is currently under consideration by the United
Nations Law of the Sea Conference. The UK duly ratified the 1958 convention and in
1964 passed the Continental Shelf Act [3] , which applied the provisions of the Petroleum
(Production) Act of 1934 [4] to the UK continental shelf.
Following the passing of this act, regulations governing the continental shelf and
territorial sea were made in May 1964, and later the same year the first licences were
issued. The first offshore gas field (West Sole) was discovered in 1965 and gas was first
brought to shore in 1967. At the time of writing, natural gas supplies met nearly all the
gas needs of the UK and satisfied about 17% of the primary energy requirement (25% of
useful heat consumption). The first commercial oil field (Montrose) was discovered in
1969 and commenced production in June 1976. The first oil production, however, was
from the Argyll field in June 1975. At the time of writing, nine oil fields were in produc-
tion and were contributing about three-quarters of the primary oil demand in the UK,
and it was anticipated that by about 1979 or 1980 the UK would be self-sufficient in
both oil and natural gas.
The legislation and regulations that have been promulgated to control these activities
can be grouped into measures for ensuring the safety of offshore structures and those
*By H.R. George and A.D. Read, Petroleum Engineering Division, Department of Energy, United
Kingdom.
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working on or near them; and measures to protect the interests of other users of the sea --
shipping, fishing, and coastal interests.
Safety of Offshore Installations
Safe Conduct of Operations
Safety ofworkers has always been a major concern of UK governments, and the first
Continental Shelf Petroleum Production Regulations issued in 1964 [5] contained
(amongst others) clauses requiring licensees to: obtain the consent of the minister for the
drilling and abandonment of wells; "execute all operations in or in connection with the
licensed area in a proper workman-like manner in accordance with methods and practice
customarily used in good oil field practice"; "comply with any instructions from time to
time given by the Minister in writing for securing the safety, health and welfare for per-
sons employed in or about the licensed area_"
These clauses were designed to minimize the risks of a blowout that could cause
loss of life, to reduce the risks of extensive pollution, and to promote good operating
practices, thereby improving the safety of workers and reducing accidental pollution.
Several instructions were issued, one of which required licensees to conform to the Insti-
tute of Petroleum's Code of Practice for Drilling and Production in Marine Areas [6].
Enforcement of these requirements was carried out by inspectors of the then Ministry of
Power.
Mineral Workings (Offshore Installations) Act 1971 [7J
On December 27, 1965 the jackup rig "Sea Gem" collapsed with 32 men on board
and 13 lives were lost. A formal enquiry was held, which concluded that the existing
provisions for safety did not cover this type of disaster adequately and recommended that
a statutory code, backed by credible sanctions, should be introduced and that an indivi-
dual on each installation should be responsible for safety. Following these recommenda-
tions, the Mineral Workings (Offshore Installations) Act was passed, coming into force in
July 1971. This was an act to "provide for the safety, health and welfare of persons on
installations concerned with the underwater exploitation and exploration of mineral
resources in the waters in or surrounding the UK, and generally for the safety of such
installations and prevention of accidents on or near them."
An "installation," under the terms of this act, includes both mobile and flXed instal·
lations concerned with the exploration for or production of oil or gas. It includes there-
fore drillships, jackups, and sernisubmersibles, as well as fixed platforms (both steel and
concrete). Any new types of installation that may be developed for this sort of work in
the future, such as tethered buoyant platforms, etc., will also be covered by this act.
The act itself requires installations used on the UK continental shelf to be registered
and to have a valid certificate of fitness, and it makes provisions for regulations to be
issued governing these matters. Clauses 4 and 5 of the act require managers to be appointed
who shall have the general responsibility for all matters affecting safety, health, or wel-
fare of the persons employed on the installation and, where necessary from a safety point
of view, for the maintenance of order and discipline on it. Other clauses enable the
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Secretary of State to make further regulations about the safety of the installations and
the people employed on them.
It is not possible in this brief section to discuss all the regulations that have been
made, but mention must be made of the Inspectors and Casualties Regulations 1973 [8] ,
the Construction and Survey Regulations 1974 [9], the Operational Safety, Health and
Welfare Regulations 1976 [10] , the Emergency Procedures Regulations 1976 [11] , the
Life-saving Appliances Regulations 1977 [12], and the Fire-fighting Equipment Regula-
tions 1978 [13] .
Inspectors and Casualties Regulations
These were among the first regulations to be issued and they make provision for the
inspection of offshore installations by inspectors appointed by the Secretary of State, and
for reporting casualties and other accidents. They detail the powers given to inspectors
and require owners of installations and others to assist the inspectors in carrying out their
duties. All installations on the UK shelf are inspected at intervals of approximately 3-4
months, and all fatal accidents and serious occurrences are investigated by inspectors of
the Petroleum Engineering Directorate of the Department of Energy.
Construction and Survey Regulations
When the Construction and Survey Regulations were being prepared, an advisory
committee composed of representatives of various government departments and research
institutes with expertise in problems related to offshore engineering was appointed to
advise on their technical content. This committee came to the conclusion that in many
areas there was insufficient knowledge to enable detailed regulations to be made. Also,
technology was, and still is, evolving very rapidly and detailed regulations based on
inadequate knowledge would badly inhibit offshore development without adding to safety.
Consequently, the regulations were broadly framed and were supplemented by
Guidance Notes [14, 15] , which are an aid to interpreting the regulations in the light of
current knowledge. At the same time, research was instituted whenever needed. As the
results of this research work became available, and, in the light of the operational experi-
ence in the UK continental shelf (and elsewhere in the world), the Guidance Notes have
recently been revised and reissued.
Under these regulations no fixed or mobile installation may be used during the
exploration, drilling, or production stages of mineral operations on the UK continental
shelf unless it has a valid Certificate of Fitness stating that it is suitable for the purpose
for which it is intended and for the environment at the place where it is to be used. Cer-
tificates of Fitness are issued by one of the Certifying Authorities appointed by the
Secretary of State. Initially, there were five such Certifying Authorities, namely, the
internationally recognized ship classification societies: Uoyd's Register of Shipping,
London; Germanischer lloyd of West Germany; American Bureau of Shipping of the
USA; Bureau Veritas of France; and Det Norske Veritas of Norway. A sixth body has
since been added to the list: Halcrow Ewbank and Associates Certification Group of the UK.
Before issuing a Certificate of Fitness, a Certifying Authority is required to carry
out an independent evaluation of the design of the installation to ensure that the design
is suitable for the installation to fulml its intended function in the area for which it is
intended. Furthermore, the Certifying Authority has to carry out surveys of the installa-
tion to ensure that the installation continues to be fit for use.
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It should be clear therefore, that the Certifying Authorities playa vital role in the
safety of offshore installations, not only during the design and construction period, but
also throughout the life of the installation. They are concerned not only with the strength
and stability of the primary structure itself but also with the secondary structures and the
equipment.
Guidance Notes
At a very early stage it was decided that the routine work of certification, design
assessment, supervision, and periodic survey should be undertaken not by any government
organization, but by suitable agents appointed for the purpose. At that time the principal
ship-classification societies mentioned above were identified as potential candidates and
preliminary, informal discussions were initiated with them.
After the nature of the task had been explained the five societies stated they had
the competence, capacity, and organization to do the work, and satisfied the department
that this was so. But they maintained that the department should stipulate the standards
to be worked to, pointing out that, in the shipping world and in the construction industry,
common standards and sound practices had been developed over a long period of time,
whereas no such equivalents existed offshore. The department accepted this view and in
1974 produced the Green Book, Guidance on the Design and Construction of Offshore
Installations [14] .
The Green Book was put together under pressure. Offshore activity was then increas-
ing rapidly; all existing installations in the UK sector were awaiting certification, and
some, at least, were already known to be dangerously below standard; owners with new
construction on the drawing board or on a building site were pressing for decisions on numer-
ous points of design and construction. In these circumstances, "something workable now"
was considered preferable to "something better too late"; priority was given to speed of
publication and a loose-leaf form was adopted with a view to the ready incorporation of
additions and amendments.
The Construction and Survey Regulations and the Green Book were both published
at the beginning of 1974 and during the next few years all available resources were con-
centrated on ensuring the effective operation of the certification scheme. Little capacity
could be spared to implement the amendment scheme as originally planned, although a
wealth of experience was gained, supplemented by valuable criticism and comment from
numerous sources. By 1976 the department realized that amendment would no longer
suffice, and a firm of consulting engineers was retained to edit a completely new edition
of the Green Book, taking into account, in collaboration with the department, the
experience gained, the comments received, and technical developments that had taken
place since the beginning of 1974. The end result is the publication: Offshore Installa-
tions - Guidance on Design and Construction - 1977 [IS], the Blue Book.
Like the earlier edition, the primary purpose of this book is to provide exper-
ienced engineers with a guide to standards of design and construction that will comply
with the statutory obligations set out in the Offshore Installations (Construction and
Survey) Regulations of 1974 [9]. It is not intended to be either a design manual or a
code of practice, although, inevitably, there is some overlap into both these areas. Tech-
nical data are included where the material is not generally available or not yet well known,
but as a general rule reference is made only to established relevant sources.
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Operational Safety, Health, and Welfare Regulations
These regulations represent one of the most important sets to be made under the
1971 Act [7] , and lay down standards of safety in an area that is the source of by far the
majority of accidents on offshore installations.
In particular, the regulations lay duties and obligations on concession owners,
owners and managers of offshore installations, employers, and employees to ensure that
the provisions of the regulations are complied with, and generally to ensure that opera-
tions on and near installations are carried out in a safe manner. They promote the use of
safe practices widely recognized as being essential to safety in any industrial environment,
and, in addition, provisions are laid down for certain procedures unique to offshore instal-
lations. These include: the appointment of competent persons to be responsible for given
equipment or operations; the preparation of written instructions by owners of installations
covering all aspects of the safe operation of the installation; a "permits to work" system
for certain particularly dangerous operations which could give rise to fire or explosion;
and provision of a proper maintenance schedule for all equipment, effective guarding of
equipment, and regular examination of all lifting appliances. The regulations complement
the Construction and Survey Regulations and together they form the basic framework of
safety provisions for operations on offshore installations envisaged at the time of prepara-
tion of the 1971 Act [7].
Emergency Procedures Regulations [ 11]
These regulations require written procedures to be established on every installation
to cover any of the emergencies that may occur, such as fire, blowout, collision, structural
failure, etc. All persons on an installation have to know what their duties are in the case
ofsuch emergencies and regular practice drills have to be held. The regulations also require
that there shall be a standby vessel within five nautical miles of every installation that is
manned. This vessel has to be capable of taking on board everybody from an installation
and has to be equipped to provide first-aid treatment.
Fire-fighting Equipment Regulations
These regulations cover such matters as the provision of automatic fire-detection
systems, gas detectors, etc., and the provision of various types of fire-fighting equipment.
The Role of the Health and Safety Commission
In 1976 it was decided that the responsibility for the occupational safety of workers
on offshore oil and gas installations should be transferred to the Health and Safety Com-
mission so as to afford them the same protection given to workers onshore. This was
brought into effect on September 1, 1977 by means of an Order in Council [16] extend-
ing certain parts of the Health and Safety at Work Act [17] to offshore sites. This means
that the policy for occupational safety matters on offshore installations is now the respon-
sibility of the Health and Safety Commission and its Executive and theirs will be the
responsibility for producing any further regulations concerning such matters. However, the
responsibility for the safety of the structure of the installations themselves and also the
control of operation so as to minimize the risks of blowouts, which are inherent in the
drilling for oil and gas, remains with the Department of Energy.
The enforcement of all regulations on the offshore installations remains with the
Inspectorate of the Department of Energy acting, where appropriate, as agents of the
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Health and Safety Executive. The enforcement has been left in the hands of a single Ins-
pectorate so as to leave the operators in no doubt for whom they are responsible in safety
matters, and who to notify in case of accidents, etc.
General Policy on Offshore Safety Summarized
The UK government's approach to the safe design and safe operation of equipment
used in the exploration and production of petroleum offshore is essentially flexible and
takes into account the rapidly developing technology employed in an environment as harsh
as that experienced anywhere in the world. Extensive use is made of established codes of
practice wherever they exist, but it is recognized that in many cases they may need modi-
fication to meet the conditions peculiar to offshore sites, and in particular the necessity
to conserve space as far as possible. Emphasis is placed on the responsibility of the owners
and the operators of offshore installations and equipment for the safety of these and the
people working on them. The government defines the broad principles that must be adopted
and monitors the conduct of operations to satisfy itself that these principles are followed.
Emphasis is placed on the need for the man on the spot to be aware of the hazards under
which he is operating and his responsibility for the safety of both himself and others on
the installation.
Protection of Other Maritime Interests
At every stage in the development of an oilfield, from exploration through to pro-
duction there is potential for conflict with other maritime interests. The following are
some examples of the regulations and consultative procedures that have been designed to
minimize these conflicts.
Drilling Rigs
Before drilling can commence, operators are normally required, as a condition of
their petroleum production and exploration licenses, to obtain consent from the Secretary
of State for Energy (Petroleum Production Regulations 1976 [I8] - clause 7 in Schedule
7). Consent from the Trade Minister may also be required under section 34 of the Coast
Protection Act 1949 [19] as extended by section 4 of the Continental Shelf Act 1964
[3] , since placing a drilling structure or vessel presents a potential obstacle or danger to
navigation. Before consent is given by the Trade Minister, the hydrographer must be given
at least 48 hours advance warning of rig movements. Continental Shelf Operations Notice
number 16 (revised) [20] requests operators to inform the Coast Guard of the finalloca-
tion of all mobile drilling rigs in UK waters.
Platforms
Under section 34 of the Coast Protection Act 1949 [19] as extended by section
4 of the Continental Shelf Act 1964 [3] consent for establishing "permanent" installa-
tions is required from the Department of Trade. Such consents require notification to the
hydrographer and also contain buoying and marking requirements.
Permanent installations are protected by safety zones of 500 meters established by
orders made under section 2(1) of the Continental Shelf Act 1964 [3] . Ships of all nation-
alities are prohibited from going within the SOO-meter safety zone, but special exception
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is made for vessels having legitimate business with the installation and for any ship that is
dealing with an emergency or is itself in difficulties or distress. Such safety zones had
been established around 68 installations by May 1978.
Pipelines
Consent for laying submarine pipelines must be obtained from the Secretary of
State for Trade under section 34 of the Coast Protection Act 1949 [19] and from the
Energy Minister under section 20 of the Petroleum and Submarine Pipe-lines Act 1975
[21] . Anyone wishing to construct a subsea pipeline is required to obtain a works author-
ization.
Section 21 (3) of the Petroleum and Submarine Pipe-lines Act 1975 [21] enables the
Secretary ofState for Energy to include in the authorization under section 20 terms about
"the steps to be taken by the person authorised to avoid or reduce interference by the
pipeline with fishing." In addition, under the terms of schedule 4, part 1, 2b, if the Sec-
retary of State receives an application that has to be considered further, he may give "the
applicant such directions with respect to the application as the Secretary of State considers
appropriate." These directions may include a requirement "to serve a copy of the notice
on such persons as the Secretary of State directs" (schedule 4, part 1, 3c). Who is con-
sulted is a matter for the Secretary of State to decide, but in the cases considered so far
the main UK fishermen's federations have been included in the list of persons to whom
notice has been served. The Secretary of State may also require the route of a submarine
pipeline to be altered in the light of representations made to him (schedule 4, part 1,4).
Any authorizations issued under both the Coast Protection Act 1949 [19] and the Petro-
leum and Submarine Pipe-lines Act 1975 [21] would require that the pipeline be trenched
to allow burial by natural backfill. The normal requirement would be for the pipeline to
be covered to a depth of one meter. The authorization issued by the Department of Energy
would also include provisions forbidding the dumping of waste material and the Depart-
ment of Trade consents cover the conditions relating to buoys during pipeline operations.
Earlier legislation concerned with submarine cables has been adapted to protect
pipelines from damage by anchors or fishing gear. Article VII of the convention scheduled
to the Submarine Telegraph Act 1885 [22], as applied by section 8 of the Continental
Shelf Act 1964 [3], provides that owners of ships or vessels who can prove that they have
sacrificed an anchor, net, or other fishing gear in order to avoid injuring a submarine pipe-
line shall receive compensation from the owner of the pipeline. The same legislation
makes it an offence to unlawfully and wilfully, or by culpable negligence, break or damage
a submarine pipeline.
The Submarine Pipe-lines (Inspectors) Regulations 1977 [23] set out the powers
and duties of inspectors concerned with pipeline operations. Under the regulations
inspectors are empowered to require a submarine pipeline to be shut down to avoid the
risk of accident or pollution.
Abandoned or Suspended Wellheads
It is a normal condition of the granting of Exploration and Production licenses
that government consent is required for the abandonment or suspension of drilling or
production activities on any well (petroleum (Production) Regulations 1976 [18] -
clause 7 in Schedule 7). Continental Shelf Notice number 11 [20] specifies that it is
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a requirement on the abandonment of a wellhead to submit a certificate to the effect that
the seabed is free of all obstructions.
The consent issued by the Department of Trade for a drilling structure or vessel
also specifies that, where the water depth is 45 meters or less, the height of the projection
above the seabed should be not more than two meters and also requires suspended well-
heads to be marked as required by the Secretary of State for Trade, if at any time he
considers this necessary for the purpose of preventing obstruction or damage to naviga-
tion. The consent also requires details of all buoys marking wellheads to be notified to
the hydrographer. Regular updated lists of the positions of wellheads and other fixtures
are issued for the information of mariners by DAFS/UKOOA [24] .
Buoys and Marking ofOffshore Installations
Requirements relating to buoys and marking offshore installations are covered by
the Department of Trade consents issued for pipelines, permanent installations, and drill-
ing structures or vessels as indicated above. The Department of Trade consents also
require buoys to carry identification markings indicating the buoy's position and its
ownership.
Debris
The Dumping at Sea Act 1964 [25] makes it an offence for substances or articles
to be dumped in UK territorial waters or outside these waters, if dumped from a British
ship or marine structure, without a license from the appropriate fisheries department.
The provisions of the Dumping at Sea Act were subsumed under section 45 of the Petro-
leum and Submarine Pipe-lines Act 1975 [21] for the laying of submarine pipelines.
However, conditions in the authorizations issued under the Petroleum and Submarine Pipe-
lines Act 1975 for pipelines, consents under the Coast Protection Act 1949 [19] for
drilling structures or vessels, and the licenses issued under the Offshore Petroleum Devel-
opment (Scotland) Act 1975 [26], all contain some reference to control or elimination
of debris. Continental Shelf Operation Notice number 8 [20] draws attention to some of
the problems created by debris and recommends that all waste materials be disposed of
ashore.
Arrangements for the compensation of fishermen whose nets have been damaged
by debris have been established by the oil and fishing industries. The local fishery officer
assists individual fishermen in submitting their claims. Where the incident appears clearly
attributable to the activities of an individual operator, the claim is submitted to him.
However, if it is not, or if a claim referred to an oil company is rejected on the ground
that the debris was not considered to be associated with his operations, a claim may be
considered under a compensation scheme for unattributable debris funded by the UK
Offshore Operators' Association (UKOOA). The fishing industry, as represented by the
Scottish Fishermen's Federation and British Fishing Federation, is responsible for oper-
ating the scheme and to this end have arranged the appointment of a management com-
mittee with representatives from the two federations. The committee meets at suitable
intervals to consider claims, and settlement is at the discretion of the committee, depending
on the merits of each individual case. The committee's decision on each claim is fmal and
binding. In funding this scheme, the UKOOAhave imposed a condition that any settlement
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will not imply a legal responsibility on the part of the oil industry and will be on the under-
standing that the claimant waives all right to claim against a member company of the
UKOOA.
General License Conditions
Exploration and production licenses are issued to operators by the Department of
Energy under the Petroleum (Production) Act 1934 [4] and the Continental Shelf Act
1964 [3]. It is a term of such licenses that the licensee shall not carry out any operations
in such a manner as to interfere unjustifiably with navigation or fishing, or with the con-
servation of living resources of the sea.
Pollution
Most of the above items relate directly to interference with fishing and navigation,
but the impact of oil itself is also relevant in terms of fouling of nets and fish, and of
toxic effects in the environment. The best approach to this problem is clearly the preven-
tion of spillage. This obviously involves good management, training, and the adoption of
the best operating procedures, all elements necessary for the safe operation of the plat-
forms discussed previously.
The discharge of suitably treated oily water is, however, necessary for the operation
of most offshore oil installations, particularly near the end of an oilfield's life, when large
volumes of water are produced along with the oil. These are controlled by section 23 of
the Prevention of Oil Pollution Act 1971 [27], as amended by section 45(2) of the Petro-
leum and Submarine Pipe-lines Act 1975 [21]. This requires oil operators to obtain per-
mission (or more strictly an exemption from the provisions of the 1971 Act) for the dis-
charge of oily water. This permission is given only with stringent conditions, taking into
account the amount of oil in the final effluent, the capabilities of the treatment plant,
the total volume of the discharge anticipated, and the dispersing capability of the envi-
ronment. Some ten exemptions have already been issued for offshore installations. The
total quantity of oil released so far in such controlled discharges on the UK continental
shelf has been estimated to be less than 200 tons. This can be compared with discharges
in excess of 1,000 tons per year from certain refmeries, and accidental spills of more than
20,000 tons in the Amoco Cadiz incident.
Oil Spill Contingency Planning
Each offshore operator is responsible for cleaning up any oil spills that result from
his activities. He is required to have a contingency plan covering the action he would
take and the resources he would deploy in such a situation. In practice, the operators
have limited cleanup resources at the platforms, but primarily rely on pooled resources
held at some four centers around the UK coasts. In a given incident, an operator would
be required to report a spill to the Department of Energy and the Coast Guards and deal
with the pollution in accordance with his plan and the guidelines laid down by govern-
ment. The government would monitor the operator's activities, offering advice and
assistance where necessary. There would be full consultation with fisheries departments
and the Nature Conservancy Council on the appropriate treatment strategy following
any major incident.
Legislation for offshore facilities 147
Civil Liability for Oil-Pollution Damage
This is presently covered by the Offshore Pollution Liability Agreement (OPOL)
[28] which is a voluntary scheme set up by offshore operators to cover strict liability for
oil-pollution damage and remedial measures from offshore operations up to US $25 million
per incident. OPOL covers escapes or discharges of oil from offshore facilities within the
jursidiction of the UK, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Ireland,
the Netherlands, and Norway. Claims are normally made directly to operators, the location
of the facility being the governing factor, so that claims can be made from victims outside
the countries listed above. All operators currently active on the UK continental shelf are
members of OPOL.
At a conference sponsored by the UK and held in London in December 1976, the
UK, together with France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands,
Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and the Republic of Ireland, agreed on the text of an inter-
national convention under which compensation will be payable by offshore operators for
oil-pollution damage caused by their activities in the waters off the coasts of countries
which join the convention. This convention is the first of its kind in the world.
The maximum available for compensation will be US $35 million per incident from
May 1977 (when the convention was opened for signature) rising to US $45 million by
1982. Operators will be required to insure against the bulk of their liability. Liability will
be on a "strict" basis; that is, there will be no need for a person suffering damage to prove
any fault by the operator to enable him to claim. Once the convention is in full operation,
a victim of pollution caused by offshore oil operations will be able to bring a claim, and
receive compensation, either in the courts of the country where damage is suffered or in
the courts of the country that licensed the installation concerned.
To date, the UK, Norway, Sweden, and the Netherlands have signed the conven-
tion, which requires ratification by at least four countries to come into effect. Legislation
that would enable the UK to ratify the convention was in preparation at the time of
writing.
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7.7 AN OPERATOR APPROACH TO BLOWOUT PREVENTION'"
Introduction
This subject is very broad and, rather than go into details about preventing blow-
outs, only the most important points will be mentioned. This means, of course, that this
section will be rather sketchy, but on the other hand it gives an opportunity to highlight
the key elements and aspects of the subject.
Prevention
Figure 7.7.1 presents some of the key elements in blowout prevention. The four
basic elements are: studies and programs; material, equipment, and services; personnel;
*By Kai Killerud, Director, Office of Safety, Statoil, Norway.
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FIGURE 7.7.1 Key elements in blowout prevention.
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and manuals and procedures. The figure gives examples of the various aspects, problems,
and equipment included in each element. Each of the four elements comprise physical,
or at least fairly concrete, tangible items. The very close connection that exists between
the third and fourth elements is apparent. The figure also indicates how experience
from the different elements should be fed back into a total prevention system.
Basic Approach to Safety
Having defined the key physical and tangible elements that are of importance for
safety, it is now necessary to draw up a philosophical and methodological approach to
blowout prevention. How should this task be approached, or at least how should an accept-
ably low risk level be achieved?
Figure 7.7.2 presents a reasonably systematic approach. Note that the total approach
includes a feedback loop, and that the total safety requirements are the sum of the author-
ities' minimum requirements plus the company's own requirements. Risk control is achieved
through preventive methods, such as reliability techniques, quality assurance, safety fea-
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FIGURE 7.7.2 Basic overall approach to a safety strategy.
etc. The risk-control elements lead to a certain built-in level of safety in the plant itself
and in its operation. Operation of the plant gives information about the plant itself, includ-
ing its workings and personnel, which can be fed back into the system.
It should be noted that this kind of approach, although it seems simple on paper,
requires the expenditure of a great deal of effort and resources in such activities as data
collection, registration and digestion of data, risk analysis, etc. It also imposes stringent
requirements on the organization concerned.
Organization
The basic approach described requires a well-designed organization with a clear defi-
nition of responsibility, working methods, etc., and also the availability of the necessary
resources, people, and money.
Before discussing organizational matters related to safety in more detail, the system
of organization within Statoil will be outlined as a point of reference (see Figure 7.7.3).
Figure 7.7.4 shows how the organization described in Figure 7.7.3 actually works in prac-
tice in regard to safety matters.
The two latter figures illustrate some general principles and other points. (Note that
the different types of arrows used in Figure 7.7.4 are intended to represent different
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"strengths.") A basic principle is that the various parts of the organization are directly
responsible for the safety and quality of the projects and operations they are running,
although the Safety and Quality Assurance Department has overall and supervisory res-
ponsibility for these matters. This setup implies some degree of independence, but also
some duplication of responsibility for safety and quality-control measures. However, the
system is designed to achieve the required amount of "self-control" or "self-policing"
that is a basic feature and principle of Norwegian safety regulations.
7.8 MEASURING SOCIAL RISK AND DETERMINING ITS ACCEPTABILITy·t
Introduction
The selection of regulatory strategies for North Sea oil development raises issues
common to the regulation of large-scale technologies in several different fields. The most
notable of these concerns the measurement of social risk and the determination of its
acceptability. This section presents a decision-analytic approach to resolving some of
these issues, describes a method for developing a risk measure, and considers several
approaches to defining acceptable levels of risk. Safety performance objectives are
developed for use as guidance in drafting regulations. The technique is presented in terms
of a specific example: regulating nuclear waste management. However, the basic features
are equally applicable to the problem of regulating North Sea oil development.
The central feature of this method is the reduction of a multidimensional description
of possible losses to a single risk measure. In the example, these dimensions involve differ-
ent types of radiological health effects and the circumstances in which they are incurred.
For North Sea oil, the dimensions could, for example, be the population losses incurred
by different species of flora and fauna in different locations. In the example the single
dimension of the risk measure is in units of equivalent current fatalities or lives saved,
while in the North Sea oil case the dimension could be in any standardized units of envi-
ronmental loss or improvement.
The role of a risk measure in developing regulations may be clarified by a brief
example. Consider a hypothetical choice by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC):
whether or not to require increased waste packaging over what is currently planned. A
risk analysis might show that this move would decrease the risk of radioactive release to
future generations, but increase the risk to current radioactive-waste workers. A radio-
·By John Lathrop, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria.
i'This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion, under the auspices of US Department of Energy Contract No. W-7405-Eng-48. The author grate-
fully acknowledges the help of Ralph Keeney who made many valuable suggestions in his review of
an earlier draft of this paper.
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logical risk measure combines these two forms of risk, so that the net effect on overall
risk can be evaluated. If in fact the increased waste packaging is found to reduce overall
social risk, the risk measure could be used to determine whether or not the risk repre-
sented by the waste-management system would be acceptable with and without the
increased waste packaging. If the increased waste packaging is found to be necessary to
reduce the overall risk to an acceptable level, or if the reduction in risk is found to be
cost-effective, the analysis would recommend the more stringent packaging regulation.
In this example, the risk measure is used directly in evaluating a regulation. However,
the risk measure itself can be rather complex, and not amenable to convenient guidance
in drafting regulations. For this reason, simpler versions of the risk measure need to be
developed and used as performance objectives.
The Basic Approach
Nature a/the Risk Measure
Developing a risk measure can be characterized as a basis for performance-based
regulations, where "performance" is specified to be risk to humans; but at what level
should this performance be measured? Consider the sequence of uncertain consequences
of a regulatory strategy depicted in Figure 7.8. I. The square node at the left of the figure
represents the decision faced by the NRC: a choice among regulatory strategies. Each
branch to its right represents a particular decision, a particular set of regulations. Each
circular node in the figure represents a state where any number of random events can
take place, each represented by a branch to its right. If this tree were drawn completely,
there would be a circular node at the right end of each branch, each with its set ofbranches.
Each regulatory strategy results in a probability distribution over waste-management
systems. Given a particular management system, there results a probability distribution
over amounts of radioactivity released. Each level of release results in a probability dis-
tribution over concentrations of radionuclides in the nearest aquifer, and so on through









FIGURE 7.8.1 Schematic diagram of the uncertain effects of a waste-management regulatory
strategy.
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A regulatory strategy can be evaluated in terms of the possible releases from the
resulting waste-management system, or possible resulting concentrations, exposures,
doses, or health effects. As will be explained later, evaluating different types of risks
involves value judgments that may not be most appropriately made by people trained in
radiation physics. Because of this, the risk measure should be in terms that nontechnical
people understand and care about. These considerations specify that the evaluation be
at the health-effect level. This specification assumes that the public does not care about
dose or exposure except for the health effects that would result. It also assumes that the
people whose values are to be used understand the implications of a health effect (cancer,
etc.) better than they do the implications of a dose (rem, etc.). Note that to develop a
risk measure in terms ofhealth effects does not mean that performance objectives, regula-
tions, regulation guides, or compliance measures must be expressed in these terms.
These other levels ofspecification must be chosen after considering their implementability.
Regulations, for example, may be expressed in terms of release, even though they were
developed using a health-effect risk measure, or dose-level performance objectives, as a
basis.
Structure of the Evaluation Problem
Once it has been established that the risk should be expressed in terms of health
effects, two basic evaluation problems remain. First, there are several different types of
health effects. A cancer can be fatal or nonfatal. It can occur in a worker who in some
sense has accepted the risk, or it can occur in a person who has no choice in the matter.
It can occur now or in a future generation. An example given later considers a risk mea·
sure that involves twelve different types of health effects. These health-effect types must
be evaluated by a single index that incorporates value tradeoffs between types, either
implicitly or explicitly.
The second basic evaluation problem involves the uncertainty in exactly what health
effects will result from a given regulatory strategy. As depicted in Figure 7.8.1 , there are
several stages between a regulatory strategy and a health effect, and each stage has a
degree of uncertainty associated with it. To measure simply the expected set of health
effects would miss entirely any social aversion to uncertainty. There may be a special
flublic sensitivity to very-low-probability, very-bad-consequence scenarios [1]. To the
extent that it exists, this aversion to uncertainty should be incorporated into the risk
measure in a logical, self-consistent manner.
Figure 7.8.2 shows the way these evaluation problems fit into an evaluation struc-
ture. As with Figure 7.8.1, the problem is presented as that of deciding among regula-
tory strategies. The several random node fans of Figure 7.8.1 can be collapsed mathe-
matically into the single probability distribution fan of Figure 7.8.2. Each (ith) branch
of the circular (random event) node of Figure 7.8.2 represents a sequence of events with
a joint probability Pi. which results in the set of health effects {xii' •. Xi 12 }. This is
the ''technical probability judgment" segment of Figure 7.8.2. (The number of elements
is selected to coincide with the example given later.) Finally, the n-by-twelve matrix in
the middle of Figure 7.8.2 must be evaluated in terms ofa single overall risk measure. TIlls
can be done by determining a health-effect scalar equivalent for each twelve-element set
of health effects xi, then determining a health-effect certainty equivalent xB ' or a health
effect that is equivalent in social value to the probability distribution over health-effect
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FIGURE 7.8.2 Evaluation of a regulatory strategy, accounting for multiple health-effect types and
uncertainty.
scalar equivalents {Pi' xi}. This process is represented by the "value judgment" segment
of Figure 7.8.2. Once the health effects of a given regulatory strategy have been assessed
on a single risk measure X, different regulatory strategies can be compared in simple cost-
versus-risk terms, and acceptability of risk can be expressed in terms of an accept/reject
limit on the risk measure.
Note that one advantage of the decision-analytic structure is the division of labor
between technologists and value source people. The technologists are asked only for tech-
nical probability judgments, while the value source people are asked only for value judg-
ments.
Evaluation Method
The names of the segments of Figure 7.8.2 are carefully chosen. The evaluation of
the n-by-twelve matrix cannot be done without using social judgments, implicitly or
explicitly. The field of decision analysis has developed methods for incorporating indivi-
dual value judgments into a self-consistent evaluation model [2,3]. The method to be
outlined here is multiattribute utility analysis, developed by Keeney and Raiffa [4] . The
essence of the approach in this context is that a person whose values are to be modeled
is asked to make choices between very simple sets of health effects and two-element prob-
ability distributions over health effects. Some choices are designed to reveal structural
properties of the person's preferences (e .g., additivity under certainty, additivity under
uncertainty, etc.). Other choices are designed to reveal value tradeoffs between types of
health effects. Still other choices reveal the person's attitude toward uncertainty. The
preference function that satisfies the structural properties of the person's preferences is
then fitted to his value tradeoff and uncertainty attitude choices.
If certain behavioral assumptions are satisfied, then the person's preferences about






where xi = {Xii' ... 'XiI2 } is a set ofhealth effects (HE), K is a parameter reflecting the
degree of complementarity among HE types, kj is an importance weight for HE type j, and
uj is the von Neumann--Morgenstern utility function on HE typej. The uj ' kj , andK values
all represent different qualities of the person's value tradeoffs. This utility function can
be used to get the HE scalar equivalent xl for each xi:
(3)
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where each xJ~ is a standard value for its HE type.
The utility function for eqn. (1) or (2) is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
function [5]. This means that the probability distribution over sets of health effects
resulting from a given regulatory strategy {Pi' Xi }can be evaluated by the expectation
over utilities of each possible outcome:




The curvature of the utility function U(xi ) represents the person's attitude towards uncer-
tainty. An uncertainty-averse person will have a concave-downward utility function, in
which case eqn. (4) discounts the value of a regulatory strategy according to the degree of
uncertainty in the outcome. In the same manner as eqn. (3), an HE certainty equivalent
xcan be defined for each regulatory strategy, represented by the resulting {Pi' xi}:
(5)
where again the xj values are standard.
The HE certainty equivalent xderived above is the risk measure for the regulatory
strategy represented by the resulting {Pi' xi }. This risk measure can be expressed as a
function of {Pi' xi} by inverting eqn. (5):
X({Pi'xi }) = U-I([f P;U(X)] , x~, ... , xJ ' ... ,X~ 2)
where U-I (.) is the inverse of the multiattribute utility function U(x), from the utility
into the first argument, all other arguments held at standard values.
Equation (6) emphasizes the role of U(x) as a transform equation. If the dimension
selected for the risk measure is, for example, the number of current fatalities. then
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i ({Pi' xi }) is the number of "equivalent current fatalities." T~at is, i ({Pi' xi }) is the
number ofcurrent fatalities such that a situation giving rise to {X ( {Pi' xi }), x~ ' ... ,X~ 2 }
is held to be equivalent to the situation giving rise to the probability distribution {p., x.}.
I I
Note that the intermediate step of finding the scalar equivalent x: for each Xi is not nec-
essary with the multiattribute utility approach, but was included in this discussion to
identify clearly the two evaluation tasks: modeling value tradeoffs and modeling attitude
toward uncertainty.
The development of a risk measure has now been described. Reducing the complex
description of risk {Pi'x) down to a single meaningful risk measure such as equivalent
current fatalities provides a basis for comparing two regulatory strategies, for comparing
reductions in risk with the cost of achieving those reductions, and for comparing the risk
of nuclear waste management with the risks of other technologies. The usefulness of
these comparisons for providing guidance in drafting regulations will be discussed later.
The central points of the present discussion are that value judgments are necessary to this
process, and that the method presented here provides a way of incorporating these values
in the appropriate segment of the analysis in a structured, self-consistent way.
Overview
In terms of the method described above, developing a risk measure and performance
objectives can be organized into four steps: (l) develop the form of the multiattribute
utility function on health effects V(x) to be used to derive a risk measure; (2) fit this
utility function to the values of panels of people; (3) determine an accept/reject limit on
the risk measure that is derived from the fitted utility function; and (4) develop simple,
implementable versions of this risk measure and accept/reject limits to use as performance
objectives. The major issues to be resolved in implementing these four steps will now be
discussed and an example risk measure presented.
Major Issues in the Development of a Risk Measure and Perfonnance Objectives
Issues Concerning the Form of the Risk Measure
Scope of the Risk Mellsure. The risk measure developed in this example is limited to
radiological risk to humans. It omits, for example, mechanical risk to miners, environ-
mental risk, and risk to fish. This limitation in scope becomes important if minimizing
radiological risk to humans results in an important increase in another form of risk. For
example, radiological risk to humans could be minimized by requiring an extremely deep
repository, at a significant expense in increased cave-in risk to miners. For this reason,
the risk measure developed here can only be considered as one of many inputs into the
regulation-drafting process.
Aggregating Values. The values to be modeled in the risk measure are elicited from
more than one person. Those individual values must be aggregated into a single preference
structure. This, of course, is one form of the central problem of social choice, and has
been treated at great length in the literature [6,7]. The method adopted in this develop-
ment involves summing the different utilities. The interested reader is referred to the
report by Brock and Sauer [8] for a detailed explanation and justification of this method
of aggregation.
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Aggregating Impacts: Equity. Any choice involving the regulation of nuclear waste
implicitly involves an important equity choice. Such a choice affects the level of risk
imposed on workers and future neighbors of the waste-management system, and the
amount of economic benefit distributed to electricity users and the general economy.
Any assessment of the impacts of a waste-management regulatory strategy should take
into account this unequal distribution of risks and benefits. But the proper way to incor-
porate consideration of this inequity in drafting regulations is far from clear.
One approach to this problem is to include monetary compensation to the neigh-
bors of the repository in the plans for a waste-management system. This approach does
not lend itself to incorporation in the risk measure. In fact, the risk measure, as it has
been presented here, cannot by itself be sensitive to the equity issue, since it only mea-
sures the risk side ofit. However, the equity issue can be incorporated in this approach
in setting the accept/reject limit on the risk measure. The more stringent the limit, the
more money spent to reduce risk. As a result of this consideration, the amount of money
to be spent to save an equivalent current life, that is, to reduce X( {Pi' xi}) by one, is a
value tradeoff to be measured in the value elicitation. The magnitude of this value trade-
off reflects the desire for equity directly, since it represents the amount of money that
should be given up by the people who will benefit for the sake of reducing the hazard to
those at risk. The details of how this judgment can be used to set the accept/reject limit
on the risk measure is explained below.
Normative versus Descriptive Nature of the Risk Measure. Several choices must be
made in developing the risk measure that involve the degree to which the measure is
normative as opposed to descriptive of public values. For example, suppose that the
people whose values are to be assessed feel that a technology is unacceptable if one pos-
sible consequence is very bad, independent of its probability. The risk measure as devel-
oped here cannot be descriptive of such values. In fact, this sort of judgment cannot arise
in the value-elicitation procedure, which carefully separates probabilities from values.
Incorporating attitudes toward uncertainty in the risk measure conforms to the von
Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility approach. The structure of the evaluation (see
Figure 7.8.2) incorporates probabilities in a logical, self-consistent way, independent of
value judgments. Combining these probabilities with values in the expected utility calcu-
lation (4) allows a very low probability to mitigate the importance of any possible conse-
quence, while at the same time modeling disproportionate aversion to very bad conse-
quences, and aversion to uncertainty.
Consider a second example of normative/descriptive choice: suppose the people
whose values are to be assessed prefer a naturally-caused cancer to an identical, nuclear-
caused one. The risk measure as developed here cannot be descriptive of these values
either. This sort ofjudgment cannot arise in the value-elicitation procedure, which assesses
values about health effects without specifying the cause. The analysis is designed to avoid
biases that arise from pronuclear or antinuclear attitudes. The point of the risk measure
is to evaluate the risk, independent of its cause.
On the descriptive side, the risk measure is to be fitted to individual value tradeoffs
between different types of health effects, and attitudes toward uncertainty.
Fitting the Risk Measure. Akey issue in the form of analysis described here is select-
ing the people whose values are to be incorporated in the risk measure. Ideally, the values
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to be represented are those of the general public. However, the value-elicitation process
requires extensive face-to-face interviews with a very skilled interviewer, only one person
being elicited per interview. With such expensive interviews and limited resources, a large-
sample survey is not feasible. In development of a nuclear waste-management risk measure
at Lawrence livermore Laboratory [9] , the sample was limited to less than sixty people.
The people interviewed, while they were elicited individually, were categorized into three
"panels. "
The first category was the "advisor" panel, a group of people who, because of their
profession or high station, were considered to be acceptable sources for expressions of
public values. Their value expressions were generally respected because of the respecta-
bility of the value source. The second category was the "polarized" panel. This was a
group of people who had openly and actively taken defmite stands on the issue of nuclear
waste management. This panel was balanced between pronuclear and antinuclear people.
Their values were ofinterest because they had thought through the issues, were highly moti-
vated, and to some degree reflected the political climate that the NRC must face in promul-
gating regulations. The third category was the "general" panel. There was no intention that
this group be representative of the general public; it was too small. It was composed of
people who remain openminded about the nuclear waste issue. The values ofeach individual
were aggregated into a single risk measure for each panel, with separate measures for the
pronuclear and antinuclear polarized groups. No attempt was made to aggregate values
across panels.
Converting the Risk Measure and Limit into Practical Performance Objectives
While the risk measure is at the health-effect level, for ease of implementation, per-
formance objectives (POs) may be at a level of performance measure further to the left in
Figure 7.8.1, such as the dose level. The risk measure and limit can be expressed as
(7)
where X(.) is as defmed in eqn. (6), and, as before, {Pi' xi} is a probability distribution
over sets of health effects. One PO corresponding to this risk measure and limit might be
(8)
where {qk> dk } is a probability distribution over sets of doses. Elements of each dose set
dk,or {dik ,··· ,djk , ... ,dmk},couldincludedosetocurrentradiation-wasteemployee,
dose to future maximum-diet man, dose to future average-diet man, etc. The function
F( {qk' dk }) is the one that best predicts X({pt, Xi}) , where {pi, Xi} is the probability
distribution over sets of health effects that result from {qk' d k }. That is
(9)
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The quantity Fo in condition (8) is selected such that, if any {qk' dk ) satisfies condi-
tion (8), thep the resulting {Pi, xi} satisfies condition (7). Note that, since F( {qk' dk n
is an imperfect predictor of X( {pi, Xi n, condition (8) must be conservative with res-
pect to condition (7). That is, there can be {qk' dk } distributions that fail condition (8)
that result in {pi, xi} distributions that pass condition (7).
The function F( {qk> d';}) may be extremely complicated and not very useful
gUidance for drafting regulations. Perhaps a simpler form, while giving up some accuracy
in the representation of values, would be a more effective PO. An example of such a
PO is
(10)
where {dj } is the set of expected doses, or perhaps certaiIlty equivalent doses, one for
each dose dimension mentioned above. The function G( {dj }) is the function that best
predicts X({pi, Xi)' where {pi, xi}) results from {dj }. The quantity Go is selected
such that, if any {dj} satisfies condition (10), then the resulting {pi, Xi } satisfies condi-




or even by simply putting a limit on each dose dimension:
(11)
(12)
The simplest PO is one achieved by approximating the constraint of condition (7) by a
constraint on only one dose dimension
(13)
where di is selected such that, if any til satisfies condition (13), the resulting {pi, xi}
satisfies condition (7).
Conditions (7), (8), and (10)-(13) represent an ordering of possible POs, from the
most complex and accurate representation of values to the simplest PO at the dose level.
The simpler POS are more implementable and understandable, but are of necessity less
representative of public values and more conservative, as explained above. The best choice
of PO depends on balancing these considerations, and can only be made well if the corre-
lations among the various measures are known.
Determining the Acceptability of Social Risk
Up to this point the main concern has been measuring social risk; but regulations
cannot be written on the basis of a risk measure alone. There must be some determination
of how safe is safe enough, an acceptable risk limit, or an accept/reject limit on the risk
measure. Eight different ways are presented of defining acceptable risk, followed by
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recommendations as to which definitions are appropriate for different levels of available
information.
Definitions ofAcceptable Risk Based on Considering Alternatives
The four definitions of acceptable risk presented under this heading are based on
the concept that the selection of an acceptable risk limit is a decision problem, a choice
among regulatory strategies involving trading off economic benefits against health risks.
This choice situation is represented in Figure 7.8.3. The abscissa is the level of safety
resulting from the regulatory strategy, in terms of the risk measure i ({Pi' Xi }) discussed
previously. If the risk measure is expressed in equivalent current fatalities, then the
abscissa is the negative of this, or equivalent lives saved, increasing to the right. The
ordinate is the net economic benefit resulting from the regulatory strategy, consumer
plus producer surplus, measured in dollars. This choice of axes separates the market,
or internal impacts of the regulatory strategy, from the nonmarket, or external impacts.
The units of net economic benefit and safety are normalized per unit of waste, or equiv-
alent megawatt-year (electric).
The technical opportunity frontier in Figure 7.83 is the set of alternative efficient
regulatory strategies, each represented by its economic-benefit and safety-outcome values.
An efficiency strategy is one that results in the most safety possible at a given hazard·
abatement cost (determining net economic benefit), or the least hazard-abatement cost
for a given level of safety. Within this efficient set, increased safety can only be obtained
at increased hazard·abatement cost, that is, at decreased net economic benefit, as indi-





























FIGURE 7.8.3 Acceptable risk limits based on considering alternatives.
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normalized per unit waste, the opportunity frontier cannot be described without some
assumptions about the scale of future generation of nuclear waste, in part because of the
existing stock of nuclear waste.
An acceptable risk limit is a requirement that any waste-management system be at
least as safe as this limit, which would appear as a left-hand constraint on the abscissa of
Figure 7.8.3. But any regu).ation that represents social values must also be sensitive to the
limit's impact on the ordinate. In the rust three definitions of acceptable risk to follow,
the technical opportunity frontier serves an important role by determining the economic
impact of any acceptable risk limit. Assuming that any waste-management system would
maximize net economic benefit subject to the acceptable risk limit as a constraint, the
choice of an acceptable risk limit will lead to a regulatory strategy and industry response
with an economic benefit and safety outcome described by the point on the frontier
directly above the acceptable risk limit.
1. The Acceptable Risk Limit as the Limit Requiring the Waste-Management
System to be Socially Optimal
With this definition of acceptable risk, the selection of the acceptable risk limit is
seen as a choice among alternative ways to regulate the management of nuclear waste, or a
choice among the resulting waste-management systems. In this interpretation, an acceptable
risk limit is the limit on the risk measure that requires implementing a waste-management
system that corresponds to the socially optimal point on the technical opportunity fron-
tier. The criterion of social optimality as used here refers to maximizing social value,
taking into account both economic and safety factors. The considerations necessary to
determine the social optimum will be discussed later.
The axes of Figure 7.8.3 are not tied to any particular zero points, but mark the
incremental changes in economic benefits and safety resulting from changes in regulatory
strategies, here indexed by the acceptable risk limit placed on the abscissa. The ordinate
values, then, do not reflect a calculation of the total economic benefits and costs of the
nuclear fuel cycle, the benefit-producing system of which waste management is a vital
part. Since waste-management regulations affect only the waste-hazard abatement costs,
all other economic benefits and costs are considered constant. It follows that the ordinate
in Figure 7.8.3 reflects only increasing hazard-abatement costs in the downward direction
as regulations are stiffened. In the same manner, the abscissa in Figure 7.8.3 does not
measure the total safety of the nuclear fuel cycle, but reflects only increasing equivalent
lives saved as regulations are stiffened and hazard-abatement costs increased.
Determining an acceptable risk limit in this case amounts to determining the socially
optimal point on the technical opportunity frontier. Determining this optimum requires
trading off net economic benefit against safety, expressed in dollars per life saved. If the
value of this tradeoff is set at one million dollars per life saved, then any safety measures
that save lives at this expense or less are to be required. But if a safety measure would
spend five million dollars to save a life, this measure would not be required. This is not
a pleasant tradeoff to consider, but it is one that is made, implicitly or explicitly, every
time a highway is designed or an air-travel safety regulation is set. In fact, an existing
numerical guide for light-water reactors calls for US $1,000 to be spent per man-rem
reduction in release [10]. Using the value of 1.8 X 10-4 cancers per man-rem mentioned
in the BEIR Report [11], with about half of the cancers fatal, this tradeoff corresponds
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roughly to the value of US $11 million per expected life saved. This tradeoff may be seen
as recognizing the fact that society is not willing to spend more than a certain amount of
money to save an unidentified life.
In the case of waste management, the amount of money to be spent to save a life
reflects more than simply the value of a life as considered in highway safety, where the
populations at risk and at benefit roughly coincide. As mentioned previously, the trade-
off for waste management involves a value for equity, as it represents the amount of
money to be spent by the population at benefit to reduce hazard to the population at
risk. If a regulation is set that requires a greater amount of money to be spent to save a
life than the amount called for by the social value tradeoff, then this regulation achieves
more than a certain sort of conservatism; it also results in a misallocation of funds and a
distortion of the value for equity, and so does not serve the best interests of society.
The dollars-per-life-saved tradeoff is represented in Figure 7.8.3 by the slope of
indifference curves (lines) II, 1'1', and 1"1". By definition, any two points on the same
indifference curve represents economic benefit and safety outcomes that are of equiv-
alent social value. It follows that the slope of an indifference curve reflects the amount of
economic benefit that can be given up to produce a particular increase in safety while
maintaining the same level of social value. Clearly, indifference curves further to the right
in Figure 7.8.3 link outcomes of higher social value. It follows that the socially optimal
point on the technical opportunity frontier is the point where the frontier is tangent to
indifference curve II. So the acceptable risk limit such that nuclear waste is managed in a
socially optimal manner is represented by limit A in Figure 7.8.3; this limit leads to a
waste-management system in which the amount of money spent to save an expected life
matches the social-value tradeoff. A more stringent limit set to the right of limit A in Fig-
ure 7.8.3 leads to a waste-management system on a steeper part of the opportunity fron-
tier, where more money is spent to save an expected life than is in society's best interest.
A less stringent limit leads to less money spent to save an expected life than is called for
by the social-value tradeoff.
Note that the analysis explained here and depicted in Figure 7.8.3 provides a clear
separation of the set of efficient technical alternatives (opportunity frontier) from the
critical social value (indifference curve slope, dollars per expected life saved). At the same
time, the description of the set of efficient technical alternatives requires using social
values, as represented by the utility function of eqns. (1) or (2), to evaluate the multidi-
mensional health effects of each technical alternative in terms of the single risk measure
ofeqn. (6), the abscissa variable of Figure 7.83.
In sum, this definition ofacceptable risk is based on an acceptable risk limit such that
the resulting management of nuclear waste is socially optimal. This limit is placed on the
risk measure at the point corresponding to the optimum on the technical opportunity
frontier, such as limit A in Figure 7.8.3. The basic points in favor of this definition of
acceptable risk are: the problem of what is an acceptable risk is treated in terms of the
actual decision problem faced by the regulator - the choice of the socially optimal regu-
latory strategy; and an attempt is made to have nuclear waste managed in a socially opti-
mal manner, with the appropriate amount of money spent per life saved. Basic points
against this definition are: only social values within the context of nuclear waste manage-
ment are optimized-· risk from an optimized waste-management system would be deter-
mined as acceptable even if nonnuclear alternative technologies could provide the same
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benefits at lower risk; and it depends on the technical opportunity frontier, and so
requires data on technical alternatives (costs, safety performance) that are hard to obtain;
in addition, t~chnical advances will expand the frontier, and so may shift the recom-
mended acceptable risk limit.
2. The Acceptable Risk Limit as the Limit Requiring the Nuclear Fuel Cycle to
Perform Better Than the Best Alternative Fuel Cycle
With this definition of acceptable risk, selecting the acceptable risk limit is seen as
implementing a societal choice between fuel cycles (including conservation as a possible
fuel cycle). By widening the scope of choice from among waste-management systems to
among fuel cycles, this defmition provides a criterion for acceptable risk more broadly
based than the previous defmition. As an example, suppose regulations for the firewood
fuel cycle are being drafted. The first defmition of acceptable risk grants the risk from the
firewood fuel cycle as acceptable as long as it is operated at the point on its opportunity
frontier where an appropriate amount of money is spent per life saved. But it could be
that, in its optimum configuration, the firewood fuel cycle causes five equivalent current
fatalities per megawatt-year (electric) (5 ECF{MWYe) owing to air pollution, while some
alternative cycle (nuclear, coal, conservation, etc.) only causes 0.5 ECF{MWYe. This sec-
ond definition then declares the risk from the firewood cycle unacceptable.
While the second defmition involves a more broadly based concept of acceptable
risk, it is still framed in terms ofa choice. It recognizes that the problem of determining ac-
ceptable risk is not that of arriving at some absolute criterion, but rather that ofpicking the
best of the alternatives available to society. If some absolute criterion is chosen and found
to rule out all available energy alternatives, including conservation, then this criterion is
meaningless. It follows that the most absolute criterion of acceptable risk must involve a
comparison of fuel cycles, and must declare acceptable only the risk resulting from the
fuel cycle that offers the best economic benefit and safety performance for its particular
scale and application. A problem with this more absolute second definition of acceptable
risk is that, in judging the acceptability of the entire nuclear fuel cycle, it provides only
indirect guidance for regulations concerning waste management alone.
In order to see how to derive an acceptable risk limit from this second definition,
consider the opportunity frontier of Figure 7.8.3 as the frontier for the nuclear fuel cycle.
Now assume that point D represents the best alternative technology, that is, the optimum
point on the opportunity frontier of all nonnuclear-energy fuel cycles. The acceptable
risk limit corresponding to the second definition is limit B in Figure 7.8.3, the limit
associated with the higher point of the nuclear frontier that shares an indifference curve
(I'I') with the alternative technology point. Umit B assures that the nuclear fuel cycle
serves society at least as well as the alternative fuel cycle. Even if the alternative fuel
cycle was represented by point E in Figure 7.8.3- an economic benefit and safety per-
formance not achievable by the nuclear fuel cycle - because point E is below the highest
indifference curve achievable by nuclear technology (II), there exists an acceptable risk
limit constraining nuclear technology to perfonn at least as well as point E. There is no such
limit if the alternative technology is represented by point F, or any point above II. If
this is the case, then no risk from nuclear teclmology is acceptable, and in fact an adjust-
ment in the scale and application of the nuclear fuel cycle is in order. Note that, if the
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alternative technology falls below II in Figure 7.8.3, the second-defmition limit is more
lax than the first-defmition limit (limit A).
In sum, this second defmition of acceptable risk is based on an acceptable risk limit
such that the resulting nuclear fuel cycle serves society at least as well as the best alterna-
tive fuel cycle. This limit is placed on the risk measure at the point corresponding to the
higher intersection of the nuclear-fuel-cycle opportunity frontier and the indifference
curve through the point representing the alternative technology, as in limit B in Figure
7.8.3. The basic points in favor of this second defmition of acceptable risk are: the prob-
lem of what is an acceptable risk is treated with a very broad scope - the choice of the
socially optimal fuel cycle; and an attempt is made to have the nuclear fuel cycle perform
at least as well as the best alternative fuel cycle. Basic points against this definition are: in
constraining the full fuel cycle, it provides only indirect guidance for writing regulations
for nuclear waste management; it does not optimize within the nuclear fuel cycle, which
may result in less money being spent per expected life saved than is socially optimal; and
it depends on the technical opportunity frontiers of nuclear and nonnuclear full fuel
cycles, and so requires data about alternative technologies (cost, safety performance) that
are hard to obtain; in addition, technical advances will expand many frontiers, and so
may shift the recommended acceptable risk limit.
3. The Acceptable Risk Limit as the Limit Requiring the Waste-Management Sys-
tem to be Socially Optimal and the Nuclear Fuel Cycle to Perform better
than the best A lternative Fuel Cycle
This defmition of acceptable risk combines the previous two. The first definition
seeks to have the appropriate level of safety achieved for the waste-management technol-
ogy, but may miss the fact that there is a better nonnuclear fuel cycle. The second defmi-
tion assures that the nuclear fuel cycle is the best technology, but may lead to an under·
investment in safety. It seems natural to combine these two definitions, and use which·
ever achieves the most stringent risk limit. This idea of a double limit is essentially what
is called for in the existing numerical guides for light-water reactors, which call for both
absolute limits on dose and the dollars·per-life~avedtradeoff mentioned previously (see
ref. 10). As explained above. using the more stringent limit means that, if the nuclear fuel
cycle is the best technology for the scale and application under consideration, then the first-
defmition limit (limit A in Figure 7.8.3) is binding. If the nuclear fuel cycle cannot per-
form as well as the alternative technology for the scale and application under considera-
tion, then the second-definition limit is binding, and no degree of safety will make the
risk of the nuclear fuel cycle acceptable.
If the organization served by this analysis can only control the licensing of waste-
management systems, then the scale of nuclear-waste generation will have to be taken as
given. In this case, the second defmition of acceptable risk does not apply when its limit
would be binding, and so this third defmition becomes identical to the first.
The basic points in favor of this third defmition of acceptable risk are: the problem
of what is an acceptable risk is treated in terms of a choice between socially optimized
fuel cycles; and an attempt is made to have nuclear waste generated only when it is social·
ly optimal to do so, and then to have it managed in a socially optimal manner, with the
appropriate amount of money spent per life saved. Basic points against are identical to
those detailed for definition 2.
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4. The Acceptable Risk Limit as the Limit Requiring the Nuclear Fuel Cycle to
be Safer than the best A lternative Fuel Cycle
Another way to defme acceptable risk that retains the concept of choice among
fuel cycles is to limit the nuclear fuel cycle to be safer than the best alternative fuel cycle
in terms ofequivalent current fatalities per megawatt-year (electric). Ifthe best alternative
is represented by point D in Figure 7.8.3, then limit C is the corresponding acceptable
risk limit. This acceptable risk defmition is similar to the second defInition, without giving
credit to a fuel cycle for greater economic benefIt. Note that this defmition results in an
acceptable risk limit that the nuclear fuel cycle can meet even if the best alternative tech-
nology is clearly superior, as would be the case if the alternative were represented by point
F in Figure 7.8.3. It may seem that this defInition eliminates the need to determine a
particular amount ofmoney to be spent per life saved. However, it is the same as defmition
2 with a tradeoffvalue of an infmite amount of money per life saved. As the two examples
(alternative fuel cycles at points D and F) have shown, tIllS extreme tradeoff can work to
ease or stiffen the acceptable risk limit the nuclear fuel cycle must meet.
The basic points in favor of this fourth defmition of acceptable risk are: the prob-
lem of what is an acceptable risk is treated in terms of the choice of the safest fuel cycle;
it is an easily understood concept of acceptable risk as risk per megawatt-year (electric)
no greater than the corresponding risk of the best alternative technology; and an attempt
is made to have the nuclear fuel cycle operate at least as safely as the best alternative
technology. Basic points against are: in constraining the full fuel cycle, it provides only
indirect guidance for writing regulations for nuclear waste management; it does not opti-
mize within the nuclear fuel cycle and may result in more or less money being spent per
life saved than is socially optimal; and while determining this limit does not depend on
the nuclear fuel-cycle opportunity frontier, it does depend on the nonnuclear fuel-cycle
frontiers, and so requires data about nonnuclear alternatives (cost, safety performance)
that are hard to obtain; in addition, technical advances will expand many frontiers, and so
may shift the recommended acceptable risk limit to the right.
Definitions ofAcceptable Risk Independent ofAlternatives
The four defInitions of acceptable risk presented under this heading are not based
on the choice and decision concepts used above, but rather on the concepts of risk context
and direct judgment. The fIrst three of these defmitions are based on the idea that a risk
is acceptable if it is not too different from the context of risks experienced in everyday
life, or the risks deemed acceptable by other regulations. The last defInition is based simply
on the idea that a risk is acceptable if it is deemed so by direct judgment. These four defmi-
tions were identifIed and assembled by Stephen Watson, then ofDecisions and Designs, Inc..
as part of the waste-management radiological performance objectives project at Lawrence
livermore Laboratory. The interested reader is referred to his discussion and comparison
of these and some of the previous defInitions of acceptable risk fI2] ; it covers points
largely complementary to those raised in this section. There are several points for and
against the following four defmitions which will be deferred to the end, since they apply
equally to all four defInitions.
5. Acceptable Risk as Risk Accepted in Observed Behllvior
People take risks in their everyday lives. They watch color TV, move to Denver
(both activities increase radiation doses), drive ears. and use electric appliances. These
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risks are apparently generally accepted. It might follow that an acceptable risk limit for
nuclear waste management should be set such that no individual be subject to an increase
in risk greater than that caused by any of these activities. The basic points in favor of this
defmition are: it is an easily understandable concept of acceptable risk as risk no greater
than risks commonly taken; and to the extent that people's behavior is a more accurate
indicator of values than any stated preference, this procedure more closely represents
personal values than a procedure involving a utility function fitted to stated preferences.
Basic points against are: it does not account for the benefits of a technology as a reason
for accepting the risk of that technology; and it makes several tenuous assumptions about
how people behave - that observed accepted risks are taken with full knowledte of the
probabilities and consequences, that people behave rationally when making risky
decisions, and that people want government risk decisions to be made with the same atti-
tude toward risk as they exhibit in everyday decisions that may not be carefully analyzed.
6. Acceptable Risk as Risk Allowed by Other Nuclear Regulations
The question of what risk is acceptable has in a sense already been answered for
nuclear tec)mology in the form ofregulations concerning radiation safety [13]. It may fol-
low that an acceptable risk limit should be set such that any risk due to nuclear waste
management is less than the risk allowed by existing radiation safety regulations. The basic
points in favor of this definition are: it is an easily understandable concept of acceptable
risk as risk no greater than risks already sanctioned; and it has the advantage oflegal prec-
edent - it can be argued that the amount of risk has already been ruled acceptable. The
basic point against is: it does not account for the fact that benefits result only from the
full fuel cycle, of which reactors and waste management are both parts, although the risks
of the two segments add up as part of the total fuel-cycle risk. The allocation of risk
among different segments of the fuel cycle should be done on the basis of equal funds
spent per life saved, not on an equal-risk basis.
7. Acceptable Risk .as the Risk ofa Small Fraction ofNatural Background
Radiation
This definition is related to definition 5 in that natural background radiation repre-
sents a context of risk against which to compare the risk of nuclear waste. In addition,
there are geographical and building-related fluctuations in natural background that people
do not seem to worry about. It seems reasonable, then, to defme acceptable risk as some
small fraction of the risk of natural background radiation, less than the risk of incremental
changes in background radiation that people seem to ignore. The basic point in favor of
this definition is: it is an easily understandable concept of acceptable risk as risk no greater
than that incremental risk that is typically ignored when it occurs as a change in natural
background radiation. Basic points against are: it does not account for the benefits involved
in changing geographic location versus the benefits of nuclear power; and it does not pro-
vide a rationale for determining just how small a fraction of natural background radiation
should be used.
8. Acceptable Risk as Defined by Direct Judgment
The most straightforward way to determine what risk is acceptable is simply to ask
people. This has actually been done and reported by Fischoff et al. [1]. In this study,
people were asked for their perceived benefits and risks of several different technologies
and activities, and the amount ofadjustment required (if any) to make the risk acceptable.
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The basic points in favor of this defmition are: it is the most easily understood process of
determining acceptable risk; it accounts for the level of benefit in determining acceptable
risk; and it involves the most direct expression of personal beliefs. Basic points against
are: the rationales used to arrive at the acceptable risk judgments remain in the heads of
the respondents, and so are thoroughly concealed; it requires the respondents to make judg-
ments consistent with their actual preferences concerning a very complex matter, involving
consideration of the consequences of alternative judgments of acceptability; and even if
the respondents could make these judgments consistent with their actual preferences, this
method assumes that they know the relevant technical opportunity frontiers. Because
the respondents may not know these frontiers, their judgments may result in defming an
infeasible level of acceptability. For example, the direct judgments may defme an accep-
table technology as one represented by a point lying above the 1"1" indifference curve of
Figure 7.8.3. Yet that standard is not achievable by any technology, nuclear or nonnuclear.
Comparisons and Recommendations ofDefinitions ofAcceptable Risk
Alternative-Independent venus Alternative-Based Definitions. The alternative-
independent defmitions ofacceptable risk (definitions 5-8) are at first glance more attrac-
tive than the alternative-based ones (1-4) because they are easier to understand, require
less difficult levels of information in their derivation, and are more absolute. However,
they have a very basic flaw. While some of the alternative-independent definitions are
based on comparisons of risk, none are based on the one relevant comparison: which of
the alternative energy strategies serves society best?
The actual situation facing society as it makes energy-related safety decisions is a
choice among energy strategies. If a definition of acceptable risk is based on anything
other than this choice, it may either rule out all possible alternatives, or allow more than
one, but it is very unlikely to single out the best alternative. It could be maintained that
the idea of an acceptable risk criterion is to provide an absolute risk maximum, with
optimization left as a second step (as in the structure of alternative-based defmition 3).
But if so, this absolute maximum had better allow at least one of the alternatives, or else
it will be meaningless. It follows that whoever sets the maximum must refer to the set of
alternatives to assure its applicability, and so fmds himselfdetermining an alternative-based
maximum after all. Once the criterion is found to be alternative-based, it has lost its
absoluteness and so is hard to defend unless it corresponds to one of the alternative-based
defmitions of acceptable risk.
One criticism often brought against the alternative-independent definitions 5-7 is
that they do not allow the benefits of a particular technology to be used to justify partic-
ular levels of risk. After all, if no benefit is associated with a technology, the appropriate
level of acceptable risk for this technology should be zero. This argument is a narrower
version of the choice-among-alternatives approach used here. The benefits and risks of a
technology are only realized to the extent that they exceed the benefits and risks of the
best alternative technology.
Recommended Definitions. If analysis resources are not severely constrained, the
most defendable acceptable risk criterion is the alternative-based defmition 3,
which combines definitions I and 2 into a criterion that requires safety optimization
within an appropriately scaled fuel cycle. If the regulating body does not have control
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over the scale of the fuel cycle to be regulated, defInition 3 becomes defInition 1, a
criterion requiring a socially optimized safety level for the regulated technology. DefIni-
tion 4 is attractive in its simplicity, but could lead to an indefensible misallocation of
funds.
If analysis resources are severely constrained, then the extensive information base
necessary for the alternative-based defmitions makes them inapplicable. In this case
defmition 6, acceptable risk determined by reference to similar existing regulations,
becomes attractive. While it does not itself address the choice among alternatives that
should be considered, it alone of the "low budget" definitions takes advantage of risk-
analysis work done by others facing a similar type of risk.
An Example ofa Risk Measure
As was explained above, the purpose of the risk measure is to evaluate the very
complex health-effect consequences of a waste-management regulatory strategy, expressed
as a rrobability distribution over sets of health effects {Pi' xi}' in terms of a single num-
ber X ({Pi'Xi }), such as equivalent current fatalities. This scalar risk measure is necessary
to rank regulatory strategies in terms of the levels of safety they represent, to defme the
efficient set of regulatory strategies in terms of economic benefit and safety, to define the
value tradeoff between economic benefIt and safety in simple and meaningful terms, and
to express the concept of acceptable risk in terms of a limit on the scale of the
risk measure.
As shown earlier in eqn. (6), the risk measure is based on a von Neumarm-
Morgenstern multiattribute utility function U(x). An example of this utility function will
now be given. Some of the ideas are taken directly from a report by Keeney [14] ; the
reader is referred to it for a more complete development of some of the concepts touched
on briefly here.
Arguments of the Utility Function. The arguments of the utility function can best
be defmed by enumerating the considerations that may affect values concerning health
effects. The fIrst of these is when the health effects occur. The time dimension can be
divided into before and after the waste repository is sealed (pre-seal, post-seal). Perhaps
the post-seal period can be further divided into centuries, but for clarity and brevity in
this example, only two periods are used. The second consideration is how the health
effects are grouped, whether or not they are bunched into catastrophes. A catastrophe is
defmed here as a set of health effects that are announced as having the same immediate
cause. The third consideration, suggested by Keeney [14], is how the impacts of the
health effects are felt. A fatality in a catastrophe has a social impact on those who read
about it in the papers and a personal impact on the victim and on the victim's family. The
fourth consideration is how the health effect is incurred: voluntarily or involuntarily.
Perhaps a better partition here is occupational vs. nonoccupational. The fmal consideration
included here is what sort ofhealth effect is involved. While there can be a large number of
health-effect categories, for this example only two will be considered: fatal cancers and
nonfatal cancers.
Figure 7.8.4 illustrates how these fIve considerations can be organized into a hierar-
chy that exploits dependencies among categories. Note that there are no social-impact
branches for nonbunched health effects, and no voluntary or occupational health. effects
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for the post-seal period. For the two time periods used in this example, the hierarchy ter-
minates in twelve arguments, {x l' ••• ,X1:2 }, where each argument is simply the number
of health effects fitting the description of its node in the hierarchy. Note that several
health effects are counted twice, once for their personal impacts and once for their social
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FIGURE 7.8.4 Hierarchy of value dimensions.
Structure of the Utility Function. Starting at the top of Figure 7.8.4, the fIrst par-
tition the utility function must aggregate over is time. Because pre-seal preferences cannot
depend on post-seal outcomes, and probably a very small fraction of people impacted in
the;piOSt-seal period will be alive in the pre-seal period, it seems reasonable to assume the
preference structure is additive over time. Using tl for the pre-seal and t2 for the post-seal
subscript:
(14)
Because any bunched health effects will be different and considered apart from non-
bunched health effects, it may be reasonable to assume additive preferences over this par-
tition also. Using b for the bunched-{lffect and n for nonbunched-{lffect subscript:
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The personal-social partition divides not health effects but the impacts of these health
effects on two basically different populations. So here too additivity seems reasonable.
Using p for the personal-impact and s for the social-impact subscript:
Ub1(X 1,··· ,x4 ) =kpUp1(X 1,··· ,x4 ) +kaus1(X1"" ,x4 )
(16)
The voluntary--involuntary partition is more involved. Since this partition represents
mutually exclusive populations, the personal impacts can be assumed to be additive. How-
ever, it is quite plausible that the social impact will include some interaction. Using v for
the voluntary-effect and in for the involuntary-effect subscript, 1T for the personal-impact
basic health-effect utility function, a for the social-impact basic function, and int for the
interaction weight:
(17)
Finally, since fatal and nonfatal cancers impact mutually exclusive populations, it seems
reasonable that personal impacts will be additive across health-effect types. In addition,
by the very nature of the personal impacts, it seems reasonable to assume additivity
across impactees within each health-effect type, indicating a linear utility function. On
the other hand, there may be interactions in the social impact both across and within
health-effect types. Using 1 for the fatal- and 2 for the nonfatal-cancer subscript:
(18)
The overall utility function U (x) can be composed from equations of the forms of (14)-
(18).
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The elicitation procedure must assess the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility func-
tions over the social impacts of numbers of health effects of each type (u 1 , u2 )· The pro-
cedure must also assess importance and interaction weights (ka l' ka 2' ka int' etc.)
corresponding to value tradeoffs between health-effect types, volu~tary ~ersus involuntary
effects, personal versus social impacts, bunched versus nonbunched effects, and effects
occurring in different periods.
Conclusions, Future Directions
This paper has described a method of measuring the radiological risk due to nuclear
waste management that can take a complex description of the consequences of a waste-
management regulatory strategy- a probability distribution over multidimensional out-
comes - and reduce it to a single number, a risk measure. This risk measure is necessary to
rank regulatory strategies and the resulting waste-management systems in terms of the
level of safety each represents. It provides a means of identifying the set of regulatory
strategies that are efficient in the sense of the most safety for a given cost. The risk mea-
sure can express the reduction in risk due to a regulation in simple, meaningful terms, so
that the risk reduction can be compared with the cost of achieving it. The risk measure
provides a scale on which a limit of acceptable risk can be set, and on which the risk of
nuclear waste management can be compared with other. risks. Several defmitions of accep-
table risk have been discussed, and particular defInitions recommended for different
levels of analysis. In addition, ways of using a risk measure and acceptable risk limit to
develop performance objectives for use as guidance in writing regulations have been out-
lined.
Several key areas of difficulty stand out as directions for future work. One is to
develop improved ways to assess public preferences, and to aggregate these performances
into a single risk measure. Another is to determine a definition of acceptable risk that fits
into a clear analytic framework and is agreed upon by the various parties in the political
and regulatory process charged with managing hazardous technologies. The method outlined
here handles only the radiological risk of a new technology. This risk analysis should be
interfaced with a more comprehensive evaluation of this technology.
The method described provides a framework for the analysis of risk due to waste
management, or, for that matter, any other technology. This framework can be used to
organize available data into a structured basis for writing regulations to manage the risk.
The method separates clearly the roles of technical probability judgments from value
judgments. It also distinguishes the identification of the set of efficient technical alterna-
tives from the crucial value tradeoffbetween cost and safety. This structuring ofthe analy-
sis can serve to identify reasons for disagreement in questions of the safety of a particular
technology, including the basic question of how safe is safe enough.
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8.1 THE DANISH RESPONSE TO WELL CONTROL·
The first oil to be discovered under the North Sea was found in the Danish sector;
at the time of the Workshop, four oil and two gas fields were under development. The
basic principles governing the regulation and supervision of offshore activities are some-
what different from those in force in the neighboring Norwegian sector. A single conces-
sionaire, the A.P. Moller Company, holds a 50-year lease on all oil and gas development in
the Danish sector and subleases to a group of oil companies who operate in the area. The
terms of A.P. Moller's lease are very broad and they effectively limit direct governmental
involvement to a fairly nominal level, except in cases where pollution has taken place.
The operating company has sole responsibility for well control.
The Maersk Explorer Blowout
The blowout in the Vagn-1 exploratory well being drilled from the Maersk Explorer
rig occurred on October 14, 1977. A pressure "kick" from a shallow gas pocket precipi-
tated a series of operating errors which led to the blowout. Some attempts were made to
close off the well but it seems that these were not continued for long enough. Equipment
needed to stop the blowout was not immediately available but it also appears that the
reasons given for abandoning the rig so early in the incident were not valid. The underlying
reasons for the blowout seem to have been human error in responding to the initial well
kick, compounded with subsequent errors of judgment by personnel under stress.
Additional hazards were present throughout the attempts to control the blowout.
These possible dangers included the risks of explosion, underground blowout, "cratering,"
and the collapse of the Maersk Explorer rig under the accumulated weight of sand blown
out of the well along with the gas. Fortunately, however, none of these complicating
events actually took place.
*Based on comments made during the Workshop by Peter Steen, Chief Petroleum Engineer, Danish
Energy Agency. Since Mr. Steen did not submit a formal paper, we present here an outline of his
remarks.
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Government response during the incident was coordinated by a Steering Committee
composed of the Ministry of Trade as leader, the Danish Energy Agency, the Danish Geo-
logical Survey, and the Environmental Protection Agency. However, as noted above, the
role of the Steering Committee was somewhat constrained by the wide-ranging terms of
A.P. MOller's lease.
8.2 NORWEGIAN REGULATORY RESPONSES TO WELL CONTROL·
The Action Group and its Future Use
The Action Group set up by the Norwegian government at the time of the Bravo
blowout has an impressive formal structure and it certainly operated very successfully
during the Bravo incident. However, there is still room for discussion ofhow best to ensure
its efficient operation in future. For a number of reasons the staff of the Petroleum Direc-
torate should be responsible to the Directorate's representative on the Action Group but
should normally not be subject to the Action Group's direct control. The reasons include
the wide variety of emergency and ongoing tasks which the Directorate must perform,
such as estimating flow rates, checking the durability of structures, organizing liaison with
all the companies involved, working in the field, and handling other emergencies and near-
emergencies. A blowout lasting a very long time may necessitate a change in organizational
structure, such as attaching personnel from private companies to the Petroleum Direc-
torate, for example, to advise on the location and timing of relief-well drilling.
One major issue which should be recognized is that there can be great political pres-
sure on the Action Group to take over well- and pollution-control operations directly. To
prevent this happening with undue frequency, the day-to-day regulator should be made
an integral part of the Action Group, thus making it unnecessary for the Group to directly
decide on too many questions for which the regulator or operator would normally be res-
ponsible. The importance of this point should be stressed: if the Action Group does move
during an emergency into an organizational area already occupied by the normal regulator
or operator, it can jeopardize or even destroy the close working relationships which are so
necessary in more normal situations.
WeU-Control Issues
Turning to more technical matters, some consideration could be given to drilling a
reliefwell directly from the fixed production platform, rather than from a separate jack-up
rig. Contingency plans in the past did not specify the availability of equipment such as
emergency vessels, working barges, BOPs, valves, etc., but now more thought is being given
to preparation for accidents. However, if too much equipment preparation occurs, then
*Based on comments made during the Workshop by Dag Meier-Hansen, Director, Inspection and Con-
trol, Norwegian Petroleum Directorate. Since Mr. Meier-Hansen did not submit a formal paper, we
present here an outline of his remarks.
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the preplanned "solution" may not fit the actual situation as it develops; therefore a plan-
ning framework is more important than a detailed plan.
Well capping and control could be made easier if these future potential problems
were considered during the design stage. While the regulator should not insist on a partic-
ular solution, thereby allowing the companies to suggest a range of plans, one possibility
is the installation of a fIXed valve under the "christmas tree" that is present at all times so
that the well is never open ,during a maintenance workover. Alternative operating proce-
dures could be devised and evaluated so that each company has available a variety of pro-
cedures, for example for shutting down a well. It is important to design components and
equipment so that, if accidents do occur, they proceed in such a way as to minimize their
consequences. It is also important to know the threshold of damage for each given struc-
ture, so that a decision maker can minimize other damage, for example by deciding to
re-ignite the flow from a blowing well to reduce the extent of oil pollution.
8.3 UK REGULATORY RESPONSES TO WELL AND POLLUTION CONTROL'"
UK Organization for Well and Pollution Control
In the event of a blowout occurring in the UK sector, central government plans
specify that a blowout emergency team would be set up in the operator's home port by
the head of the Petroleum Engineering Division, Department of Energy (who would advise
on well control). The team would also include representatives of the Department of Trade
(to advise on pollution cleanup), the Ministry of Defence, and the Scottish Office (if the
incident occurred north oflatitude 55 0 N). The responsibilities of this emergency team
are defined to include maintaining hour-by-hour contact with the operator, monitoring
operator actions promptly, and relaying government advice. The team would report direc-
tly to a special Cabinet-Office committee at ministerial level; the actual members of the
committee are never named and the precise organization would depend on the magnitude
of the incident.
The Department of Trade is advised on pollution control by environmental experts
in government departments (e.g., fisheries) and on nature-conservation issues (such as
damage to seabird populations) by the Nature Conservancy Council.
Emergency Vessels
Since the Bravo blowout, the UK government has been studying the types of fire-
fighting vessels available and their various response times. Some differences of opinion
between industry and government regarding the response times and capabilities of the
vessels have emerged. Further study is necessary on the relative benefits of on-platform
·Based on comments made during the Workshop by A.D. Read, Department of Energy, United
Kingdom. In addition to the formal paper submitted by Mr. Read (see Section 9.1), it was felt
that a summary of his remarks would be of interest.
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drenching systems and fire-fighting vessels arriving at various times after the incident has
started.
The real capabilities of working vessels anchored alongside a blowing platform are
also under study because of the probability that they will not be able to operate at full
specified capacity in very rough seas. There is a need for larger fire-fighting vessels and
also for working platform vessels equipped with dynamic positioning aids so that they can
maintain their positions in heavy seas. Up till now, strategies for drilling relief wells have
relied on the availability in the area of numerous mobile exploration rigs; however, as the
exploration drilling phase draws to a close, it may be necessary for one or two ofthese rigs
to be purchased and kept available for emergency relief drilling. Finally, the UK govern-
ment is supporting research on a single-vessel oil pick-up system for use in selected areas.
PoUution-Control Issues
Oil tankers are considered to pose a greater and more long-standing threat to the
UK than oil blowouts because of the density of tanker traffic and prevailing currents in
the area. Because of this mobile threat from both British and foreign tankers, the UK has
had to organize its own independent clean-up system, whereas the responsibility for deal-
ing with any pollution caused by UK-based offshore operations rests with the operators
themselves. There are oil-spill contingency plans for the operators and these are discussed
in more detailin Section 9.1.
At strategic points around the UK coast, stocks of government-approved chemical
dispersants, information on environmentally sensitive areas, and lists of contacts for more
information are maintained. The approved dispersants are used as the basic response to oil
spills; toxicity regulations specify that the mixture of oil and dispersants must be no more
toxic than the oil itself. Dispersal techniques are used because they are considered at pre-
sent to be the only available methods which actually work in the sea conditions experienced
around the coasts of the UK. If an accident occurs, operators do not automatically start
spraying dispersant; spraying only takes place initially to ensure safety in the vicinity of
the platform and to counter any immediate perceived threat to seabird populations. At the
same time, the operator seeks immediate advice from the government on the advisability
ofany further spraying. In the future the UK hopes to move to a mixed response involving
both mechanical and chemical methods, because it accepts that recovery (where this is
possible) is environmentally preferable to dispersion.
Discussion
It is recognized that spraying dispersant on oil spilled from a platform in the UK
sector can speed the arrival of oil in the Norwegian sector. There are still differences of
opinion on when to spray, how long to continue spraying, and what dispersant concen-
tration should be used. There is clearly a need to balance the risk to seabirds of oil float-
ing on the surface and the risk to fish from dispersed oil in the water column below. Finally,
it should be noted that the oil blown from the well is often at a high temperature ("'i00° C);
evaporation of this boiling oil and rapid degradation of oil in seawater are in fact the main
routes by which the concentrations of the lighter fractions are reduced, regardless of the
clean-up method used.
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8.4 AN OPERATOR APPROACH TO CONTROL'"
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This subject is very broad in scope and therefore only an outline of the more impor-
tant elements is presented here. The large number of factors connected with emergency
preparedness can be appreciated by examining Figure 8.4.1. Clearly the factors may be
divided into three main elements, namely personnel, equipment, and contingency plans;
the figure gives some indication of the possible subdivisions ofeach element and also shows
the close interrelation between the elements.
Contingency Plans
In Norway, Statoil has developed a system of contingency plans that can be uti-
lized for a broad range of accidents, plants, and equipment. The system is based on the
use of one overall and fairly general plan for Statoil, taken in conjunction with individual
rig or plant-related plans. In the event ofan accident, these two types of plans are intended
to complement each other. Personnel are on call partly under the provisions of the over-
all Statoil plan and partly on an individual-rig (or plant) basis. Figure 8.4.2 presents the
main organizational elements in the Statoil plan, plus the connections to emergency ser-
vices controlled by the central authorities. The action group within Statoil can draw upon
all the resources of the company as the need arises.
Cooperative Planning: the "Sector Clubs"
To increase efficiency and pool resources, thus easing the burden of emergency pre-
parations for each field, the North Sea Operators' Committee-Norway (NSOC-N) and
the United Kingdom Offshore Operators' Association (UKOOA) have collaborated in
drawing up a "Code of Practice and Plan" for offshore emergencies. The Code is based on
the concept of "Sector Clubs" which are groups ofgeographically neighboring fields coop-
erating in the provision of emergency equipment and services. There are a total of five
such clubs in the North Sea: the four which involve both Norwegian and UK fields are
shown in Figure 8.4.3, while the fifth (not shown here) lies entirely within the UK sec-
tor.
The Code defines three different steps in dealing with emergencies. Step I (up to
one hour after the emergency starts) is that of immediate preparedness - evacuation and
medical care for personnel and immediate fire fighting. Step II (from one hour to several
days after the emergency starts) is the phase of stabilization - including long-term fire
fighting. Step III (from several days onwards) is the stage of fmal control and correction -
including well control, capping, relief-well drilling, any additional fire fighting, etc. The
basic principle of the Code is that each field should independently cover its own needs
for Step I and at least part of Step II. Each sector club should be capable of indepen-
dently covering the remainder of Step II and all of Step III.
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FIGURE 8.4.3 The NSOC-N/UKOOA emergency-preparedness plan: location of the four sector
clubs involving both Norwegian and UK fields.
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TABLE 8.4.1 Estimated effects of evaporation, natural dispersion, and mechanical clean up on a
North Sea oil spill: percentages of oil remaining after various stages.
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/ZOn the Beaufort scale.
bNo clean up attempted in very high seas.
cPercentage of original spill which arrives on the beaches.
The Code of Practice and Plan also contains information on the resources which
should be available during an emergency, such as drilling rigs, vessels (for fire fighting,
well control, hospital purposes, cleaning up oil spills, etc.), and other equipment such as
mud pumps. As an example, when the Statfjord field is fully developed it is intended to
have the following vessels at its disposal: two for evaluation and hospital use which can
double up as fire-fighting vessels, two additional vessels for fire fighting alone, and one
ship for well control.
Equipment for Fighting Oil Spills
Statutory requirements call for the provision of equipment that can pick up 8,000
tons per day; this equipment must be capable of operating in wave heights of 2.5-3.0 m
and able to be mobilized within 24 hours of the beginning of the emergency. In practical
terms these requirements translate into the following equipment. Twelve vessels are needed
to control booms, six are required for the skimmers, and one other vessel acts as the com-
mand and coordinating center; in addition, a number of tankers are needed to carry away
the oil collected. Other equipment required includes approximately 3,000 m of booms,
six to eight skimmers, and the various pumps and fittings needed to transfer the oil to the
tankers.
The specified meteorological operating conditions of 3-m wave heights and 13-m/s
winds are, on average, only exceeded for 15-20% of each year in the North Sea.
Table 8.4.1 estimates the approximate efficiency of the system described above,
under average North Sea conditions. It shows the relative contributions which can be
expected from evaporation, natural dispersion, and mechanical clean-up methods, and
concludes that a fairly constant 6-9% of the oil spilled may be expected to reach the
beaches, regardless of the weather conditions.
Discussion
Some authorities feel that the assumptions used in developing Table 8.4.1 are too
optimistic all round and that significantly higher waves and wind speeds should be expected.
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This is a real problem. On the one hand it is unrealistic to take all the figures to their worst-
case extremes (even though fisheries' interests would certainly prefer a worst-case analysis);
even in winter, wave heights are less than 3 m for almost 80% of the time, but when the
waves do get too high it is virtually impossible to collect any oil. On the other hand the
study of very extreme cases is under way in order to ensure that the equipment used col-
lects as much oil as possible from the sea before damage is done. The philosophical prob-
lem for a regulator is to decide whether to inform politicians of the worst possible out-
come of an accident or to restrict the advice to a "most realistic" case. Finally, it is noted
that a list of tankers available for storing spilled oil is maintained.
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A.D. Read, A.J. Flikke, Eric B. Cowell, Lars F~yn, R. J. Morris, and David
W. Fischer
9.1 OIL-SPILL CLEANUP ARRANGEMENTS IN THE OFFSHORE OILFIELDS·
This section, which has been produced by the UK Departments ofTrade and Energy
in consultation with the UK Offshore Operators' Association (UKOOA), deals with con-
tingency planning for oil spills by offshore operators, and the nature and extent ofgovern-
ment involvement when spills occur.
Primary Responsibility for Action, and the Role of the Government
The Operator's Responsibility
It is widely held, both in the UK and elsewhere, that the polluter should pay for
the cost of cleaning up any spill. The UK government goes a stage further and maintains
that the primary response role should rest with the polluter whenever this is reasonably
practical. It is accepted that in the case of tankers, which make long journeys past the
coasts of many countries, it would not be reasonable to expect shipowners - individually
or collectively - to provide and maintain the worldwide organization that would be
required to deal with spills wherever they might occur.
In the case of offshore oil operations off the UK coast, however, the potential
source of a spill is localized and there are good communications and logistics facilities
connecting the installations with the mainland. There is also, to a great extent, a pooling
of interest within the UKOOA. Thus, it becomes a practical proposition, given advance
preparation and planning, for the operator to fulfill the requirement of dealing with any
spills of his own making. Much of this preparatory work is already in hand.
It follows, of course, that ifthe response is to be meaningful, the operator must have
foreseen the contingency of a spill, drawn up an organizational and operational plan for
such an event, trained the personnel concerned, and provided or have access to the nec-
essary equipment and other resources. These aspects will be dealt with more fully later.
*By A.D. Read, Department of Energy, United Kingdom.
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The Role ofGovernment
Assistance to Operators. Government experience in dealing with oil spills from
tankers suggests that it would be difficult to justify the level of expenditure necessary to
provide the resources required to deal with the "maximum credible incident," such as, in
that field, the collision of two loaded VLCCs (Very Large Crude Carriers) with several
tanks opened to the sea. If such an event were to occur, the government might if necessary
look to industry or to its partners in the Bonn Agreement to augment its resources.
In a similar way, whilst an offshore operator must equip himself adequately to deal
with the maximum size of spill, he may reasonably expect, having regard to the nature and
scale of operations at his installation, that a situation may arise that will outstrip his capa-
bility. (UKOOAs current facilities are calculated to be capable of cleaning up about 2,000
tons of oil per day for eight days.) In such an instance, government would look favorably
on any request for assistance.
It is likely that, by the time such a situation has developed, the spill will already have
been reported to government as required, and the channel of reporting will offer the
best means of requesting assistance. No doubt as a practical move, an operator faced with
a situation beyond his immediate capability would calIon the resources ofother operators,
of UKOOA, and possibly ofthe North Sea Operators' Clean Seas Committee, as appropriate.
It should be borne in mind that the Department of Trade oil-spill cleanup organization is
oriented to spills that threaten the coast, and operations well out to sea could pose prob-
lems, e.g., in terms of response time, replenishment, etc.
Protection of the Coast and Seabirds. The Department of Trade has been given the
responsibility of dealing with oil spills at sea that threaten to cause major pollution of the
coast, or to harm important concentrations of seabirds. In no way does it see this role as
derogating from the primary responsibility of offshore operators to deal with spills from
their own installations. However, it reserves the right to take action in fulfillment of its
responsibility - and to recover the cost thereof from the responsible operator - should
it form the opinion that the action of the operator is, for whatever reason, likely to prove
inadequate. The department will, of course, confer with the operator in the first place
and will, so far as possible, act in concert with him. Protection of the coastline becomes
increasingly significant the nearer the installation is sited to land, particularly if the stretch
of coastline in question is sensitive from the point of view of wildlife as well as amenity.
Major Spills. An extreme situation, such as a continuing release of oil following a
major blowout, is of great interest, both to the public and to parliament. The spillage
would no doubt be looked upon automatically as a menace, and it would become polit-
ically impossible for government to refrain from taking an interest in the cleanup operation.
This is not to say, however, that the government would necessarily take charge. The circum-
stances prevai1ing at the time will dictate the degree of involvement, which may range from
regular monitoring of the cleanup operation to assure itself that all reasonable steps are
being taken, through assistance, to assuming control. Examples of such assistance are the
provision of additional cleanup resources, or of aerial surveillance. The possibility of govern-
ment involvement in this manner should not, however, dissuade the operator from providing
the initial, full response to the spill.
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Background
In order to meet his responsibility to deal adequately with spills of his making, an
operator must have in readiness a viable contingency plan, backed up by the necessary
resources. To ensure compatibility between the plans of different operators and of the
government, and to assure the government that the degree of preparation and of response
capability is adequate, operators have been asked to submit their plans to the Departments
of Energy and Trade for examination.
Regulations
The preparation of such plans is required by the Offshore Installations (Emergency
Procedures) Regulations 1976, which apply both to established fixed offshore installa-
tions and to mobile installations. They require every manned installation to carry an emer-
gency procedure manual specifying the action to be taken, inter alia, in the event of a
leak or spillage of any oil or gas [Reg. 4(lXc)].
The scope of the regulations extends ~Reg. 4(3Xc)] to action to be taken by per-
sons on land or on other installations, and so covers all aspects of an oil-spill contingency
plan. In addition, the Secretary of State may "upon demand" require a copy of this emer-
gency procedure manual to be furnished to him [Reg. 4(6)]. Regulation 13(1) makes any
contravention of the regulations by the installation manager, the concession owner, or the
owner of the installation, as the case may be, an offence punishable by fme or imprison-
ment, or both.
Submission ofPlans
Last summer the Department of Energy approached the 54 designated operators to
whom Petroleum Production licenses had been granted and asked them to submit their
plans for examination. Contact is now maintained with 38 of the companies. Those
excluded have either given up their licenses or have no immediate plans to drill. Drilling
for some of those remaining will be undertaken by other companies, and those companies'
contingency plans will cover the license holders. The department has so far received plans
from 26 companies. Of the remaining 12, two have been promised as soon as possible and
six are to be submitted when drilling is contemplated. (Four companies have not yet
offered plans.) Plans have thus been received from all companies actively drilling in the
UK sectors at this time.
Scope ofPlans Received
The nature of the contingency plans received has varied considerably: several have
been comprehensive documents; some have been the 1974 UKOOA guidelines (see below)
"topped and tailed" (quite inadequate as a fullscale emergency operating plan); others
have been letters or copies of internal memoranda which cover only the barest minimum.
It may be that the companies whose submissions have been skeletal have nevertheless




While the Offshore Installations (Emergency Procedures) Regulations 1976 do not
apply to submarine pipelines, pipeline operators are nevertheless being urged to prepare
contingency plans similar to those for offshore platforms and to submit them for exam-
ination in similar manner. These plans should cover the action to be taken in relation to
spills occurring at any point along the route of the pipeline, both well offshore and close
to the coast. The remainder of the text applies equally to pipelines, as well as to other
types of installations.
The UKOOA Plan
The UKOOA's Clean Seas and Emergency Services Committee published Oil Spill
Contingency Guidelines in November 1974. A revised version is in preparation and is
expected to be issued shortly. In addition, a comprehensive contact list of key personnel
within government, local authorities, and other agencies was prepared about the same
time by the Department of Energy and the UKOOA. This is presently being revised by
the department. The UKOOA makes clear that it regards these gUidelines as a framework,
and it assumes that each operator will have his own operational plan with appropriate
organizational structure, lines of communication, and provision of or access to adequate
resources.
Part 1 of the 1974 Plan outlines the terms of reference and structure of the UKOOA,
and describes the emergency action groups set up at Aberdeen and Great Yarmouth, and
planned for the Celtic Sea. (Note that these action groups do not undertake the cleanup
operation itself; their function is briefly described below.) Part 2 outlines action proce-
dures and gives details of quick access to the use of shared services, in particular, spraying
equipment and dispersant. It states that these jointly held resources provide an operator
with the capability of dealing with most oil spills, as well as an initial means for tackling
larger spills that can require providing further backup facilities. The plan goes on to des-
cribe the composition and location of the UKOOA units, the procedure to put the facil-
ities to use, the location of the Department of Trade's stocks of dispersants, a list of
international sources, specific details of the UKOOA bulk tank, and guidance on the use
of dispersant. Through the North Sea Clean Seas Committee, a UKOOA member can
also call on the resources held by other national operators' associations around the North
Sea.
Limits of UKOOA 's Responsibility
The UKOOA coordinators at Aberdeen are on call 24 hours a day to mobilize their
resources and to make them available to the operator. Once alerted, the coordinator con-
tacts the appropriate UKOOA holding company to arrange for the equipment, including
tanks of dispersant, to be loaded onto the vessel, which has been arranged by the opera-
tor. Once this has been done, however, and the spray booms fitted, the responsibility for
further action becomes the operator's.
The UKOOA function is therefore distributive rather than operational, and it is
vital that operators acknowledge this by taking appropriate action to fill in the gaps. Also,
they should make clear in their contingency plans how the UKOOA arrangements will be
used within their own organizational structures. For instance, they should make clear that
suitable manned vessels will be arranged to take on board the equipment and dispersants;
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that the procedure to coordinate with UKOOA is understood by all relevant personnel;
and that the crews of spraying vessels are/will be adequately instructed in the use of the
equipment. If necessary, other companies' facilities and expertise could be deployed and
their plans should make such arrangements clear.
There have been no returns to date from nonmembers ofUKOOA. All the companies
drilling at present are members.
Present holdings are based on UKOOA units. Each unit consists of one spray set
complete with breaker boards and six lift tanks each containing 1,200 gallons of concen-
trate dispersant. These units are situated as follows: six in Lerwick, three in Aberdeen,
one in Lowestoft, and two in Pembroke Dock.
Essential Elements of the Plan
The Appendix outlines the principal elements of an oil-spill contingency plan, and
the action required to maintain an adequate state of preparedness as seen by government.
The Appendix does not, however, seek to be fully comprehensive.
Appendix: Notes on the Principal Elements of an Oil-SpiII Contingency Plan
Application
Regulations 3 and 4 of the Offshore Installations (Emergency Procedures) Regula-
tions 1976 describe the range, scope, and application of a contingency plan.
Responsibilities and Training
The plan should be familiar to all those involved in following its procedures, and
the allocation ofresponsibilities should be clearly set out and understood. The key operating
staff should be trained in the control of a pollution incident and should have frequent
opportunities for "refresher training." Simulated incidents should be devised from time
to time to test the plan - in particular, its communications and decision-making elements -
and the personnel. There should be provision for frequent updating in the light of the
experience gained during these exercises, any actual incidents, and because of technical
developments and personnel changes.
Reporting ofSpills
All oil spills should be reported in accordance with company instructions. They
must also be notified as quickly as possible to HM Coastguard (HMCG) by the most appro-
priate means of communication. HMCG will be responsible for relaying the information
to the Department of Trade cleanup organization (presently through the appropriate prin-
cipal officer). A report must also go to the Department of Energy (Petroleum Engineering
Division) in accordance with the conditions attached to the production licenses. There
should be provision for periodic situation reports to be rendered to the same addressees
so that government may be kept fully informed of developments. This will reduce the
number of enquiries, e.g., on behalf of ministers.
Contact List
An up-to-date directory (with means of contact throughout the 24 hours) is essen-
tial to any contingency plan. It should cover: all personnel involved at the installation; all
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company personnel - wherever located - who need to be informed; HM Coastguard and
the appropriate principal officer (Department of Trade); and all other appropriate officials
of government and interested agencies (but with clear instructions as to the circumstances
under which any of these should be approached). For example, where an installation is so
located that an oil spill will cause an immediate threat of coastal pollution, consideration
should be given to the inclusion of appropriate local authority contacts.
Communications
The plan should make clear the best and then alternative means of effecting com-
munications in relation to all of its parts.
Action Plan
All procedural steps from the discovery ofan incident to its close should be mapped
out, including callout procedures, and the means of early appraisal of the extent and con-
sequences of the spill.
Surveillance ofslick. Provision should be made for aerial surveillance of slicks, and
it is recommended that a flight be arranged as soon as possible after the alert so as to deter-
mine the size and location of the slick as well as to assess its likely behavior.
Prediction of movement. Facilities should be available, either within the company's
organization or by arrangement elsewhere, for the prediction of the likely movement of
the slick. Provision should be made for obtaining appropriate meteorological and nautical
information.
Treatment of slick. Clear guidance should be given on the appropriate method and
scope of treatment, as well as on the procedure to be followed in order to seek outside
assistance, should this prove necessary.
Consultation. Notwithstanding any general guidance that might be given as to the
circumstances in which action or inaction might for the time being be appropriate, pro-
vision should be made for consultation at the time of an incident with the Nature Conser-
vancy Council and with the Fisheries Inspectorate of the appropriate Fisheries Department
(the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) or the Department of Agriculture
and Fisheries, Scotland (DAFS)) so that account may be taken of any particular circum-
stances then prevailing.
Public Relations
Oil spills from offshore installations are very likely to attract the interest of the news
media. Experience has shown that these latter, if allowed free enquiry, can seriously inhibit
the conduct of operations. It is strongly recommended that facilities (including accommo-
dation and public relations personnel) be allocated for their reception and information in
any incident that arouses their interest.
Resources
Full information should be given on the resources held by the operator for oil-
spill cleanup operations, including any resources jointly held with other operators. This
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information should include the resources normally carried on the operator's standby and
supply vessels. Many of these will be permanently loaded with dispersant and fitted with
spray booms, etc. It will be expected as a minimum that standby vessels serving platforms
close to shore and those using a tanker loading system will also be so equipped by carrying
sufficient dispersant for at least one day's spraying. The plan should set down the proce-
dures for activating or obtaining from elsewhere the required resources (e.g., equipment
and dispersant) and for obtaining the use of manned vessels for spraying duties.
Any non-UKOOA operators should state their arrangements for gaining access to
the necessary resources. Small operators should make clear any complementary arrange-
ments they may have with other operators to assist (e.g., with organization, personnel,
vessels, etc.) during an oil spill and its aftermath. They should also make clear how and to
whom contact should be made.
Post Mortem
The action following an incident should include: the early restoration of all equip-
ment used, including replenishment of dispersant stocks; and a survey of the incident
itself and of the action taken to deal with it. This should determine how the contingency
plan stood up to the test and what lessons have been learned for the future. These lessons
should be reflected as necessary in appropriate amendments to the contingency arrange-
ments.
Spills of significance are fortunately rare, but live experience is therefore sparse.
It is accordingly recommended that operators make a brief report to the Department of
Trade on any lessons learned above for dissemination to other operators.
9.2 THE REGULATORY APPROACH TO POLLUTION CONTROL·
The peculiarities of the North Sea compared to other oil-producing areas of the
world are well known. Suffice it to say that, relatively speaking, the environment is very
hostile, and that water depths and the sea conditions in the early stages of development
pose some completely new problems. As far as construction work is concerned, it is prob-
ably true to say that pioneering work has been necessary but is now complete.
In terms of drilling and safety technology, the North Sea also presents challenging
and difficult problems. It is well known that typical North Sea production zones in lime-
stone or chalk are capable of production rates exceeding 25,000 barrels per day under
present completion and operating conditions, and that these wells under blowout condi-
tions could flow at a rate of 80,000-100,000 barrels per day. Closed-in wellhead pressures
for these wells would be on the order of 5,000 psi or close to 350 kP/cm:l. In known sand-
stone reservoirs, under expected calculations, a flow of 50,000 barrels per day using 7-
inch tubing string and appropriate back pressures are to be expected. With open flow
through 9.625-inch casing to the atmosphere, the flow rate may exceed 100,000 barrels
per day. Closed-in wellhead pressure is likely to be in the region of 3,000-3,500 psi or
200-250 kP/cm2 • Jurassic wells in sandstone formations are also known, but little infor-
·By A.I. Flikke, Norwegian State Pollution Control Authority.
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mation is as yet available. It is, however, significant to note that closed-in wellhead pres-
sures are exceedingly high, perhaps on the order of 8,000-1 0,000 psi or 500-700 kP/cm2 •
Availability of equipment with the appropriate working pressure (15,000 psi) is limited.
In addition, the closing time for a blowing well may be as high as 100 days or more, if a
relief well has to be drilled.
In summary, therefore, it may be said that environment and formation pressures
emphasize the importance of safety aspects, and that the large flow rates to be expected
during a blowout in the North Sea may create a pollution situation never before expe-
rienced offshore if appropriate measures are not taken. The discharges will, if the situation
should develop, take place on the doorstep of some of the most important European har-
bors and in waters of significant fishing importance. The sanding up ofa well, which could
reduce the flow, in all probability will be quite slow, so that natural circumstances can-
not be relied on to retard the expected flow rate.
The activity on the Norwegian continental shelf at the time of writing may be indi-
cated briefly by the following facts: thirteen operators are registered; approximately 200
exploration wells have been drilled; some 50 wells are producing oil in the Ekofisk area
with a fmal total of 100-120 wells expected; at Frigg some 25 wells are presently pro-
ducinggas; Statfjord A began producing in 1980 and will reach a total number of 42 wells;
and two more platforms are planned.
It is unnecessary to give a lengthy explanation of the events leading to an open-
hole blowout offshore. Suffice it to say that risks are involved during certain phases of
drilling, completion, and overhaul, and that serious accidents can also take place during
normal production. Briefly speaking, accidents may be grouped as follows: blowout from
an exploration well being drilled from a floating rig or drill ship, and blowout from one or
more wells on a fixed installation caused by accident during drilling or workover, gas explo-
sion, fire, or damage to structure.
While accidents under the first group will lead to an underwater leakage that may
only be stopped by drilling a relief well, the second group of accidents may possibly be
cured by capping the blowing well or wells. Relief-well drilling will take on the order of
100 days, while capping may take a considerably shorter time. Successful capping is, how-
ever, to a large extent dependent on the surrounding conditions. Fire and deterioration or
collapse of the structure may cause great problems and necessitate the drilling of one or
more relief wells.
Discussing oil activities and risk elements naturally suggests the question of what
kind of situation would result should a large-scale accident occur on the continental shelf
of one of the North Sea countries if the oil is not contained and removed. In Norway con-
siderable thought has been given to this problem, and several measures have already been
implemented in order to counteract it. Practical research and experience from the Bravo
accident has proved that North Sea oil is broken down quite rapidly, and that only small
amounts will ever reach the shoreline.
A Norwegian institute has made theoretical predictions, shown in Table 9.2.1, which
indicate that only 2-5 percent of the oil will reach the shoreline. This table is partly based
on the recorded wave heights noted in Table 9.2.2. Other calculations indicate the drift-
times to shore shown in Table 9.2.3. Drift models indicate that spills in the central part of
the North Sea will threaten the west coast of Denmark to a large degree and southern
Norway to some extent, while spills in the northern areas will drift mainly towards the
west coast of Norway. All calculations indicate that little or no oil will reach UK shores.
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TABLE 9.2.1 Calculated times (days) for oil discharged on the Norwegian continental
shelf to reach the shorelineQ •
October-March April-September
Fastest Average Fastest Average
From location drift-time drift-time drift-time drift-time
Ekofisk
(October 1972-AprilI977) 10 17 12 20
Statfjord
(October 1972-AprilI977) 5 10 8 17
Haltenbank
(April 1973-July 1977) 4 7 6 12
Troms¢lflaket
(April 1973-July 1977) 5 10 7 9
aCalculations performed by the Norwegian Meteorological Institute, based on winds
and currents in the areas.
TABLE 9.2.2 Percentage of period when wave heights are below given limits.
Under Under Under Under
Period Place 1.5 meters 2.5 meters 3 meters 4 meters
January Ekofisk 24 49 61 80
Haltenbank 23 49 60 76
Statfjord 16 36 48 70
TromS¢f1aket 30 59 70 84
July Ekofisk 39 70 81 93
Haltenbank 45 75 85 95
Statfjord 30 61 73 90
TromS¢flaket 52 77 87 95
Yearly average Ekofisk 29 59 71 87
Haltenbank 32 62 74 86
Statfjord 22 47 60 79
Troms¢flaket 40 69 80 91
TABLE 9.2.3 Calculated amounts of oil that would reach the shoreline
during blowouts at Ekofisk and Statfjord.
Most favorable Least favorable Average oil
month month reaching shoreline
Tonsb Tonsb
(% per month
Percenta Percenta over the period)
Ekofisk 0 0 5 12,000 1.4
Statfjord 2 4,800 6 14,400 4.0
~Amount in %of total discharge reaching shoreline during one month.
Calculation based on a discharge of 8,000 tons of oil per day in 30 days. Evaporation
and natural dispersion included.
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Under the circumstances there is little reason to believe that massive amounts of oil
from the central parts of the North Sea, such as during a tanker accident will be encoun-
tered in any areas. Most probably the oil will hit the coast in scattered places as an emul-
sion and in patches, requiring mobile cleanup forces and a good surveillance system to
give advance alert. Large spills from the northern UK. and Norwegian fields will, however,
present a more serious threat to the west coast of Norway ,owing to the prevailing westerly
winds and the direction of the currents (from south to north) that will distribute the oil
over very large areas.
Even though only a fraction of the discharged oil is expected to drift ashore, the
total amount of oil will be of importance if an incident of long duration should occur.
Furthermore, extremely large amounts of oil will be mixed into the water column, with
as-yet unknown effects on and damage to marine life. For this reason, there is strong opin-
ion in Norway that maximum efforts should be exerted to reduce the risk element by
proper regulations, inspection, and control, and to build up an efficient system for the
mechanical removal of oil from the sea. Since the control side has already been dealt with,
no further comment will be made but the question of pickup of oil from the sea needs
discussion.
First efforts to establish a mechanical system for picking up oil at sea were started
three years ago. Studies carried out at that time showed that no equipment suitable for
use in the North Sea was available. The only equipment of any interest was a very large
boom built by Exxon for the Santa Barbara Bay, and a pickup system owned by the Clean
Gulf Association consisting of a SOD-ton barge with a boom arrangement delivered by a
Canadian fum. It was soon agreed that the Exxon arrangement was too impractical in size
and operation, while the Clean Gulf system, though interesting in principle, could not do
a useful job in the North Sea unless extensively modified. Having come to this conclusion,
requirements on the operators for mechanical pickup equipment were temporarily post-
poned while work went ahead with establishing an oil-pollution control system for the
Norwegian coastal areas.
The work also concentrated on an emergency system for larger shipping accidents
andon action management and alert procedures. In 1975-1976 US $2 million was invested
in equipment for six coastal depots, and in 1976-1977 another US $10 million was granted
by parliament for the purchase of four special oil-recovery vessels and heavy booms and
skimmers for an additional six depots. During all negotiations a point was made ofinform-
ing industry about the increased demands for offshore containment and collection systems.
The technical specifications were gradually strengthened, and industry seemed to respond.
By 1976, therefore, it was felt that equipment was beginning to be available that could
perform with some success under moderate conditions, and in September of that year,
operators were requested to come up with a proposal for a system that could remove oil
from the sea in two-meter waves from a blowout of 8,000 tons per day. This proposal was
under evaluation for approval by the Norwegian State Pollution Control Authority, and
some of the equipment was under practical testing when the Bravo accident occurred in
April 1977.
In accordance with Norwegian regulations, the oil companies have accepted an
unlimited liability for all damages caused directly or indirectly by their activities. They
have also accepted that an up-to-date pollution-control system for larger oil spills should
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be available, and that this system should be subject to approval by the environmental
authorities. For practical reasons the operating companies wanted to build up this system
jointly under the North Sea Operators Committee, and this arrangement has been approved
by the authorities on the basis of providing equipment for two simultaneous large-scale
blowouts in different areas.
The use of the equipment is based on the philosophy that each individual operator
is responsible for his own spill, and that equipment is made available to him free of charge
when needed. An operations plan has been worked out jointly, but each operator has to
adjust this plan to his own internal organization and to make it an integrated part of his
contingency plan. The operators also have worked out a common code of practice on
how they are going to assist one another in an emergency in terms of special equipment,
vessels, experts, and other personnel.
The system under development today by the operators on the Norwegian shelf is
based on conventional concepts. Basically, it consists of 3,000 meters of heavy boom and
6-8 large-eapacity skimmers. When fully implemented, six dedicated and special equip-
ment-supply vessels will form part of the system, all capable ofloading 1,000-1,200 tons of
oil or oil emulsions. A well-prepared tanker shuttle for bringing the oil recovered to shore
will also be part of the system. The concept is to use the booms, in lengths of 300-500
meters, downstream from the blowout and to position the skimming vessels at the bottom
of the V-shaped sections.
In connection with drilling north of latitude 62° N, a similar system is under fmal
planning and implementation. It is not possible to avoid the question of whether the system
now tinder implementation is realistic. Of course, no such guarantee can be given, but, so
far, this system represents the best mechanical system that it has been possible to produce,
and it is felt that this will do a useful job under moderate conditions.
It is recognized that some drawbacks exist: the system is very complicated to operate
in terms of the number of vessels maneuvering in a limited area; operation becomes increas-
ingly complicated in waves exceeding 1.5 meters; reduced visibility from darkness or fog
will seriously complicate operations and reduce efficiency. By consulting Table 9.2.2, and
considering conditions of reduced visibility, an assessment of the efficiency of the system
can be made. Nevertheless, the problem is of such a nature and magnitude that it simply
carmot be left there. This is merely a first step and the development of new equipment
must continue or special arrangements be made on the platforms to prevent oil from
reaching the sea. In an age when we can send people to the moon and back, it is incon-
ceivable that the problem of oil pollution from a blowout carmot be overcome. It is not
so much a question of what is possible, but rather of the amount of money made avail-
able to fmd a solution.
It should be remembered that, at present, there is an overemphasis on oil coming
ashore during a blowout, rather than on consideration of the long-term effects of oil in
the marine environment; the pickup systems proposed so far are more of a burden than a
help; and there were no complaints from fishermen about oil around the Bravo accident
area.
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9.3 ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS FROM THE OPERATOR'S VIEWPOINT-
This section will concentrate on the response of the ecosystem to oil spills rather
than the reactions of industry or government to the accidents.
Some Common Misunderstandings
It is certainly not true that all oil spills are equally damaging. Every spill is an indi-
vidual event and the biological effects vary according to many factors, including the time
of day or season, the geographical location of the spill, the weather at the time, the quan-
tities of water present, and the amount and type of oil spilled. It is of particular impor-
tance to note that refined products such as diesel fuel, "No.2 fuels," etc., are generally
more biologically damaging than are crude oils or heavy fuels, except to bird populations.
It is often thought that the most damaging impacts of oil spills are felt by seabirds.
However, most seabird populations are fairly robust. The impacts on these populations
are complex and depend upon the locations and timing of the spills as well as the repro-
ductive capacity of the species concerned. Existing natural stresses or tendencies, including
population cycles, are of great importance in determining the overall effect. Except in the
case of rare or endangered species, cleaning seabirds may satisfy peoples' emotions but
does little to help the bird populations affected. Bird cleaning can in many instances pro-
long suffering without benefit to the birds. To make better use of the concern undoubtedly
felt by the public, amateur efforts could perhaps be directed toward methods ofimproving
breeding success, for example the creation of new and improved nesting areas. When looking
at the ecosystem as a whole, the point should be made that the number of individual birds
killed is less important than any underlying alteration or destruction of the ecosystem
role of the species concerned.
One commonly-held view is that oil is a uniform substance that is always equally
damaging. This is of course a great over-simplification. Oils have differing chemical and
physical properties and can differ greatly even when they share common geographical
origins or are obtained from the same field. Changes, some of them very rapid according
to the nature of the oil, local weather conditions, the state of the sea, etc., can in fact
occur after spillage.
Laboratory experiments on the toxicity of dispersants often have little relevance to
the real world. These experiments frequently involve the exposure of marine organisms to
dispersants for long periods, for example 48-96 hours, whereas locally toxic levels in
nature may only be maintained for 2-3 minutes. Even in the case of the Torrey Canyon
incident, where outdated toxic dispersants were misused on a massive scale, no permanent
damage was recorded and fish catches afterwards were not affected. There is no concrete
evidence that dispersants significantly add to the risks incurred by marine life during and
after blowout incidents. Indeed, if correctly used, dispersants can minimize ecological side-
effects.
*By Eric B. Cowell, E. and P. Forum Ltd., United Kingdom.
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Recommendations
Every effort should be made to prevent oil from reaching coastlines, since dilution
effects and other factors are adverse in shallow coastal areas. Somewhat surprisingly, it is
not always appropriate to clean oiled beaches, since in many situations cleanup techniques
can be more damaging than the oil itself. Oil-spill relief coordinators must not always give
way to public pressure for total cleanup, but should consult ecologists to ensure that the
proposed response is appropriate for the local environment. Dispersants should not be used
in areas of restricted water exchange, especially freshwater lakes, rivers, tidal marshes, and
shallow seas close to fish-spawning grounds. The documentation of ecologically sensitive
areas should be part of all contingency planning. Decision makers must beware of giving
in too easily to public demands; when necessary, they must have the courage to say that
doing nothing can sometimes be better than increasing damage through the use ofinappro-
priate cleaning methods. There is a need for cooperative field work on the best methods
of cleaning oil spills. As stated above, laboratory-based toxicity tests are often not useful
in predicting real-life oil-pollution effects. Finally, more research is needed on the mech-
anisms by which oil becomes incorporated into sediments; the role of dispersants in pre-
venting or encouraging the phenomena involved needs further investigatiop
Discussion
Given the potentially large scale of oil accidents (for example, an oil blowout of
25,000 tons per day for 100 days), a pollution-control system based on chemicals alone
does not seem adequate. A blowout on this scale would almost certainly deposit oil on
the coast, regardless ofthe nature or efficiency ofthe pickup system used or whether total
reliance were placed on mechanical pickup methods. Furthermore, even if a mechanical
system of 90 percent efficiency existed, it would be too costly to have one such system
(or vessel) standing by continuously at every potential blowout site; therefore, one returns
to a comparison of the costs and risks inherent in each method used.
When discussing the use of particular methods, the differing cleanup philosophies
and geographical locations of the various North Sea countries must be considered. For
example, chemically dispersed oil from UK fields can arrive in the Norwegian sector as soon
as two hours after an incident because of the prevailing currents; thus, in a sense, the UK
never has to live with the results of its decision to use chemicals to disperse the oil. How-
ever, forecasts based on dispersion models show that under most circumstances no oil will
reach the coast.
Aerial dispersant spraying offers great promise for a rapid response on a large scale
which can then be followed up by spraying from surface vessels. At the time of writing,
however, some technical problems remain so that the technique must still be considered
to be under development. In practice, one can never treat an entire oil slick with disper-
sants so it is usually more a matter of deciding which areas are to be protected. It will not
generally be possible to pick up or treat most of the oil spilled but natural processes will
deal with very large quantities through evaporation and dispersion.
To conclude, the most satisfactory basis for dealing with the effects of blowouts
seems to be a combined approach, involving chemical, mechanical, and natural cleanup
processes and controlled by expert judgments on which methods are most appropriate for
each of the areas affected.
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9.4 OIL EXPLOITATION - A DANGER TO FISHERIES?·
The North Sea fisheries, or rather the northeast Atlantic fisheries, are some of the
most important in the world. With an annual catch of approximately ten million tons, of
which three million come from the North Sea, these areas contribute to the total world
fisheries catch of around seventy million tons in a very considerable way. During the last
ten years the oil activities in the North Sea have also demonstrated this area's activity as
an important oil production site. With both valuable fishing grounds and oil fields, the
North Sea can become an area of conflict between those exploiting two valuable resources:
fish, which are renewable, and oil, which is a nonrenewable resource.
Although there had not been any major pollution in the North Sea from oil activities
until the Bravo accident, the problems of oil damaging the fishery resources have been
and still are an important concern for Norway. These problems have been dealt with in
several parliamentary white papers.
In addition, fisheries are particularly important in connection with the plans for
extension of oil exploration on the Norwegian continental shelf north of latitude 62° N.
The fear of conflict in these more northern areas has been more pronounced than in the
North Sea because they are more vulnerable to pollution damage. Some of the northeast
Atlantic's most valuable fish stocks have their spawning areas and migration routes along
the Norwegian coast. Therefore, both scientific and political concern have been focussed
there.
It is appropriate here to give a brief explanation of the behavior of oil in the sea and
its effects op marine life, and in particular fishery resources. Crude oil is composed of
thousands of different hydrocarbon components. The composition of a crude oil reflects
its place of origin and this composition determines the potential damage to the environ-
ment. The oil components and their degraded products have different levels of toxicity,
degradability, and solubility in seawater. They are, to various degrees, absorbed by living
organisms. Some of the oil components are unlikely to be harmful, while others, in par-
ticular the aromatic hydrocarbons, are known to be harmful. When oil is spilled on the
sea, it is exposed to physical, chemical, and biological action. The lighter oil components
evaporate and some oil is removed as the wind and waves whip the oil into droplets, the
resulting aerosols being blown away. In addition, some oil components dissolve in the
water, some are whipped into the water as small droplets, and some form water-in-oil and
oU-in-water emulsions. In this way oil is broken down physically and the products sub-
jected to biological and chemical activity, which in turn break them down further.
The movement of oil on the surface of the sea is mostly dependent on wind forces.
As the oil is mixed down into the water, the movements are further influenced by per-
manent oceanic and tidal currents. Absorption of oil in the water to form particles may
give it a distribution somewhat different from that predicted from prevailing wind and
current directions. The physical influences on the oil described above will remove it from
the site of spillage and from the water surface.
-By Lars F¢yn, Institute of Marine Research, Directorate of Fisheries, Norway.
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When chemicals are used to disperse the oil, all oil components are moved down into
the water and interact with marine life. As the use of chemicals is most effective during
the first few hours after the oil has reached the sea, the operation of natural forces, such
as evaporation, and the formation of aerosols by wind drift will be seriously inhibited and
only a fraction of the oil that would have been removed in the absence of chemicals will
actually be so affected. Evaporation removes an estimated 50% of Ekofisk oil from the sea
surface if the oil is simply left alone.
Oil and oil components have little or no effect on marine life until they move down
into the water; consequently, those processes that remove spilled oil from the sea surface
without interfering with the water layers beneath the surface will cause least disruption to
marine life. Therefore, the Norwegian fisheries authorities have strongly recommended
the use of mechanical oil-removal equipment for oil pollution. This policy is based pri-
marily on the fact, as stated above, that damage to fisheries from oil pollution is most pro-
nounced when the harmful components of the oil are distributed below the surface layer
of the sea where sensitive marine organisms are to be found.
The sensitive organisms, the plankton, include the primary producers, the phyto-
plankton, the next steps in the marine food chains, the zooplankton, and the youngest
stages of fish, eggs and larvae. All drift more or less passively with the water masses and
thus are vulnerable to pollutants within the same body of water.
Phytoplankton are sensitive to oil; the concentrations at which fatally toxic effects
or reduced production capacity have been observed are as low as 0.1 microliter of oil per
liter of water. During the Bravo accident, a significant reduction in primary production in
the vicinity of the Bravo platform was found.
Some species of zooplankton are known to accumulate oil hydrocarbons without
harm, but toxic effects have been observed in other species at concentrations of ten micro-
liters of oil per liter of water. Investigations during and after the Bravo accident showed
that some environmental conditions, Le., an early spring with little biological activity,
caused a scarcity of zooplankton in the area; but, where fresh oil was observed, there
were also effects on the zooplankton.
As mentioned above, it is the youngest stages of the fish life, eggs and larvae, that
are most vulnerable to oil pollution. However, the literature gives various figures for the
concentrations that affect fish eggs and larvae. Depending on the actual species, fatally
toxic effects have been observed for concentrations as far apart as 200,000 microliters
to 1 microliter of oil per liter of water. These figures probably do not give a realistic
picture of the real concentrations as they are mostly based on volumes of oil added to the
water and not on the concentration of oil in the water. Chemical analysis of the water
gives the correct concentrations at which the effects are observed. Based on such analy-
ses, effects on the development of capelin eggs have been observed at 20-30 mg of oil
per cubic meter of seawater (ppb), which is far below the figures quoted above.
The North Sea mackerel has its major spawning site in the area of the Ekofisk
field. Since the mackerel eggs were floating close to the surface, there were fears that
the oil from the Bravo blowout would damage this fishery resource, but fortunately
mackerel spawning had not started at the time of the blowout and by the time it fmally
started the oil had dissipated.
A summary of the fmdings of the investigations on the Bravo accident stated that
acute effects were small. Although sublethal effects cannot be excluded, the low concen-
trations of hydrocarbons in the water columns outside the immediate neighborhood of
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the platform, combined with the low availability of sensitive organisms, make it unlikely
that any serious acute harm to the fishery resources occurred. It is evident that several fac-
tors account for this: mainly the high temperature of the oil on escape and the fact that
winds and rapid surface spreading caused efficient evaporation of the most volatile and
toxic compounds. Furthermore, unstable conditions in the water masses caused the effec-
tive dilution of dispersed and dissolved hydrocarbons.
So experience from oil pollution from the Bravo and other accidents seems to indi-
cate that the fears of catastrophe to marine life from oil are exaggerated. However, small
continuous oil spills from offshore oil installations are of concern because not enough is
known about sublethal effects of oil on the different species and on marine communities,
including interactions between them. Furthermore, oil is just one small part of total marine
pollution, and therefore all other pollutants have to be considered to give a picture of the
real "health" of the sea.
From the fisheries point of view, pollution damage to individual fish is of no partic-
ular interest. Concern is more with the effects on overall fishery resources; in other words,
will the pollution harm the overall harvest of sea resources? A more realistic approach to
the marine-pollution problem must take account of the real damage that might be suffered
should the pollution coincide with spawning. Although nature itself takes a great toll, pol-
lution may add to this to such an extent that the population of a particular species is sig-
nificantly reduced and, as a consequence, the potential harvest of that fish stock is dras-
tically diminished.
In Norway, where the fishery resources are a valuable part of the economy and form
the very basis of existence for most communities along the coast, more attention will obvi-
ously be paid to eventual damages from oil exploration and exploitation than that likely in
a country where fisheries playa less important role. This importance may be seen in the
different approaches to combating an oil spill. The use of chemicals to disperse the oil will
be viewed more favorably where public concern focusses on dead sea birds and polluted
beaches rather than unseen organisms in the water, while physical methods will be in favor
where fisheries have considerable economic importance.
Finally, consider the question posed in the title: is oil exploitation indeed a danger
to fisheries? Some of the important points have been considered above. But the major
problem to Norwegian fisheries up to now has come from a so-far unmentioned hazard -
obstacles on the seabed caused by laziness in dumping unwanted tools and other equip-
ment on the bottom instead of bringing them ashore for disposal. As regards oil pollution
itself, the different authorities regulating oil activities must pay much more attention to
advice from marine biologists as this advice will at least help to prevent unnecessary pollu-
tion.
Accidents, although still feared, even with the worst possible coincidence of migra-
ting and spawning fishes, weather conditions, etc., will only damage the population of the
species for one season, not the total fishery resources. Therefore, with some reservations,
the original question can be answered in the negative.
t'fects ofpollution control on marine ecosystems and species
9.5 EFFECTS OF POLLUTION CONTROL ON MARINE ECOSYSTEMS AND
SPECIES·
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Decisions must be made on the treatment of oil spills as and when they occur. How-
ever, as a result of limited scientific data, those decisions that include any element ofenvi·
ronmental risk assessment are at best educated guesses aimed at minimizing the overall
ecological damage.
The object of environmental risk assessment is to weigh the potential effects on the
normal ecosystem of a particular perturbation. A complication to any such assessment is
that sometimes in lessening one risk, another is increased, thus creating problems for
decision-makers. In the marine environment there are a number of ecosystems and species
groups that can be affected in a variety of ways by an oil spill and its treatment. Without
attempting to cover all the potential variables, the following factors certainly need to be
major considerations for any environmental risk assessment.
Major Factors in Marine Risk Assessment
Littoral Ecosystem
Of all the marine subecosystems, this is probably the best known, because it is the
easiest to sample quantitatively. Over the years many research workers have built up a
considerable amount of data on the effects of natural and nonnatural perturbations on a
range oflittoral ecosystems. However, there is still much to be learned. littoral ecosystems
are designed to withstand a number oflarge, natural perturbations, such as dehydration,
temperature extremes, wave exposure, and fluctuations in available oxygen. Ecosystems
that can survive such natural stresses might be expected to be better equipped to cope
with other stresses such as oil pollution than less naturally stressed ecosystems. Alterna-
tively, it could be that ecosystems already naturally stressed are less able to withstand
additional stress. The beaching of floating oil and its dispersal into the water column
close inshore are likely to be the major risks to the littoral system arising from an oil
spill. Recent work by the Marine Biological Association (UK.) suggests that, ten years
after the Torrey Canyon oil spill, the effect of the beached and dispersed oil on parts of
the Cornish littoral ecosystem can still be seen.
Benthic Sublittoral Ecosystem
This is an extremely important part of the overall marine system, and benthic ecol-
ogists have put much effort into overcoming the problems of sampling. Reasonably reliable
grabs are now available that can take a quantitative sample, even in deep water. However,
a large sampling program must be mounted before a usable baseline can be established for
any particular benthic area. Hence, limited data are available on long-term changes within
benthic ecosystems as a result of seasonal or other less predictable effects. The sinking of
oil into sediments poses the most obvious threat to the benthic ecosystem, although the
*By R.I. Morris, Central Unit on Environmental Pollution, United Kingdom.
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potential effects of soluble or dispersed oil in the water must be considered, especially in
areas of restricted circulation.
Estuarine and Salt-Marsh Ecosystems
Although considered as separate entities, these systems are composed of closely knit
littoral and sublittoral ecosystems with many complicated trophic interrelationships. They
experience many of the natural stresses common to littoral and shallow-water sublittoral
ecosystems, together with large salinity variations and many changes in other chemical
properties of the water, owing to the complex reactions that occur in the freshwater /
seawater mixing zone.
The beaching of floating oil, its sinking into sediments, and its dispersal in inshore
water columns all pose potentially serious threats to these ecosystems. In addition, the
soft, unconsolidated nature of sediments in these areas can result in penetration ofoil into
underlying sediments. If this occurs, long-term chronic pollution over a period of several
years is likely owing to the slow leaching of the oil back out of the deeper sediments and
into the surface sediments and overlying water.
Midwater Ecosystem
This is a three- dimensional system involving many different trophic levels. It is by
far the most difficult of all marine ecosystems to understand. Several research groups
have spent a number of years attempting to examine just the major variables of such sys-
tems and are still only able to make very general statements about their behavior.
Midwater ecosystems exist in fairly stable environments (Le., stable salinity, temp-
erature, available oxygen, nutrient levels, etc.). Even relatively small changes in certain
environmental parameters can result in significant ecological changes. The problem is how
to quantify these changes. The sampling technique (Le., net design, method of towing net,
speed of towing, time and depth of haul) is extremely critical. It is unlikely that any net
takes a wholly quantitative sample, but even for relative comparison of samples it is vital
that the fishing technique does not vary. Therefore, clearly, if changes occurring as a
result of natural variations cannot be quantified, the potential impacts of nonnatural
perturbations can at best only be subjects for guesswork. Statements are regularly made
that there is no evidence of effects to the marine ecosystem from this or that pollution
incident. Such statements are factually correct, but it is likely that, since these ecosystems
are so difficult to quantify, no effects will be noted unless they are catastrophic. The sol-
ution, mixing, and dispersion of floating oil into the water column poses the major threat
to midwater ecosystems.
Seabirds
Apart from oiled seabirds being a painfully visual and very emotive result of an oil
spill, floating oil is a real threat to many coastal seabird colonies. Several research groups
in the UK believe that even a relatively small oil slick at the wrong time and in the wrong
place can result in large-scale mortalities to important breeding populations, which would
have serious long-term implications for the survival of certain species. Migratory species
are most at risk during their seasonal migrations, but inadequate data are available on sea-
bird movements to be able to predict the start, duration, or route of these migrations
reliably.
Effects of pollution control on marine ecosystems
Pollution Control and Risk Assessment
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What risk assessments can be made to aid decisions on treating oil spills? Obviously,
if the floating oil can be removed from the sea surface mechanically, this will remove the
threat to all parts of the marine system. Arrangements also have to be made for the safe
dispersal of the recovered oil and oil emulsions, which, in the case of large spills, may
amount to many thousands of tons. At present the UK does not believe that mechanical
recovery can be relied upon as the sole method for oil-spill cleanup. Natural dispersion
(mixing and solution into the bulk seawater), evaporation, and weathering of the floating
oil at sea are considered to be the next-best "treatment," provided the floating oil does
not threaten important offshore seabird populations.
Natural dispersion will result in raised levels of hydrocarbons in the water column
under the oil slick. It is often difficult to measure such increased concentrations, as they
qUickly drop to the ppb level as the distance from the slick increases. Hydrocarbon levels
in the ppb range are often below the sensitivity of water sampling and analytical techni-
ques. Therefore, because hydrocarbons in the water column below an oil slick "cannot be
detected," it does not mean that a significant raising of the normal background hydro-
carbon level has not occurred. Chemosensory processes, which are believed to control
many aspects of the behavior and interaction of marine organisms, almost certainly take
place at and below the ppb level in seawater. Thus, the potential for ppb levels of hydro-
carbons in the water to interfere with these complex and very important processes must
not be ignored.
Effect of Pollution Control on Ecosystems
Better data are gradually being acquired on the fate and behavior of different types
of oil at the sea surface so that more reliable predictions can be made on oil-slick move-
ment. Such predictions are very necessary if the possible risks to inshore ecosystems or
bird populations are to be gauged. If there appears to be a real threat to these systems and
mechanical recovery cannot be relied upon, other methods of treatment must be consid-
ered. The UK believes that the use of dispersants in offshore areas is a valuable and nec-
essary option in such situations. The decision that has to be made is whether the potential
effects of the floating oil on the better known and visible ecosystems (littoral, shallow-
SUblittoral, estuaries, salt marshes, seabird colonies) are more serious than the potential
effects of the chemically dispersed oil on the poorly understood midwater ecosystem.
Such decisions have to be made quickly, because as the floating oil moves inshore into
areas of shallower water, there is less capacity for diluting the dispersed oil. The UK believes
that under these circumstances the chemical dispersal of the floating oil to deep water
well offshore is generally the best environmental option, unless the offshore area in ques-
tion contains important fish breeding grounds. However, it is clear that such decisions are
essentially based on educated guesses about relative environmental risk.
Decisions on oil-spill treatment cannot be taken in the absence of economic consid-
erations. Damage to a coastal area can be relatively easily quantified in terms of lost
amenities, unemployment, loss of business, etc. The damage to offshore fisheries is less
easy to cost. Thus, oil operators who eventually may face damage liability claims as a
result of oil spills are likely to favor methods of treatment that minimize the most obvious
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and most easily costed damages. It is, however, necessary to ensure that such economic
considerations do not totally outweigh environmental considerations.
9.6 ALTERNATIVE POSTURES FOR OIL·SLICK CLEANUp·
During discussions at the Workshop, five main approaches to oil-slick cleanup
emerged. This section summarizes the most important advantages and disadvantages of
each approach.
Mechanical Removal Only
The advantages of this approach are as follows. Under favorable operating condi-
tions, the spilled oil can be totally removed. The method is politically visible, showing
that "something is being done." It relies on a high degree of technological sophistication
but is very effective near the shore in calm waters.
The disadvantages of the method are as follows. It is relatively ineffective in the
open sea with wave heights exceeding 1.5 meters. Emulsified oil is extremely difficult to
capture by mechanical means. Finally, an extraordinary effort is needed for the effective
coordination of the vessels and personnel involved.
Chemical Dispersion Only
The main advantages here are that the method speeds the existing natural disper-
sion process and that it reduces the political visibility of the problem. Furthermore, it is
more economical than mechanical cleanup methods.
The disadvantages of the approach are as follows. The effects of chemical disper-
sants on marine life in the open sea are still perceived as largely unknown, despite consid-
erable research, and the use of chemicals in coastal waters can be dangerous. A very rapid
response, with tons of chemicals readily available, is necessary if this method is to be
effective. Finally, laboratory findings showing high toxicity to marine life are assumed by
potential users to be also valid for the open seas.
Combination of Mechanical and Chemical Methods
The advantages of using a combination of methods are that decision makers have
more flexibility in choosing their responses and that it is possible, simultaneously, to use
one method in one area and another method in a different area.
The main disadvantages are that operators need to be familiar with both types of
method and that decision makers require a thorough understanding of which means are
more useful under which conditions.
*Summarized from the Workshop discussions by David W. Fischer, International Institute for Applied
Systems Analysis.
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The advantages of a policy of selective responses are as follows. The policy recog-
nizes that it is not possible to treat the entire spill, no matter which means are employed.
The sea itself plays the major role in dissolving the bulk of the spilled oil; at the same time,
human efforts can be concentrated on the areas of greatest potential damage.
The disadvantages ofsucha policy include the continuing controversy over the long-
term effects of dissolved oil in the open sea. Also, detailed a priori knowledge of spawning
and migration areas, as well as other ecologically sensitive locations, is needed before the
policy of selective responses can be successfully applied.
Doing Nothing
The advantages of this "strategy" may be listed as follows. In time, the sea will
dissolve spilled oil without any outside intervention. The greatest levels of toxicity
generally occur before a proper response can be mounted, and the effects of oil on marine
life in the open sea often appear to be minimal. Finally, this approach is obviously the
least expensive, at any rate in the short term.
The main disadvantages of doing nothing are that the public will almost always
demand some response, regardless of the effectiveness of the method used, and that
there will be the possibility of eventual toxic effects, depending on the type of spill and
on when and where it occurs.
9.7 THE ECOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF USING DISPERSANTS: EXPERIENCE IN THE
UNITED KINGDOM·
Introduction
During the cleanup operation that followed the To"ey Canyon disaster in 1967,
dispersants were misused on a massive scale. The ecological damage that resulted was a
cause of concern, and the areas of coast affected were extensive. The materials used were
originally formulated as industrial degreasers without regard for their toxicity. Their
application by untrained personnel (fire services, soldiers, and local-authority employees)
and the large volumes used created more biological damage than that from the oil itself.
The few people with knowledge of the effects of the dispersant used were not consulted,
and attempts to communicate advice on safe use were blocked by a harassed administra-
tion subjected to "advice" from numerous sources and considerable public pressure.
The materials used (mainly BP 1002) were highly toxic to marine life (LDso 3.3-
10 ppm Crangon crangon) and were typically poured onto beaches, into streams dis-
charging into the sea and over cliff tops, and into oil slicks around the Devon coast. Biol-
ogists recorded damage to rocky shores, sandy beaches, muddy inlets, and salt marshes
[1-3] . By the time of the Santa Barbara disaster in 1969, the early dispersants had gained
*By Eric B. Cowell, The British Petroleum Company Ltd., London, United Kingdom.
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a very bad reputation and their use was discouraged in some countries and banned in
others, although a great many continued with their use and development.
These same materials had been used carefully for some years in places such as the
oil port of Milford Haven, where their effects had been studied by the Dale Ford Field
Centre [4] , Orielton Field Centre, The Field Studies Council's Oil Pollution Research
Unit [5] , and the University College, Swansea [6,7]. At Milford Haven no long-term
damage had been recorded except in one or two limited areas such as salt marshes [5].
Here the nature of BP 1002 was understood and its use carefully controlled with basic-
ally good techniques, including post-spraying agitation [8] .
Even in Devon after the Torrey Canyon accident, few offshore and sublittoral
effects were observed and no adverse effects on fish catches were recorded. It is the
widespread view among European Fisheries Authorities that oil-spill removers do not
present a hazard to commercial fisheries [9--11]. No sublittoral damage attributable to
dispersant use was demonstrated and the damaged shores had substantially recovered
ecologically within three years with virtually total recovery within five years. There was
some evidence of loss of fish eggs from the immediate area and young pilchards were
said to be scarce in the area in which dispersants were used at sea [I]. No evidence of
depleted fish stocks was found by assessments of fish landings in the ensuing season [9].
During this period the ecological effects of dispersant use were studied by the
Field Studies Council's Oil Pollution Research Unit at Orielton [12, 13], the Marine
Biological Association at Plymouth [1], and other laboratories, including those of the UK
Ministry 0 f Agriculture and Fisheries [10, 14] .
Development of Improved Low-Toxicity Dispersants
After the Torrey Canyon investigations, the oil industry conducted research that
lead to the development of new low-toxicity dispersants, which were introduced commer-
cially in 1969. It was discovered that the toxic component of the original materials was
largely in the solvent, particularly the aromatic component. It was also specified that new
materials should be biodegradable to ensure that they were nonpersistent. The second-
generation dispersants that resulted were low-toxicity materials such as BP 1100, almost
1,000 times less toxic than the BP 1002 which they replaced (48-hour LDso > 10,000
ppm Crangon crangon); these materials were toxicity-tested by the UK Fisheries Laboratory
at Burnham upon Crouch and by independent laboratories [15,16]. Large numbers of
species were used. Results obtained by Crapp et al. [17] and Crapp [18] at the Oil Pollu-
tion Research Unit at Orielton have shown the huge decrease in toxic properties of the
new materials.
Shortly after the introduction of BP 1100, even better materials based on a kerosene
solvent with less than 3 percent aromatic content were commercially developed, e.g., BP
1100X, and Table 9.7.1 shows how this dispersant ranks against nine other materials,
including BP 1002 and BP 1100, in tests conducted at the UK Fisheries Laboratory [14].
It can be seen that BP 1100X is better than BP 1100 by one order of magnitude.
BP 1100X was put on the UK government list ot approved dispersants and rapidly
became the most widely used dispersant in the UK and large parts of Europe. It was
adopted as the standard material by the port of Milford Haven, which is probably the best
biologically monitored oil port in the world.
Ecological effects ofdispersants - UK experience
TABLE 9.7.1 A comparison of rank orders of ten dispersants
for Crangon and Cardium a.
48-hour LC Crangon Cardium
50
Dispersant (ppm) rank rank
Slickgone 2 3.3-10 1 3
BP 1002 3.3--10 2 5
Gamlen OSR 3.3-10 3 1
Cleanaso1 33-100 4 2
Atlas 1901 100-330 5 4
Dermo1 100-300 6 6
Polycomplex A 100-330 7 7
BP 1100 1,000-3,300 8 8
Corexit 7664 3,300-10,000 9 9
BP 1l00X (> 10,000) 10 10
r = 0.843
apublished by UK Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food.
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Other companies soon produced low-toxicity materials of their own and many of
these were put on the accepted list. In the toxicity tests used to gain approval, BP 1100X
became a standard reference material (> 10,000 ppm 48-hour LDso for Crangon erangon
was the pass standard expected).
BP 1100X has now been used in almost thirty countries, from which no adverse
effects on fisheries have been reported in field use. The countries include the UK, Canada,
Denmark, France, Norway, Hong Kong, Indonesia, New Zealand, and Sweden. Materials
developed by other companies have also been widely used in many countries; the concen-
trations in water reached during field use fall well below those shown to be toxic in labora-
tory toxicity tests (see below).
All these second-generation dispersants were designed for neat application; however,
recently new concentrate dispersants have been developed, which are used after dilution
with sea water. These materials offer logistic advantages; since they are concentrates,
smaller quantities of material need be transported and stored. For any given volume,
longer spraying times and better use of boat time at sea can be achieved. The toxicity of
concentrate dispersants at the dilution recommended for use is similar to that of approved
second-generation formulations (> 10,000 ppm). They have been toxicity-tested at the
required dilution by the Burnham upon Crouch laboratory and have been approved for
use by the UK government. Other companies have also developed concentrated materials
with similar toxicity characteristics. Even more recently there have been interesting devel-
opments of dispersant application by aircraft. Initial tests are promising, but the materials
have not yet been fully evaluated under field conditions. In the past, aerial application of
conventional dispersants has not generally been effective, because of the lack of mixing
after spraying and the difficulty of ensuring that the dispersant reaches the oil, particularly
in windy conditions. If suitable aerial spraying techniques can be developed that utilize
the materials efficiently and use materials that require minimal agitation, then there would
be distinct logistical advantages.
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Toxicity Testing and Bioassay
At a recent Institute of Petroleum Workshop on the toxicity testing of oils and
dispersants [19] the dangers of making ecological predictions from laboratory toxicity
tests were emphasized by the authors ofseveral papers [20] . It was agreed that laboratory
tests are useful for ranking dispersants in order of toxicity and can provide a guide for
assessing improvements in the formulations. Laboratory results, however, are on limited
numbers of species and take no account of community interactions and interspecific
competition effects. They are also usually conducted at concentrations far higher and for
longer periods than are obtained under field usage. Field evaluation is essential before a
final judgment is made.
The toxicity tests used by the British Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food
have been based on the shrimp Crangon crangon using various concentrations of dispersant
in sea water for 48 hours. The concentration of 10,000 ppm has become the standard
expected for attaining approval by government; however, 10,000 ppm is seldom if ever
reached under field conditions at sea and holding this concentration for 48 hours is clearly
virtually impossible. The tests used can therefore be regarded as extremely stringent.
When the toxicity response curves of several dispersants tested under the same con-
ditions are compared, it is apparent that their relative toxicities are not constant with time;
it follows that rank orders established at different times differ significantly. The standard
procedure adopted by the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries [14] is to compare median
lethal concentrations of dispersants at 48 hours (48-hour LCso ) and the "median lethal
threshold" concentrations; the 48-hour LC so is retained to allow comparisons with earlier
determinations made in the laboratory. After 48 hours little change occurs in the rank
order of most dispersants [21] . Wilson [14] has shown that the influence of abiotic and
biotic variables is exerted on the lower portions of the toxicity response curve, with the
threshold varying only slightly.
It is implicit that anyone standard technique should produce closely similar ranking
orders irrespective of the test species. Wilson et al. [21] have shown that the toxicity for
ten dispersants given by Portmann and Connor [22] can be rearranged to produce a rank
order with respect to their standard test species, the brown shrimp Crangon crangon (see
Tables 9.7.1 and 9.7.2). This order can be compared with those given by other species
using the rank coefficient r, where r = 1 - 6d2jn(n 2 - 1), in which n = number of ranks,
and d = difference between any two ranks (see Table 9.7.2).
If the rank orders of Crangon and Cardium for dispersants which cover this wide
range of toxicities are compared, there is good agreement (see Table 9.7.1). This table also
shows quite clearly the improvement in dispersant technology, the second-generation
materials such as BP llOOX and Corexit 7664 having an LCso value on the order of
10,000 ppm~while the earlier materials had an LC so value of 33-10 ppm.
If the 1£50 values of these materials obtained in laboratory tests are compared to
the concentrations that are obtained under field conditions. as given in Tables 9.7.3 and
9.7.4, it can be seen that serious concentrations of modern dispersants are not found
when oil spills are treated at sea, although lethal concentrations of the first generation of
dispersants would have been found (e.g., 4.8 ppm of BP 1002, whose LC 50 = 3.3 ppm).
The rank orders of all species of crustacea show close agreement but significant dif-
ferences exist between these and the clam Cardium edule. However, the toxicities of these
ten dispersants ranged over only one order of magnitude.
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TABLE 9.7.2 A comparison of rank orders of ten dispersants to four species of marine
animal [21].
48-hour LCso
Dispersant (ppm) Crangon Pandalus Carcinus Cardium
Slickgone 2 (3.5) 1 1 4 4
BP 1002 (5.8) 2 3 1 8
Slickgone 1 (6.6) 3 2 6 5
GamienOSR (8.8) 4 7 3 2
Essolvene (9.6) 5 5 2 7
Polyc1ens (15.7) 6 4 5 9
Cleanasol (44.0) 7 8 7 3
Slix (119.5) 8 6 8 1
Atlas 1909 (120.0) 9 9 9 6
Dermol (156.0) 10 10 10 10
r 0.879 0.818 0.152
TABLE 9.7.3 Concentrations (ppm) of crude oil and dispersant with time following chemical dis-
persant treatment in the upper meter assuming 1:10 dispersant oil ratios [23].
Run 1 Run 2 Run 3
Time after spill Oil Dispersant Oil Dispersant Oil Dispersant
(minutes) (ppm) (ppm) (ppm) (ppm) (ppm) (ppm)
0 34.4 3.4 24.2 2.4 0.85 0.08
1 15.8 1.6
2 47.8 4.8 8.7 0.9
2.5 12.2 1.2
5 9.4 0.94





40 0.8 0.1 1.35 0.13
50 1.9 0.2
80 1.5 0.15
100 2.2 0.2 0.8 0.1
TABLE 9.7.4 Concentrations of nonionic surfactants in water samples collected in
oil plume (following the Chevron Main Pass oil spill in 1970 [24]).
Sample no. Concentration (ppm) Sample no. Concentration (ppm)
1 S 1.0 37 S 0.9
2S 0.2 37 M 0.2
4B 0.2 38M 0.2
5M 0.2 38M 0.2
5B 0.2 39M 0.2
7 S (3 mi WS) 0.2 49 S 0.6
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Cowell [20], in a critical examination of present practice, has reviewed various
toxicity testing procedures and their problems. Toxicity tests fall into two main categories:
those that produce comparative rankings of toxic materials, and those that make ecological
predictions. The two types are complementary and neither can fulfill both requirements.
Comparative rankings are of limited value, but are necessary to governments, oil com-
panies, and manufacturers to assess improvements in formulation technology or the rela-
tive risks ofone material compared to another. Since field conditions are so different from
those in laboratories (owing to dilution factors, weathering effects, dispersion, and inter-
specific competition), quite separate field experiments are necessary to assess and predict
ecological effects.
No report seems to exist in the literature of offshore use of dispersants that claims
significant ecological impacts result from using these !TIaterials. Even the highly toxic
dispersants used at the time of the To"ey Canyon accident do not seem to have affected
fisheries.
There are many approaches to laboratory toxicity testing [19] ;each research worker
may have his own ideas and each laboratory its own preferred method. There are particu-
lar problems with oil and oil-dispersant mixtures, and continuous-flow methods are par-
ticularly difficult. The techniques adopted by the UK government [14] and by the Canadian
government [25] seem to be reasonably satisfactory for offshore dispersant use.
It is a requirement in the USA to test the toxicity of both the dispersant and 1: 10
mixtures of dispersant and No.2 fuel oil. Several materials are currently being examined
by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for possible use in waters off the USA.
Other laboratories have worked on dispersant toxicities, including mixtures of dis-
persant and crude oil. Some workers have produced data showing that such mixtures can
be more toxic than either crude oil or the dispersant alone [16]. There is no simple rela-
tionship among the toxicities of mixtures, presumably owing to laboratory difficulties in
maintaining constant droplet sizes throughout the period of the experiment. There can be
little doubt that droplet size is important in the biological effects ofhydrocarbon materials;
however, almost no work has been done and few laboratories seem to have appreciated the
difficulties. Van Gelder-Ottway [16] produced curious results showing that mortalities to
two species of shore snail were lower in neat dispersant than when the dispersant was
diluted; yet mortalities rose steeply as dilution increased, but then declined with further
dilution.
Swedmark [15] , working on cod and various mollusc species, had similar results from
continuous-flow toxicity tests using 1: 1 dispersant oil concentrations for 48 hours followed
by 48-hour recovery periods. It is significant that 96-hour LCSQ values for cod in mixtures
quoted for one dispersant were 940 ppm for the dispersant, > 1,UOO ppm for Oman crude,
and 120 ppm for 1: 1 mixtures of dispersant and Oman crude. Similar results were quoted
for clams.
The results are vital in oil-spill cleanup procedures, since it is important to ensure
that toxic concentrations are not allowed to develop, for example, in shallow waters, fresh-
water ponds, and areas without adequate dilution potential.
The results obtained in laboratories must, however, be put into perspective. In marine
situations at normal application rates, lethal concentrations of dispersant or oil, or mix-
tures of both, are not found in the water column, and even initial concentrations are not
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maintained for more than a minute or two at most (usually only for seconds). A situation
in which these initial concentrations are maintained for 48 to 96 hours cannot be envisaged
outside a laboratory.
It is important to realize the significance of dilution on toxicity. Common salt
(sodium chloride) is essential to most marine animals at concentrations ofaround 30-34%,
yet doubling this concentration to 60% kills or seriously affects most marine species. This
is obviously not an argument for desalinating the sea! As well as concentration, persistence
is an extremely important factor in toxicity determination.
Use of Dispersants in Cleaning the Intertidal Zone
Despite these observations [2, 26, 27] , research at Orielton and by the Marine Bio-
logical Association [1] has shown that critical concentrations can be reached on beaches
that are cleaned with dispersant and that, on most rocky shores in northern Europe, the
limpet Patella vulgata is the most susceptible indicator of critical concentration. Since the
limpet is the dominant herbivore and therefore controls the basic ecological energetics of
European rocky-shore ecology, the Burnham on Crouch Laboratory is currently revising
its test procedures. Two new approval lists will be published, one for dispersants that can
be used offshore and a second for materials that can be used to clean beaches. In both
tests the materials will be tested in oil/dispersant mixtures and it will be required that the
dispersant/oil mixture should not be significantly more toxic than the oil alone. For the
offshore list, the oil/dispersant mixture will be conducted in agitated circular tanks on the
shrimp Crangon crangon, while for beach-cleaning dispersants, the test used will be on the
limpet Patella vulgata using the "drop off' test developed at the Oil Pollution Research
Unit at Orielton [28]. In addition to its use in toxicity ranking of dispersants, this test
has proved extremely sensitive, picking up not only seasonal differences in susceptibility,
but also circadian-rhythm variation within the animal, which gives greater susceptibility at
night than in the daytime, and shows that in some situations beach-cleaning at night is
more ecologically damaging than during the day. Crapp [18] has clearly demonstrated
that there are marked seasonal differences in toxicity response to dispersants in different
species, so that some animals may be more susceptible to chemical beach-cleaning in a
particular season than others in the same community.
The criteria that will be finally used to allow a dispersant to be included in the UK
list for beach-cleaning have not yet been announced, but it is understood that most second-
generation materials, BP l100X and similar formulations, will be included, and that the
list of licensed materials for offshore use is not likely to be significantly changed.
Ecological Effects of Shore Cleaning
Despite the improvement in formulations and increased government stringency on
licensing materials, it is interesting to note that dispersants have been used extensively in
Milford Haven for about 15 years and that, for the first 6 or 7 of these years, the toxic
BP 1002 was used. Extensive ecological monitoring has demonstrated little permanent
ecological damage, except to salt-marsh areas dominated by vascular plants. The overall
ecology of Milford Haven is substantially unaffected by the operations of Britain's largest
oil port. In addition, a herring spawning ground close to a Gulf Oil terminal has been
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studied by Nelson-Smith [29] and no adverse effects on herring spawning or migration
have been detected. An important clam fishery (Cardium edule) at Angle Bay, Milford
Haven, South Wales, close to two oil jetties, continues to produce some 200-500 tons of
edible clams annually (North-West Wales Sea Fisheries). These are untainted, and in a
recent screening for possible neoplasias conducted by Aldennan [30] of the Government
Fish Pathology Laboratory at Weymouth, Milford clams were given a clean bill of health.
No neoplasias were found.
Practical Applications
The UK has now had many years of experience in dispersant use and has developed
methods of application that are considered to be both effective and relatively safe for
fisheries and marine life. It is generally agreed that, to be effective and to attain maximum
efficiency and therefore to use the lowest possible volumes of dispersant, application of
both conventional and new concentrate materials should be followed by agitation to ensure
adequate mixing of dispersant, oil, and water. The spraying pumps and booms and simple
breaker-board equipment developed by the UK Department of Industry, Warren Spring
Laboratory, has proved ideal for the purpose and is now marketed in sizes to suit both
small and large spraying vessels. In addition, they can be fitted to ships very rapidly. Using
this equipment, application rates of one part of dispersant to ten parts of oil are aimed at.
While this is easily achieved in extensive areas of oil slick, efficient use in practice falls off
when slick and windrows (separated "fingers" of the slick) are being chased by dispersant-
spraying vessels.
Where possible, oil should be treated while it is still at sea and while it is fresh, and
all efforts should be directed toward preventing oil reaching intertidal areas and hence
the coast. When oil is treated at sea, rapid dilution to concentrations below those toxic to
marine life occurs and dispersant use is most effective.
If oil does reach the intertidal zone, then most ecologists agree that the safest treat-
ment is to leave it alone for natural weathering and self-cleaning to occur. Ifamenity and/or
recreational interests dictate that cleaning must be done, then this can be achieved with
minimal ecological damage by applying the dispersant just in front of a rising tide followed
by copious amounts of seawater from hoses to ensure good dispersion and dilution [31].
It is certain that beach-cleaning with modern low-toxicity dispersants is biologically less
harmful than the bulldozing, pressure hosing, or steam-jet treatments that are practiced in
some areas.
No one method of oil-spill cleanup provides a universally acceptable ecological
panacea. No two oil spills are alike, owing to differences in the oil spilled, the local geo-
graphy, the season of the year and many other factors. Ideally, it is generally agreed that
the best solution is first to contain the spilled oil and subsequently to pick it up. Various
devices have been developed aimed at achieving this end and some of these are now mar-
keted. Even with the best equipment available, however, if offshore weather conditions
are bad, a point can be reached where the deployment of such heavy gear becomes impos-
sible because of dangers to life and limb. At this point dispersant spraying can usually be
continued safely, since the equipment is fitted and the ships loaded in the calm of ports
or in the lee oflarge vessels. When it is too rough for even dispersant application, natural
dispersion takes place at an accelerated rate.
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Dispersants have been used in many countries without adverse effects, under condi-
tions as varied as those in arctic Norway (following the British Mallard accident) and
Cormnna, Spain (after the Urquiola grounding). The oil-spill literature reviewed by Ottway
[11] and Van Gelder-Ottway [32] revealed remarkably few cases of ecological damage.
There are many instances of successful dispersant use; only a few have yielded reports of
significant fishery damage apart from taint or depressed markets.
There are, of course, recent examples of dispersant misuse. Unfortunately, some of
the older materials are still stocked; however, the most frequent cause of dispersant misuse
is incorrect application techniques. Many examples of this could be cited, but a particular
fault is underdilution of dispersants, resulting in the application of larger quantities of
active material than are necessary to achieve efficient dispersion, and consequent increases
of this material in water-column concentrations.
Ecological Limitations of Dispersant Use
It must be said that dispersants do have biological limitations. Highly viscous fuel
oils, waxy oils, and some emulsions are often difficult to treat physically with dispersants
unless large quantities of dispersant are applied, these quantities frequently exceeding toxic
concentrations, even if only temporarily. Biologically, oil can be treated safely and effec-
tively offshore with damage only to limited amounts of plankton and greatly to the bene-
fit of seabirds; close inshore, however, as a precaution fish-spawning grounds are best
avoided in the breeding season; similarly, spraying is best avoided over shellfish beds, etc.,
to avoid risks of oil taint.
Most marine organisms are resistant to dispersant, particularly to exposure of short
duration; this is particularly true of marine algae [31] . However, it must be emphasized
that vascular land plants are very susceptible indeed, owing to their lipophyllic surfaces,
stomata, and internal conduction systems [2,33-35] . For this reason, salt-marsh areas
including mangrove foliage should never be cleaned with dispersants. Penetration into vas-
cular plants occurs in seconds and no amount of washing with hoses can undo the damage.
Toxicity, however, is related to concentration [27] and tidal water containing small
amounts of dispersant from offshore spraying does not cause damage to salt-marsh vege-
tation. Oil close offshore can therefore be safely sprayed to prevent it coming ashore
[27,36]. Under the UK Dumping at Sea Act 1974, licenses are required for the use of
dispersants. There are conditions attached to these licenses which effectively control the
misuse of approved materials. These conditions prevent dispersant application to ecol·
ogically sensitive areas identified by the Fisheries Authorities and the Nature Conservancy
Council.
The use of dispersants is not recommended in freshwater rivers or in lakes, unless
the lakes are extremely large. Little is known about the effects on freshwater organisms
and more research is required. In general, provided the materials are correctly used accord-
ing to the recommendations of the manufacturers and by trained personnel, dispersants
have proved to be a safe and effective method of treating oil spillage at sea. Dispersants
can, if used carefully, be used for cleaning oiled rocky beaches and sandy shores [31].
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Biological Consequences of Emulsifier Cleaning
Crapp [26] concluded after three years of work that: "When emulsifiers (disper-
sants) are used sparingly and washed away with large quantities of water, even highly sus-
ceptible limpet populations are not severely depleted. Other species may be affected, but
the grazing population remains sufficiently numerous to prevent an invasion by brown
and green algae."
Crapp also concluded that, with second-generation dispersants, shore-cleaning should
be possible without causing extensive biological changes.
Conclusion
Modern dispersants can be used offshore without risk of severe biological effects
other than to small areas of plankton in the immediate vicinity of the area treated.
Although second-generation dispersants are much less toxic, they are not recom-
mended for unrestricted use in shore-cleaning. They can be used for rocky shores and
sandy beaches without causing major ecological disturbances. The critical factor is the way
cleaning is carried out. Several biological factors need to be taken into account: the nature
of the oil, the nature of the shore, and the time of the year.
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A.f. Fairclough and D. W. Fischer
10.1 NORTH SEA OIL HAZARDS: THE ENVIRONMENT/DEVELOPMENT INTER-
FACE AND IMPLICAnONS FOR MANAGEMENT·
It is the job of management - of the decision maker - to decide. He may decide
well or badly, boldly or cautiously, decisively or tentatively; but sooner or later, decide
he must. And usually it is sooner rather than later; and on the basis of information that is
far less comprehensive and well integrated than he would wish, and which may well be
unreliable.
1 shall present - as a decision-maker who has been involved to some extent - some
considerations that seem relevant in relation to the process of decision-making in regard
to North Sea oil. The quality and quantity of information available on at least the major
parameters is important if good support is to be given in a complex developing situation
like that pertaining to North Sea oil. Such a situation needs a steady flow of decisions -
and it is the decision-maker's function to take them at the right time and in the light of
the best information available.
To say this is not, of course, to argue that the decision maker can afford, as is said
in the UK, "to fly by the seat ofhis pants." Of course he cannot; he needs tools, guidance,
information in a wide range of fields, and their systematic analysis and integration into a
set of aids. But however adequately or inadequately this may be done, when the moment
is ripe, he must make up his mind, because he knows that a well-researched decision taken
too late may be far worse than one taken at the right time but based on less adequate
information.
In relation to most situations, there is no uniquely right set of decisions. In almost
all subsystems of the total complex North Sea oil situation, decisions have had to be taken
on the basis of less than adequate information. In many of them there is room for per-
fectly legitimate subjective differences of judgment on the basis of similar facts. And
social and political factors also enter in, so that different factors have to be given different
weights in different situations, even though the information base is the same.




In relation to North Sea oil development, for very many of the elements on both
sides of the environment/development interface, the situation was novel in many respects;
hence, certainties were few. On the development side, in relation, for example, to design,
construction, operating conditions, corrosion, durability, and so forth, there was little
previous experience to go on. On the environment side, rather more was known from
other previous large projects in relation to the social, housing, and land-use impacts of
large-scale construction and facilities in sparsely populated areas; but the hazards likely to
arise from pollution of the open sea, coastal waters, ports and estuaries, important conser-
vation areas, amenity beaches, and so forth, as a result of accident, blowout, or regular
discharges, were largely unknown. On both sides of the interface, the suddenness with
which events developed increased the difficulties.
As stated in an earlier paper on risk assessment [1] , central government is continually
faced with the need to assess risks in a variety of fields, using a variety of methods to weigh
the very uneven results one against the other, and to form ajudgment as a basis for decision-
making which, recognizing that zero risk is unattainable, endeavors to find the optimum
balance. That balance will essentially be one involving an analysis of the costs, risks, and
benefits of both adopting a particular course of action and of not adopting it.
In the earlier paper it was noted that risks can be viewed from several points of view
and this is worth repeating here and bearing in mind in relation to the North Sea oil situa-
tion. Obviously, one can break down the analysis of risk in a very detailed way if desired,
and there are numerous different approaches to risk assessment (as is clear from a recent
SCOPE report [2] and a booklet recently published by the Council for Science and Society
[3] , to mention only two items from the rapidly growing literature in this field). But I
think that at the very least it is important to pay attention to: the probability of an event
occurring; the nature of the risk (especially whether the consequences are reversible or
irreversible); what is at risk; the source of the risk; and related psychological attitudes.
Turning more specifically to North Sea oil, the assessment of the relevant risks has
been an integral part of the UK government's approach to all aspects of the matter, both
environmental and developmental. On the developmental side this is scarcely surprising,
since throughout all phases of North Sea oil development, human lives are directly depen-
dent upon the adequacy of design and engineering of which the assessment of the risks of
failure is an essential part. On the environmental side too, risk assessment, although still
a very underdeveloped science, has been present from the beginning. On March 18, 1967
the Torrey Canyon ran aground near Lands End and during the next ten days or so released
about 100,000 tons of oil into the sea. The White Paper [4] published in April 1967 on
the disaster made plain that weighing the risks of various alternative courses of action
had played a large part in deciding what action to take; and in the fmal paragraph of the
report, the government of the day announced that action through IMCO (the International
Maritime Consultative Organization) was necessary to safeguard "coastlines and marine
life against the increasing risks of large-scale accidents involving pollution."
In the followup action, risk and its assessment was again to the fore. The Committee
of Scientists [5] that reported on the Torrey Canyon disaster examined the risks of
various adverse effects resulting from oil pollution and the advantages and disadvantages
of the various alternative means of dealing with it that were then available. The report on
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coastal pollution by the Parliamentary Select Committee on Science and Technology [6] ,
which followed in July 1968 and reviewed the whole history of marine oil pollution,
including the Torrey Canyon incident, devoted the first two chapters of its report to the
risks of oil pollution and to ways and means of reducing the risks. The Committee also
delivered a ringing declaration of belief which is worth repeating. "All coastal pollution is
a disgrace, bad economics and harmful to the environment. It endangers man's own health
and spoils his enjoyment of the beaches he so wantonly befouls. To use the oceans as
though they were the waste pipe of the world, leading to some bottomless sump-pit, ever
capable of absorbing more oil or other noxious substances, is an unethical abuse of the
natural environment which man shares with the flora and fauna."
I believe that these sentiments have considerably influenced thinking and develop-
ments in the UK since, and it would not be out of place to say why. The Select Committee
obviously paid a good deal of attention to the views of Sir Solly (now Lord) Zuckerman,
who had been Chairman of the Committee of Scientists, and who gave evidence to the
Select Committee. The Committee of Scientists had concluded that: "The Torrey Canyon
incident revealed a painful ignorance about a number of matters which should now be
urgently inquired into if oil is to be more rapidly, safely and efficiently disposed of in
any future incident." The Select Committee clearly felt the same; and it went on to make
a number of far-reaching recommendations touching on the machinery of government for
dealing with marine oil pollution, future emergency situations, and international coordina-
tion and cooperation. Although the government of the day, in their observations [7] on
the Select Committee's report, did not accept their organizational views, it seems fairly
clear that they played an important part in the view that was developing rapidly at that
time that clearer and more effective arrangements were needed for the protection of the
environment at large. Be that as it may, the fact is that in 1969 responsibility for "coor-
dinating government action on the control of environmental pollution" was given to a
single Secretary of State; and, by the following year, the Department of the Environment
(DOE) had been established [8], with the Central Unit on Environmental Pollution
(CUEP) as an integral part of it and with the standing Royal Commission on Environmental
Pollution established "to advise on matters, both national and international, concerning the
pollution of the environment; on the adequacy of research in this field; and the future
possibilities of danger to the environment."
In the White Paper on the protection of the environment [9] , which preceded the
establishment of DOE by some six months, there had been reference to the Torrey Canyon
accident, to action under way through IMCO and to work in progress to reduce the risks
that accidents at sea may cause pollution. In addition, the White Paper referred to an
interlocking system of local authority plans and provisions for beach-cleaning should oil
come ashore, developed since the Torrey Canyon disaster, and it went on to anticipate
the sort of control that the government intended to exercise should "oil in commercially
exploitable quantity" be found around the coasts of the UK. The government would
"control and supervise the conditions under which it is produced and distributed" with,
as one important object, "to guard against the possibility of oil leaks ...". The govern-
ment would also continue "in consultation with the oil industry, to regulate the conditions
of oil exploration and production so as to prevent accidents ...".
The general approach thus defined has remained the approach of the UK ever since,
withnumerous parts ofthegovernment machine involved in the total process. In organizational
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terms, therefore, the scene was set for the discovery of North Sea oil and for environmental
input into the controls exercised over its development. The scene was set, too, for the
close watch that has been kept by the Royal Commission on marine pollution and the
environmental impacts of North Sea oil development (several of its reports [10, 11] dis-
cussed the problems arising) and for the involvement ofthe Central Unit on Environmental
Pollution, with its responsibilities - matching in breadth those of the Secretary ofState -
"to coordinate the government's action to combat pollution."
The United Kingdom Approach to Decision-Making
First, may I stress that very considerable importance is attached in the UK to the
doctrine of collective responsibility. This means that each minister speaks for the govern-
ment as a whole in putting forward the policies of his own department. Implicit in this is
the aim ofconsistency across the whole range ofgovernment policies, rather than confron-
tation in support of particular departmental interests. This in turn means that, both at
ministerial and at official level, a very high degree ofinterdepartmental consultation, coor-
dination, and cooperation is essential. Of course the primary responsibilities of each depart-
ment or ministry are different. But, flowing ultimately from the doctrine of collective
responsibility, it is an essential feature that the Petroleum Production Division (PPD) must
also be concerned about environmental protection, and CUEP must also be concerned
about development, given that these interests both have their part to play in national
policy overall.
As far as concerns the onshore impact of North Sea oil development, it is necessary
to look at land-use planning arrangements in the UK, which have operated, on the whole
successfully, for over 30 years. A very important part of the whole system is the wide
range of measures concerned with various aspects of positive planning that are involved
and .- this should be stressed - it is not only concerned with the control of development.
The positive planning arrangements, all fully debated in and established by Acts of Parlia-
ment, cover such matters as national parks and nature reserves, industrial location, regional
policy, heritage coasts, the control of office development, green belts around urban areas,
as well as the positive requirement laid upon local authorities in the UK to publish and
have publicly examined their policies and plans for the use of land in their areas.
Mention should also be made of the statutory establishment of the Nature Conser-
vancy Council in 1973 [12] and the Countryside Commission in 1967 and 1968 [13, 14] ,
which formally institutionalized concern for these aspects of the environment. These bodies
are funded, on a growing scale, by central government; they act entirely independently of
central government under their own controlling bodies, they play an active part in the
land-use planning process, and they give advice to - and on occasions argue with - central
government on environmental issues that fall within their terms of reference. They have
certainly played a part in the development of North Sea oil.
Indeed, it can well be argued that the whole system - positive planning and the
exercise of control over development, which has dealt perfectly satisfactorily over the
years with many major developments - would have been fully adequate to deal also with
North Sea oil, had it not been for the suddenness with which and the scale on which new
developments became necessary in areas whose local authorities were unused to, and
lacked the manpower for dealing with, massive proposals of this character. In any event,
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a great deal of what was necessary to deal satisfactorily with these new developments was
in reality handled tluough the planning system (assisted, at the peak, by 15 consultant
groups engaged by government, local authorities, and oil companies, and supplemented
by only a very few special measures, some of which are referred to later). It needs also to
be remembered that the essential feature of the planning system of the UK is that, in
arriving at decisions about the use of land, all relevant considerations must be taken into
account. This means, inter alia, that all environmental impacts are considered and weighed
in the balance with other factors. Thus any onshore hazards likely to result from North
Sea oil-related developments, whether in particularly sensitive areas or in more normal
areas, are considered at the time that planning decisions are taken. In the remainder of this
section the focus ofattention will be offshore hazards; this is not because onshore risks are
considered unimportant, but simply because the machinery for dealing with offshore
hazards was much less well developed when North Sea oil development began, whereas
the planning system, by and large, satisfactorily limited and controlled the onshore risks.
To summarize, in order to understand fully how the UK reached its present balance
between development and environmental protection in relation to North Sea oil, it is nec-
essary both to look further back into the history of the matter and to recognize that pre-
sent arrangements had their genesis in the mounting surge of environmental awareness
during the 1960s and were powerfully influenced by the To"ey Canyon disaster; and
also to view them not in isolation, but within the framework of the overall arrangements
established in the UK for protecting the environment. Those who wish to pursue these
aspects of the matter further should refer to a relevant article in the literature [IS].
So far as the environmental side of the interface is concerned, special importance is
attached to the establishment of the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution,
which was, from the outset, conceived as providing "the main source of independent
advice to the government." It is interesting to note that the commission has not to date
been unduly concerned about pollution hazards arising from North Sea oil. In its most
recent comments on the matter, the Fourth Report [11], the commission recorded that,
following discussions "with officials of the Department of Energy and with one of the
oil companies" and relevant visits, it had "been reassured by the safeguards that have
been made to deal with accidental spills that could occur." The Royal Commission went
on to say that it had "concluded that there is no need at present for us to pursue the
matter further, but we [the commissioners] are bound to keep an anxious eye on it,"
and that it welcomed the investigation "being undertaken by the Central Unit on Envi-
ronmental Pollution within DOE in conjunction with other departments concerned" ~
the investigation which later appeared as Pollution Paper No.8 [16] - and said that it
would keep in touch with progress (as indeed it has).
North Sea Oil - Current Areas of Concern
Some of the main areas of concern that have affected the perception of the envi-
ronment/development interface concerning North Sea oil in UK eyes will now be con-
sidered in greater detail. The development side of the interface will be discussed first.
The UK attaches great economic importance to oil production from its sector of the
North Sea. As the government put the matter in a White Paper [17] : "North Sea oil
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provides a unique opportunity for Britain to improve her economic performance, raise
her living standards, move forward to full employment, and develop as a socially just
society. It will also put her in a stronger position to discharge her international responsibil-
ities, not least in relation to developing countries." The importance of North Sea oil to
the UK is thus seen as very fundamental, right across the economic and social spectrum.
The White Paper records the weak balance of payments situation in the UK and the slow
productivity growth and long-standing lack of competitiveness of some of the major indus-
tries and goes on to say that: "As a result of this long period of decline, our living standards,
which were among the highest in Western Europe a quarter of a century ago, are now among
the lowest."
North Sea oil, whilst it is seen as presenting a great challenge, is thus also seen as
providing the UK with a great opportunity to correct these inadequacies of the past. No
view of the UK approach to North Sea oil that neglects these vitally important elements
in the overall picture will be adequate.
Related to these important economic and social considerations are questions about
the rate at which North Sea oil should be developed. It was decided to go for a rapid rate
of development until the point was reached, in 1980, where net self-sufficiency was
achieved. This needs to be seen in relation, not only to the social and economic considera-
tions already mentioned, but also to the overall energy policy, on which a Green Paper
[18] has recently been published. Energy policy is not yet firm or fixed, but seeks to
develop a variety of possibilities and to keep a range of options open for the future. Mean-
while, solutions to the problems arising in connection with nuclear power (the Royal
Commissions's Sixth Report [19] and the government's response [20] thereto discuss
these) and the longer-term potential of renewable sources of energy are being pursued
urgently. Whilst this work is going forward, North Sea oil and the very large coal resources
(together with a vigorous program of energy conservation, which was further extended
very recently) leave the UK in a relatively fortunate position in energy-supply terms.
Clearly, however, as time passes, oil, whether indigenous or imported, will become scarcer
and more expensive. At the same time, knowledge of the North Sea reserves is increasing.
It can only be in this context that the changing rate of exploitation of North Sea oil and
the timing and phasing of the inevitable changeover from its use as a fuel to its use as a
feedstock can be determined.
Design, engineering, structural, and safety considerations also inevitably remain areas
of prime concern on the development side of the interface. Here all that one can say is
that, since operation is often beyond the limits of experience, risks must inevitably be
high by comparison with more normal situations, although they seem to be declining as
learning proceeds. This much said, however, it is right to add that experience to date is
still too short to permit many secure conclusions to be drawn.
Of particular concern from the standpoint of the environment/development inter-
face is technology that is directly relevant to preventing oil pollution - accident and
blowout prevention, oil/water separation techniques and equipment, pickup and treat-
ment techniques, and equipment for oil that is spilled. The Ekofisk Bravo and the Amoco
Cadiz incidents show there is still scope for improvement in both blowout and accident
prevention, even obvious things like not assembling equipment upside down and sensible
routing arrangements would clearly help. The close bilateral links that the UK is devel-
oping with both Norway and France cover many aspects of North Sea oil development
and tanker movements and these will certainly help.
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On the environment side of the environment/development interface, the most obvious
matters of environmental concern were discussed in Pollution Paper No.8 - questions
about the risk and frequency of incidents involving discharges of oil into the sea in the
various sectors around the coasts of the UK, the scale and seriousness of the effects of oil
discharges, both massive and routine, on marine life and on amenity, and the balance of
the debate about the merits and demerits of various ways of dealing with oil that is spilled,
ranging from doing nothing through to massive onslaughts with dispersants.
The purpose in mentioning these various areas of concern is to underline the impor-
tance and complexity of the issues arising and to reiterate that in relation to most of
them there is a profound lack of reliable experience and data. The problems of North Sea
oil development are too new and too unusual to make it easy to judge on the basis of the
past. Moreover, so far as possible major hazards are concerned, statistics of occurrence are
rarely useful, since major incidents are by definition rare and almost certainly arise, in
each case, because of a peculiar and unusual concatenation of circumstances likely to be
unique to that case.
Even in relation to the subsidiary elements in the overall system, the difficulty of
learning from experience is present to a greater or lesser extent in many of them. Pollu-
tion Paper No.8, for example, looked at the risks of oil spills around the UK: whilst it
arrived at fairly specific conclusions (Le., that in 1981 the cleanup organization is likely
to be called out three or four times to deal with tanker spills, of which one or two are
likely to be greater than 135 tons whilst there could in addition be four or five platform
or pipeline spills greater than 135 tons) it revealed on closer examination that to arrive
at these conclusions, some fairly sweeping assumptions had to be made, along with some
fairly arbitrary decisions designed to relate experience elsewhere to the North Sea situa-
tin. Although this appears to be adverse criticism, it must be recognized that actual statis-
tical information on North Sea experience was not available, and the forecasts made in
Pollution Paper No.8 can only be fairly judged on actual experience.
So the situation can only be summed up as follows: there are no easy answers, and
there are very few certainties. What is involved is the exercise of judgment in such a way
as to integrate available information into the decision-making process at each stage. The
main requirement is to ensure to the greatest possible extent the comprehensiveness and
relevance of the information available, on the basis of which balances will be struck and
judgments made. In such a complex and uncertain situation as that surrounding North
Sea oil development, the judgments that are made can perfectly validly differ. Indeed,
given the very wide range of factors involved in decisions at the environment/development
interface, it is virtually certain that they will.
There are a couple of elements in the total picture that make it perfectly under-
standable why UK and Norwegian conclusions should be different. Consider first the
economic implications. The crucial economic and social importance of North Sea oil to
the UK is the perceived opportunity to arrest long-standing decline and once more
become as prosperous as the rest of Western Europe. Is it surprising that the UK should
seek to press ahead rapidly with development? By contrast, consider Norway: a small
population with a relatively high standard of living already and with a very sensitive and
precautionary approach to resource conservation and to any action that could result in
harm to living systems. In economic terms Norway has less need to press ahead fast with
North Sea oil development; indeed it seems to me- if 1may, as a foreigner, presume to
comment - that to go relatively slowly is entirely consistent with their attitude to very
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many other aspects ofnational life . The result is a perfectly legitimate and understandable
difference of approach between the two countries, which must be recognized.
Take another, perhaps less dramatic, example. Fishing interests play an important
part in Norwegian life and are politically powerful. The Norwegian authorities are there-
fore perfectly naturally very sensitive to oil pollution and action to control it; they take
the view that the large-scale use of dispersants may risk harming fIsh resources, especially
spawning grounds. By contrast, in the UK there is an enormously strong and widespread
interest in and concern about the well-being of birds, and hence a need to remove oil
from the sea surface when birds are threatened. That is not to argue that Norwegians are
not interested in birds or that the UK has no concern for fIsh; merely that the priorities
differ in the two countries and that the effect of this fact is to make action to protect fIsh
more urgent in Norway and to protect birds more urgent in Britain. Another perfectly
legitimate difference of approach.
Finally a related point: although in general both the UK and Norway regard inac-
tion, pickup equipment, and dispersants as all having a part to play in dealing with spilled
oil, there is no doubt that Norway is very inclined to rely on pickup equipment and to be
very hesitant about using dispersants, whilst the UK is sceptical about the former and
much more ready to use the latter to protect the coast, marine life, or concentrations of
seabirds. Personally, I think that the Norwegian view is mistaken. The UK certainly sees
the advantage of effective pickup equipment and substantial efforts are being devoted to
developing better recovery systems. Meanwhile, when leaving spilled oil to disperse and
degrade naturally is not acceptable, UK policy [21] is to rely on spraying with dispersants
as "the only method of dealing with spills so far proven to be really effective at all times
in the seas surrounding the UK." Modern dispersants are much less toxic than those used
at the time of the To"ey Canyon disaster - the criterion for passing UK tests is that the
toxicity of the oil/seawater/dispersant mixture must not exceed that of the oil/seawater
mixture on its own. Do not forget that, even at the time of the To"ey Canyon, the Par-
liamentary Select Conunittee that looked into the whole matter concluded that: "On the
open sea there are not really strong biological grounds for eliminating the use of toxic
detergents." To rely at the present time entirely on mechanical pickup seems to me to fly
in the face of the facts. Nevertheless, having said this, I must add that although I disagree
with Norwegian policy, I think that I fully understand the considerations underlying the
Norwegian attitude. Here again there is a perfectly comprehensible difference of view,
although in this case I think it is one that might gradually be reduced on the basis of
experience, developing technology, and scientifIc facts.
Future Concerns
In a situation as complex as the development of North Sea oil, one is never faced
with certainties. A decision-maker will always have to make his mind up - because some
decision is necessary -- on the basis of inadequate information and in the face of risks
that he cannot altogether quantify; but this is not the same thing as saying that the
attempt to quantify should not be made or that the analysis of risks should not be
attempted. Quite the reverse. It is clear too that discussions on the systems and sub-
systems involved in the decision-making process also has a useful part to play, although
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one must always be wary lest analyses based on inadequate information lead to misleading
conclusions. Indeed, to tum this last point around, better decisions will only be possible
when they are founded on a more comprehensive view of the totality of the system and
better integration of the numerous interacting subsystems, that is, when the information
and data base have improved. With this in mind, how might matters be improved in the
future?
In considering the environment/development interface in relation to North Sea oil,
one is, from the environmental point of view, dealing with technology-associated disasters
(or impacts). To improve judgment in relation to such impacts, the clear need is to improve
the knowledge of the technologicallimits and risks. In Chapter 7 of Pollution Paper No.8,
the three possible approaches to the problem of assessing the risks of oil spills that were
considered are set out. In fact, it was decided to base the calculations on a Massachusetts
Institute of Technology study; but the possibility of undertaking component reliability
analysis on the lines developed by the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority in rela-
tion to nuclear installations was considered. It might be, as technology becomes more
established (and as experience grows) in relation to North Sea oil, that a critical engineering
approach of this kind rather than a merely statistical approach to risks might well have
something to be said for it.
A second area in which improved knowledge is clearly needed is the environmental
consequences of oil spills in different quantities and circumstances. Better knowledge of
how such consequences can be limited, contained, or dealt with is essential and this plainly
involves both research (for example on the effects of oil and dispersants on marine eco-
systems) and also technological development (for example on the means of restricting
massive or chronic discharges and on developing effective booms and pickup equipment).
The Committee of Scientists that reported on the To"ey Canyon disaster spelled out
many of the needs in this area: they said, for example, that research was needed on the
effects of natural factors on the movement, dispersal, and destruction of oil at sea; oil
sinking, scavenging, and gelling agents; more-effective but less-toxic detergents; detergent
spraying and other cleansing equipment; mechanical methods of removing oil both from
the sea surface and from beaches; cheap and effective booms to protect harbors and inlets;
and the effects of pollution on marine life, seabirds, and coastal vegetation, and on ways
of minimizing them.
The Parliamentary Select Committee that reported the following year supported
these recommendations, expressed disappointment that more progress had not already
been made, and added some further recommendations for research that had been proposed
in the USA, which should also be considered. Since that time a good deal of progress has
already been made on many of the matters listed above, and substantial programs of
research are currently under way, notably on dispersants and pickup systems. Neverthe-
less, the understanding of the effects of oil on marine ecosystems in particular is still far
from adequate, and the DOE is at present making an effort to mount a fuller research
program in this area.
A further point for the future that emerges from an analysis of North Sea oil devel-
opment may be expressed as "trying in new developments and new bonanzas to get things
more nearly right from the start." Obviously, unless talking about further major offshore
oil developments, one is not thinking about developments or bonanzas that provide exact
parallels: nor where experience would be directly relevant. It is worthwhile, however, to
examine what precisely did actually happen in relation to North Sea oil. The aim must be
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to see what, if any, lessons there may be of wider application, implicit in the way things
were handled: the sequence ofevents, the organization of management, the comprehensive-
ness of consultation, the timeliness of guidelines, and so forth.
I will not attempt to suggest all the lessons of this character that may be learned. So
far as the UK is concerned, there are three situations that would repay study. The first,
which is probably best studied in the UK itself, is the sequence of events that I described
in some detail earlier surrounding the To"ey Canyon disaster, when this first major inci-
dent involving massive oil pollution of the sea came together with developing concerns in
other fields of environmental protection and led rapidly to important organizational and
structural changes within government.
The second UK example that may repay study is the question of the effect and value
of the coastal planning guidelines published by the Scottish Development Department [22]
in 1974. In my judgment, these guidelines were one of the more important of the small
number of special steps taken in relation to North Sea oil to augment the normal planning
processes, and played a very considerable part in limiting adverse onshore impacts. The
guidelines included a map showing preferred development zones and preferred conserva-
tion zones around the coast of Scotland. The associated document made plain that the for-
mer were areas within which sites for oil- and gas-related development seemed likely to be
appropriate and that, whilst not all types of operation would necessarily be acceptable or
feasible, developers should look in these areas for suitable sites; and the planning author-
ities were advised to prepare development plans in anticipation ofdevelopers' requirements
in these zones. In relation to preferred conservation zones, it was indicated that there
would be a general presumption that the areas were of such national scenic, environmental,
and ecological importance that major new oil- and gas-related developments within them
would be inappropriate; and that any intrusion into such zones would have to be justified
by compelling arguments, including the demonstration that no suitable sites existed out-
side such zones. This was a relatively simple but extremely effective step, which was backed
up by a requirement that all major oil- and gas-related developments should be notified to
the Secretary of State. The advantage seen in it was that (given that there was a need to
site new developments in a way that made the best use ofexisting labor and infrastructure
and minimized the effect of subsequent decline) there would be considerable benefit in
grouping developments, preferably in or near existing population centers, so as to avoid a
scatter of industrial development affecting many small communities and numerous rural
areas, and so as to allow the full use of existing labor pools, housing, and public services,
the economic provision of additional services, and the possibility ofdiversification to cush-
ion subsequent decline. As will be seen from this brief statement of aim, this short and
simple document achieved a very considerable degree ofcomprehensiveness; and it brought
together a large number of the subsystems involved in the whole process associated with
North Sea oil development.
The third area which I suggest would repay further study and analysis is the whole
area of risks arising from technological failure. I have already referred to the possibility of
using a critical engineering approach in relation to design. But I am now talking about
something rather more broad than that - an analysis of the various sources of risk on the
lines undertaken in a paper published by the Scottish Office at the request of the Oil Devel-
opment Council for Scotland [23] while the study that led to Pollution Paper No.8 was
under way. In a chapter entitled "The Risks of Pollution," seven main types of accident
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likely to lead to discharges of oil into the sea were analyzed and discussed. Pollution Paper
No.8 took this process further. My own view is that it could be taken further yet and
that, by breaking down the overall picture into subsidiary elements and analyzing the
risks of failure in each, a better understanding, both of the subsidiary elements themselves
and of the total overall risk picture might well be obtained.
The fmal suggestion about concerns for the future relates precisely to the IlASA's
own remit, the systems view. This is not because I think that decision-makers always (or
pehaps ever) perform in accordance with the diagrams and charts that analysts produce,
but because it seems that it is valuable to endeavor to discover the response sequence, the
interdependencies and interactions, the prior and subsequent elements, and so forth, so as
better to understand how things might work (even if not how they actually do!). As I
see it, the systems approach is at its best when it allows cooperation in a consistent man-
ner using some explicit agreed model; and the aim obviously has to be to make the model
as close as possible to reality. Plainly this is very difficult, unless at least the major variables
can be quantified; and equally plainly the ideal is never achievable. Personally I doubt
whether there is an ideal or whether there is a unique model. But unless one endeavors to
spell out how it might be, an ad hoc condition exists and the possibility of benefitting
from past experience might be lost.
My own view is that the systems approach can indeed help; but it is also most
emphatically my view that it will never answer the decision-maker's problem. Judgment
will always be essential. The aim should be to ensure that it is a better informed judgment.
This will only come about if a conscious effort is made to secure better information and
to learn from experience; and also to correlate information and experiences in relation to
the various elements in the overall system. In this event - and that is precisely what IIASA
and this workshop have been attempting - then really useful models might be developed,
instead of always having to start from lots of new beginnings.
A final point on information: it is all very well talking about analyzing and systems
and models, but this is all so much whistling in the wind unless it is all very firmly founded
in reality. This means that facts are needed. This in turn means that research is needed to
improve the understanding of basic processes, and also that monitoring is essential. Not
just monitoring for its own sake -- that is foolish and pointless - but monitoring that is
properly related to policy issues and needs, to the requirements of management and
decision makers, whether they be developers, environmentalists, regulators, or entrepre-
neurs. If one can assemble, manipulate, retrieve, and analyze relevant data of this kind,
then the systems approach will be founded on firm ground and valuable lessons can be
learned for the future, not only in relation to offshore oil development but perhaps about
many other important and complex areas of activity where there is a significant environ-
ment/development interface.
Conclusion
Management's job is to manage; the decision-maker's job is to decide. At the
environment/development interface the essence of the task is to judge the appropriate
balance between costs and risks and benefits, of both action and inaction. This seems to
me a statement that is perfectly generally true; and just as powerfully so for North Sea
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oil as for any other example. But the system within which judgments are necessary in rela-
tion to North Sea oil is a peculiarly complex one; uncertainties abound and will remain.
Whilst the systems approach and models of the interacting sets of subsystems involved
may help and may assist management in making better judgments, they will not replace
judgment.
The essential role of management, whether the developer or the environmental
protector, remains: to decide. At the right time and on the basis of such information as is
available on all the multiplicity of relevant factors that go into the decision-making pro-
cess - but nonetheless to decide.
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Round-table discussions" a summary
10.2 ROUND-TABLE DISCUSSIONS - A SUMMARY·
Pre-Blowout Incidents and Regulation
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Blowouts do not begin immediately with no prior warning, and, even when they do
occur, there is often time to recognize their imminence and take measures to prevent the
blowout or ensure the safety of personnel before abandoning the rig. All drilling operations
may be viewed as a series ofminor incidents and problems that the crews generally succeed
in overcoming: blowouts result from the rare sequences of events that are not successfully
controlled. In the immediate pre-blowout period, one event leads very rapidly to the next,
so that a number of elements are needed to keep the incidence of blowouts low -- respon-
sible operating practice, comprehensive crew training, frequent safety and emergency
drills, and good luck. In such a complex situation, no regulator can hope to design a sys-
tem that will be 100% effective in preventing blowouts, although this must always be the
target.
Detailed regulatory practices differ from country to country, but some important
elements can be discerned. Canada requires operators to present contingency manuals out-
lining their response to every incident that could lead to a blowout. In the US, all incidents
and accidents that occur during drilling must be reported; the information is then collated
and circulated to all operators. Another US regulation requires operators to maintain con-
tinuous radio or telephone contact with the central authorities throughout all emergencies,
so that any potential blowout can be assessed and, hopefully, prevented before it begins.
Furthermore, US regulatory contacts are continued over fairly long periods; the operator
and regulator often get to know one another on a first-name basis and are familiar with
each other's strengths and weaknesses, thus tending to ensure complementary responses
during emergencies. Cases have been reported, in Canada and the US, ofdrilling supervisors
requesting regulators to put pressure on operators to change onsite drilling practices
which the supervisors regarded as unsafe.
Over-regulation could be counterproductive but even in the US, after 25 years of
progressively tighter regulation, it is felt that this stage has not yet been reached. Any
efforts to introduce or extend regulation should of course avoid adding unduly to the
amount of paperwork and reporting needed because these can create "noise" in the feed-
back signals necessary for safe drilling by taking supervisors away from real supervision
and thinking about drilling problems. An extreme reaction to regulation is sometimes
exhibited by drilling crews from countries with very few or no regulatory procedures;
such crews have been known to complain of over-regulation when subjected to even the
most streamlined procedures.
One difficult problem for regulators is to decide whether the operators and drilling
supervisors are truthfully reporting the real drilling conditions experienced on the plat-
forms. Similarly, even those operators with the best intentions, the best instruction
manuals, and the most comprehensive safety policies are sometimes unaware of what is
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really happening on their own platforms, because the operators are onshore and their dele-
gated managers on the platforms send back incomplete or inaccurate information. Diffi-
culties have been experienced in feeding back the benefits of new information or revised
operating recommendations into the normal safety procedures of operators and drilling
crews. One somewhat alarming conclusion is that it seems to be necessary for a catastro-
phic situation to actually occur before operators and regulators feel able to communicate
frankly and realistically about operational problems.
Post-Blowout Lessons and Research
Experience from blowouts has shown that there is often a complete lack of coor-
dination between the research carried out by regulators, operators, and other experts,
even though there is informal liaison between the groups; the introduction of a certain
amount of control, if only to prevent fruitless duplication of work, would seem worthy
of future efforts. Of course, it is not really possible (or necessarily desirable) to impose a
completely coordinated research plan on individual scientists who differ so widely in
academic qualifications, motives, and personal interests. However, some steps have been
taken. In the US, for example, a scientific coordinator is now appointed after each
major oil spill to ensure that scientists from different organizations do not duplicate their
efforts and generate a plethora of different interpretations of the same observed data.
(The magnitude of the problem was illustrated when the Argo Merchant spilled its oil
and nearly 400 scientists converged on the area with very similar ideas of what should
be studied.) Organizational issues aside, the basic scientific unknown (despite extensive
research and documentation in the US) is still the physical fate of the oil in the sea.
As in other areas, scientific advice, and more particularly the publication of this
advice, can be a two-edged sword. Scientists themselves generally attach a series of qual-
ifications to any answer given, but these qualifications are often forgotten by the non-
scientific audience and educated guesses become transformed into "facts." Similarly,
decisions tend to be seen by the public as being based on all possible information whereas
they are often in reality only the best possible decisions in the light of very limited infor-
mation. These types of pressure and the possibilities for misunderstanding can make scien-
tists very reluctant to give opinions on practical short-term problems. Furthermore, scien-
tists are only rarely exposed to the decision-maker's need to examine the whole problem
because the nature of their work frequently leads to fairly narrow specialization. It is of
course true that scientists in institutes attached to government ministries are more accus-
tomed to giving "expert advice" and taking responsibility for it than are their colleagues
in the more purely academic institutes; the latter have less direct responsibility to the
general public and are geared more to peer-group criticism.
In their turn, decision makers must accept the consequences of the way scientific
and technological research has been organized in the past. If they want more direct and
more immediately useful answers then they must be willing to serve on scientific steering
committees to make sure in advance that research findings will be transferrable to their
problems. Another problem aggravated by the separation of scientists and decision-makers
concerns the optimum allocation of research funds. A great deal of money is at present
given to new short-term research projects that have not been coherently developed, rather
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than being channeled toward existing long-term projects that have a more solid basis.
Improved communication between scientists and decision makers and anticipation of
future problems to allow a more structured dialogue between the two groups could go a
long way toward solving the problems outlined above.
The role of systems analysis is not to duplicate the work of any particular specialized
science but rather to fill in the gaps between the approaches of the regulator, the operator,
and the scientist, and to knit together these approaches into a coherent whole. Systems
analysis can help in resolving conflicts of opinion by asking, structuring, and integrating
questions relevant to the entire system rather than just parts of it. The emphasis through-
out is on developing (or identifying) a unified system for obtaining better-quality infor-
mation through better channels and methods, rather than on providing specific advice on
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